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IT.S.N. (Ret.) 



The Macmillan Company, Neta York, 1955 

Copyng^t 19SS by C. Turner Joy 

AD nghts reserved no part of this book may be repro- 
duced in any form without permission in wilting from the 
publisher, except by a reviewer who wishes to quote bnef 
passages in connection with a review written for inclusion 
in magazine or newspaper 

Printed in the United States of Americm 
Firtt Printing 

Parts of this book have appeared in U S News 6 World 
Report under the trie "Blunders Behind the Korean Truce " 



Throughout my tenure as Commander in Chief, United 
Nations Command, Admiral C Turner Joy was the Com- 
mander of Naval Forces in the Far East He served as Senior 
Delegate and Chief of the United Nations Command Dele- 
gation to the Korean Armistice Conference during my period 
of responsibility for the armistice effort I could not overstate 
the value of his calm advice, his skillful performance, and his 
loyal personal support during that trying tune His qualities 
of absolute integrity, deep sincerity, and intelligent devotion 
to the best interests of freedom shone brightly through all 
the dark shadows of our negotiations with the Communists 
at Kaesong and Panmunjom His power of penetrating analy- 
sis was superb No one could have more ably represented the 
United States in that conference 

Admiral Joy's analysis of Communist techniques is drawn 
from the experience of ten arduous months of confronting 
the Communists almost daily The negotiations he conducted 
covered the entire spectrum of Communist interests and ob- 
jectives political and military, in Korea and world-wide I 


know of no citizen of the free world who could speak of 
Communist negotiating tactics from a broader base of prac- 
tical knowledge 

All Americans would be well advised to consider Admiral 
Joy's thoughtful and well documented examination of the 
Communist negotiating procedure It should be obvious that 
we Americans must learn to meet Communists successfully 
in the arena of negotiations Otherwisebut there must be no 
otherwise The world is so ordered today that there is no 
acceptable alternative to successful negotiations with Commu- 
nists It is the duty, and it is in the self-interest, of every 
American to make himself aware of the nature of these relent- 
less, ruthless men Admiral Joy's terse analysis will provide a 
basic education toward that essential end. 


I am grateful to Senator William E Jenner and to the secre- 
tary of his committee, Dr Edna Fluegel, for encouraging me 
to write this book 

The analytical pattern of this book does not lend itself to 
proper recognition of the work done by the men of the United 
Nations Command Delegation to the Korean Armistice Con- 
ference I wish it did Never before was such a superb team 
assembled as that representing the United Nations at Kaesong 
and Panmunjom For the men who served with me from our 
great commander, General Matthew B Ridgway, to the most 
junior of the delegation personnel quality is the word quality 
of mind and of heart They were men of the United States 
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps and of the armed 
forces of the Republic of Korea They were magnificent 

As Senior Delegate and Chief of the United Nations Com- 
mand Delegation, I was responsible to General Ridgway, who 
at that fame served as Commander in Chief, United Nations 
Command In turn, General Ridgway reported to the United 
States Joint Chiefs of Staff The United States Government 
was the executive agent of the United Nations for the Korean 
War, and for the armistice that ended it 



General Ridgway and his United Nations Command staff 
gave our delegation full, steady support at every turn in the 
long road to an armistice I could not have asked for more 
wholehearted backing 

The delegates and principal staff officers of the United 
Nations Command delegation under my command consti- 
tuted the most effective joint group of officers I have ever 
known They were the cream of the Far East Command The 
nation has not recognized adequately the unique service ren- 
dered by that matchless assembly of dedicated men I salute 
them in this poor way, hoping that if ever again the United 
States of America is in need of her finest sons, men like these 
will stand forth 





General Matthew B Ridgway 


*Vice Admiral C Turner Joy 


I I 



*Major General L C Craigie, Brigadier General W P Nuckols, 


*Major General H I Modes, Colonel D H Galloway, USA 

USA Colonel G C Mudgett, USA 



*Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke, 

*Major General S Y Paik, 

Major General H M Turner, 

Major General W K Harrison, 


Rear Admiral R E Libby, USN 
Major General Heung Koon Lee, 


Major GeneralJ H Yu,ROKA 
Major General C B Ferenbaugh, 


* Original slate of delegates 


Captain H M Bnggs, USN 
Colonel D O Darrow, USAF 
Colonel George W Hickman, Jr , 


Colonel A J Kinney, USAF 
Colonel J C Murray, U S M C 
Colonel J A Norell,USA 
Colonel Arthur Hurr, USAF 
Colonel E J Latoszewsfo, 


Colonel D S Somenalle, USA 
Colonel Robert Israel, USAF 
Captain O W Spahr, USN 
Lieutenant Colonel S Y Lee, 

Commander George R Muse, 

Commander R E Stanley, 


Commander B W. Spore, USN 
Lieutenant Colonel Norman B 

Edwards, USA 
Lieutenant Colonel H S Levie, 

Lieutenant Colonel Albert 

Butler, USA 
Lieutenant Colonel L G Hill, 

Lieutenant Colonel J W 

Thames, USA 
Lieutenant Colonel R L Kolb, 

Lieutenant Colonel C L Vardas, 





Lieutenant Colonel W A Shaw, 

Lieutenant Commander George 

G Ball, USN 
Lieutenant Commander Oswald 

Jacoby, USN 
Lieutenant Commander W J 

Ellis, USN 
Lieutenant Commander S D 

Chancy, USN 
Major M E Sorenson, USA 
Major J A Galwicle, USA 
Lieutenant B D Sfcehl, USN 
Lieutenant H G Underwood, 

Lieutenant R F Underwood, 

Warrant Officer Kenneth Wu, 



The spreading stain of Communism now blotches a vast area 
of the earth A great Communist empire sweeps from the 
Elbe River in Germany to central Indochina, covering an area 
more than four times as extensive as the United States and 
containing a population five tunes that of Europe Commu- 
nists have come to control this, the most monstrous tyranny 
in history, by shrewdly combining force and negotiation 

The measure of expansion achieved by Communism 
through negotiations is impossible to disassociate from what 
they have achieved by force, for the Communists never com- 
pletely separate the two methods Yet their negotiating meth- 
ods have yielded them nch returns some of their profits derived 
principally from negotiation are clearly identifiable The nego- 
tiations at Yalta had the effect of delivering to Communism, 
among other things of value, China, North Korea, Sakhalin, 
and the Kunle Islands The negotiations at Geneva delivered 
to Communism almost half of Indochina On occasion, suc- 
cess in negotiations had to be confirmed by further Commu- 
nist military operations Such a case was China Elsewhere, 
partial success in military operations was made complete by 
victory in negotiations Such was Indochina Thus the niter- 


play of force and negotiations in the Communist method has 
produced major extensions of human slavery Perhaps it is 
fame that we Americans, at whom Communist designs of 
world domination ultimately point, inform ourselves of the 
techniques employed by these, our relentless enemies, m ne- 
gotiating their way to evil triumph 

Each negotiating situation presents differing aspects, as 
Yalta differed from Geneva, as Potsdam differed from Pan- 
munjom Yet the Communist dogma is a strong rule, strongly 
compelling Communists to adhere to it at all times It is pos- 
sible, therefore, to identify certain fundamental techniques 
applying to Communist negobatory efforts wherever and 
whenever they occur Of all opportunities to view the Com- 
munist technique MI negotiations, none is so comprehensive 
as Panmunjom There, for two long years, the Communists 
exposed their negotiating system, applying it to all the many 
facets of that extended international parley For this reason, 
and for the reason that the author of this account participated 
ni the Korean Armistice Conference as the Senior Western 
Delegate, attention hereafter will be focused on the methods 
used by Communists at Kaesong and at Panmunjom, Korea 
Americans are urged to consider well the following analysis of 
the techniques of their enemies, for the American future is 
largely dependent on how competently we meet these Com- 
munist tactics in many dangerous tomorrows 



General Matthew B Ridgway, USA (Ret) v 



I The Stage Setting i 

II The Communist Delegation 10 

III The Loaded Agenda 18 

IV Incidents 30 
V Roadblocks 39 

VI Premeditated Crimes 62 

VII The Veto 74 

VIII Red Hemngs 89 

IX Truth and Consequences loz 

X Inches into Miles 119 

XI The Welshers 130 

XII "Wearying Tactics 137 

XIII Prisoners of War 146 

XIV From This Thorn, These Wounds, These Warnings 163 



Communists neither blunder into conferences nor rush pell- 
mell to engage in negotiation First, they carefully set the 
stage Their concern for maintaining "face," as well as their 
regard for practical advantages arising from favorable nego- 
tiating conditions, causes the Communists to consider care- 
fully the physical circumstances in which a parley is to occur 
Witness how they applied this principle of stage setting in 
the Korean Armistice Conference 

During late June of 1951, the Soviet Ambassador to the 
United Nations remarked publicly that it might be well if the 
opposing sides in Korea arranged a truce, based on the 38th 
Parallel as a truce line The first notification to the United 
Nations Command that the Communists would like an armis- 
tice in Korea came from Washington to the United Nations 
Command headquarters in Tokyo General Matthew B 
Ridgway, Commander in Chief, was directed by the United 
States Joint Chiefs of Staff to broadcast by radio a message to 
the Communist military commanders in Korea, inquiring 
whether truce talks were desired On 2.0 June, 1951, General 


Ridgway caused a message to the Communists to be broadcast, 
suggesting that truce talks be held in the Danish hospital 
ship Jutlandia, after the ship had been brought to the harbor 
of Wonsan, North Korea Thus General Ridgway offered as a 
site for truce talks a hospital ship, internationally recognized 
as a nonbelligerent facility, a ship provided by a government 
(Denmark) which had not participated in the Korean fight- 
ing This neutral, noncombative ship was to be placed in 
waters controlled by Communist guns and mine fields This 
seemed as reasonable an arrangement as could be con- 

The arrogant Communist reply came by radio on the 
night of i July It did not even menbon the Jutlandia The 
language used in the response might be paraphrased as 

"If you desire a truce, come to Kaesong and we'll talk " 

Kaesong is a city almost precisely on the 38th Parallel of 
latitude We were to learn later the significance of that fact 
Moreover, Kaesong was controlled by the Red Chinese, so 
that by going to Kaesong the United Nations Command rep- 
resentatives in effect went to the Communists, rather than 
meeting them halfway Obviously, the Communists wished 
to make it appear that the United Nations Command was 
in need of a cessation of hostilities and therefore came hat in 
hand to a Communist citadel to ask a truce General Ridgway 
recognized these facts but considered that in the interests of 
saving time and of showing sincere intentions Kaesong should 
be accepted 

On the 8th of July, Colonel Andrew J Kinney, U S A F , 
and several other United States officers proceeded to Kaesong 


to arrange with Communist liaison officers for the meeting of 
delegations on July loth Without success, Kinney sought 
Communist agreement to a demilitarized neutral zone around 
Kaesong The Communists refused to give up their advantage 
of military control of the Kaesong area Throughout this in- 
itial meeting Kinney and his party, though completely with- 
out arms, were surrounded by troops of armed Communist 
soldiers brandishing hand machine guns threateningly Com- 
munist photographers and press representatives did not fail 
to make the most of this situation, in line with their thesis that 
the United Nations Command, not the Communists, needed 
and sought a truce 

At the opening meeting of liaison officers, the Communists 
strongly argued that the United Nations Command delegation 
should remain overnight at Kaesong during the course of the 
negotiations The Communists wished to hold the United 
Nations Command delegation in their military grip while 
parleying This Kinney flatly rejected, having already been 
subjected to the "captive" treatment in store for Americans 
at Kaesong 

Communist concern with even the smallest detail of stage 
setting, especially where "face" is involved, was illustrated at 
the liaison officers' meeting Within a Korean teahouse on 
the outskirts of Kaesong, a long table to be used by the dele- 
gations had been set up so that one delegation would face 
north, the other south Oriental custom has it that at a truce 
discussion the victor faces south, the defeated faces north 
Unaware of this consideration, Kinney accidentally arrogated 
to his party the north side of the conference table, the victor's 
side The Communists were flustered and dismayed by this 


development, so much so that the Communist liaison officer 
actually stuttered in replying to Kinney's opening remarks 
Two days later, when the main delegations met, the Commu- 
nists made certain that the north side of the table went to 
them by the simple act of barring the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation from access to it 

While seeking by every means to create an illusion that the 
Kaesong meetings represented a conference between the vic- 
torious Red Army and defeated Americans, the Communists 
knew well that simple equality was quite enough for their pur- 
poses As their renegade British reporter Alan Wmnington 
told Western newsmen "This is the first time Oriental Com- 
munists have ever sat down at a conference table on terms of 
equality with Americans, and they intend to make the most 
of it " After all, what nation but Red China in all the world 
today can boast of fighting the United States and her allies 
to a stalemate? Was not Communist prestige enhanced by 
compelling delegates from the powerful United Nations 
Command to meet Communist China's representatives under 
battlefield conditions of equality? Moreover, was it not plain 
that some undermining of the United States' position of non- 
recognition of the Red Chinese regime must result when 
senior Americans sought to negotiate with representatives of 
that regime whose existence the United States officially 
denied? Yes, I am sure the Communists knew that equality at 
Kaesong was sufficient 

The Communists proceeded industriously to embroider the 
situation in their favor At the first meeting of the delegates, 
I seated myself at the conference table and almost sank out 
of sight The Communists had provided a chair for me which 


was considerably shorter than a standard chair Across the 
table, the senior Communist delegate, General Nam D, pro- 
truded a good foot above my cagily diminished stature This 
had been accomplished by providing stumpy Nam B with a 
chair about four inches higher than usual Chain-smoking 
Nam II puffed his cigarette in obvious satisfaction as he glow- 
ered down on me, an apparently torpedoed admiral This con- 
dition of affairs was promptly rectified when I exchanged my 
foreshortened chair for a normal one, but not before Commu- 
nist photographers had exposed reels of film Such devices by 
the Communists may seem childish when each is considered in 
isolation It should be borne in mind, however, that a great 
multitude of these maneuvers can add up to a propaganda 
total of effective magnitude 

Not the least of the stage setting employed by the Commu- 
nists was their legion of armed guards These heavily armed 
sentinels were everywhere, governing each step taken by the 
United Nations Command delegation During a recess of the 
first meeting of delegates I was directly threatened by a Com- 
munist guard who pointed a burp gun at me and growled 
menacingly My messenger, dispatched to convey an interim 
report to General Ridgway, was halted and turned back by 
Communist armed force One sentinel posted conspicuously 
beside the access doorway to the conference room wore a 
gaudy medal which he proudly related to Colonel Krnney was 
for 'Tolling forty Americans " Such impositions resulted in my 
protesting to Nam II in unmistakable terms, demanding 
prompt elimination of such crudities. Nam II was evasive, 
however No doubt he calculated that the Communist propa- 
ganda machine was acquiring a wealth of material suitable for 


picturing the United Nations Command as a beaten suppliant 
for an armistice 

The ever present Communist newsmen and photographers 
led me to announce to Nam II that Western newsmen would 
attend the subsequent meetings of the delegations Nam II 
immediately agreed Having set the stage and directed the 
shooting of distorted scenes by his own photographers, Nam 
II may have felt that he could afford to open the further pro- 
ceedings to the frank cameras of Western newsmen One hour 
later, however, Nam II recanted his agreement and announced 
that the question of admitting Western newsmen to Kaesong 
would have to be ruled on by his superiors Note the ensuing 

*ADMIRAL JOY I am still not satisfied with your answer con- 
cerning the newsmen I wish to re-emphasize that the pres- 
ence of newsmen at this conference is considered of major 
importance to us I repeat we require twenty newsmen to 
proceed daily with our delegation from the Inrjin River to 
the site of the conference Do you have any further com- 
ments to make concerning the newsmen? 

GENERAL NAM XL I have nothing more to say than I gave the 
answer already That means that I did not give you the 
answer I don't mean to say I refused the newsmen to come 
to the conference site area, but for the time being the mat- 
ter must be held in abeyance, and the question of the news- 
men is not the principal problem for our discussion, so 
while we carry on our discussion about mam problems we 

*The dialogue illustrations appearing in this book are verbatim from the 
Armistice Conference 


will have chance to talk over the matter So I find it better 
to go over to discussing the mam problems from now on 

ADMIRAL JOY Before we recess, I wash to read to you a dis- 
patch I have received from the Commander in Chief of the 
United Nations Command 

"I desire that you inform the Communist delegates as 
follows The presence of a selected number of newsmen at 
a conference of such major importance to the entire world 
is considered an inherent right by members of the United 
Nations Therefore, a selected group of professional news- 
men, photographers, and newsreel cameramen numbering 
approximately twenty will accompany and be an integral 
part of the United Nations Command delegabon to any or 
all future sessions beginning 12 July " 

GENERAL NAM TL (interrupting) You mean the newspapermen 
are an integral part of the delegation? 

ADMIRAL JOY They are part of the delegation party the com- 
mand party that comes up every day, though not into this 

[Continuing with General Ridgway's message ] "This 
party of newsmen will be controlled by our officer personnel 
The United Nations Command neither asks nor desires 
that newsmen be admitted to the conference room Signed 
Ridgway " 

If by tomorrow morning you still feel that newsmen are 
unacceptable at the site of the conference we request that 
you inform us by 0730 tomorrow by what date it will be 
possible to resume the conference with newsmen present at 
the conference site 

GENERAL NAM iL I am not quite clear Do you mean that 



without the party of newspapermen, you don't want to pro- 
ceed with the meeting at all? 

ADMIRAL JOY We wish to proceed with the meeting, but we 
will recess until you inform us that the newsmen are ac- 

When our delegation failed to appear at Kaesong the next 
day, the Communists hurriedly dispatched a message to the 
United Nations Command agreeing to equitable conditions 
at the conference site, including agreement to withdraw their 
armed personnel from the immediate vicinity 

Other embroideries of the basic stage setting occurred as 
the conference evolved An amusing sequence arose in connec- 
tion with flags Just prior to one of the early meetings, one of 
our interpreters placed on the conference table a small stand- 
ard bearing a handkerchief-sized replica of the United Nations 
flag Throughout that session the Communists regarded the 
miniature flag with suspicion and dislike Nam II took occa- 
sion repeatedly to push the small standard away from the 
center of the table I would casually set it back dead center 
Following a recess, the Communists offered an improvement 
of this game by placing on the table another standard bearing 
a North Korean flag, identical in all respects to the United 
Nations emblem except that it rose some six inches higher 
AH in the United Nations Command delegation specukted 
with amusement as to where an increase in the height of the 
United Nations Command standard would lead I hastened to 
veto any tendency toward such competition, thereby perhaps 
averting construction of the two tallest flagpoles on earth 

Sadly, one must relate that not all the stage setting favor- 


able to the Communist cause was at their initiative Without 
any intention whatsoever to aid the Communists in preparing 
the scene, certain actions of the United States Government 
unintentionally did just that The United States impatiently 
broadcast the first direct appeal for truce talks, despite the 
fact that it was the Communists, not the United Nations Com- 
mand, who sorely needed a truce The Secretary of State was 
reported to have stated that a truce settlement with the Com- 
munists along the 38th Parallel would be acceptable to the 
United States Government How this piece of stage setting 
affected matters will be discussed later It is not unlikely that 
the peremptory recall of General Douglas MacArthur just 
after that renowned officer had advocated more vigorous mili- 
tary action against the Communists may have had as great an 
effect as any These developments reinforced the picture that 
the Communists wished the world to accept, the picture of a 
United Nations Command, frustrated militarily, begging a 
truce that would simply restore the situation as it existed prior 
to the outbreak of hostilities in Korea Thus, by their own 
devious methods, and assisted by windfalls of American policy 
mistakes, the Communists prepared the scene for the crucial 
negotiations to follow 



The Communist system of negotiating does not depend 
critically on the individuals involved Their method is a dogma 
followed slavishly by each of their representatives None the 
less, any extended negotiation will be marked by occasions 
when doctrine does not apply perfectly, and a degree of in- 
genuity will be required of the participants Knowing this, the 
Communists are quite careful in the selection of their nego- 
tiating teams Force of intellect is the primary consideration 
Reputation, rank, and position are of secondary consideration 
to the Communists in choosing the members of their delega- 
tion Persistence and an unruffled demeanor in the face of 
logic seemed to be the prime characteristics of then* negoti- 
ating group at the Korean Armistice Conference A slight 
bent to sardonic humor was observable in some few of the 
Chinese delegates When asked to say how long it would take 
his own superiors to provide him guidance on a certain ques- 
tion, the Chinese delegate General Hsieh Fang said, "I have 
no talent for prophecy " 



The nominal chief of the Communist delegation was Gen- 
eral Nam II, allegedly a North Korean and today the Foreign 
Minister of the North Korean puppet state Born m Asiatic 
Russia of Korean parentage about 1913, Nam II attended mili- 
tary schools in the USSR and was reported to have fought 
in the Red Army as a captain during World War II He came 
to North Korea with the Soviets at the end of the war and was 
assigned to key posts in the field of educabon and propaganda 
As Vice Minister of Education after 1948, he was influential in 
shaping the educational policies of the so-called "Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea" m line with Soviet plans, and in 
converting the Education Ministry into a key propaganda 
agency of the government Shortly before the attack on the Re- 
public of Korea in June of 1950, Nam II was called into the 
National Defense Ministry and assigned a top planning post 
in preparation for the attack When appointed to head the 
Communist delegation, Nam II was Chief of Staff of the North 
Korean "People's Army " In August of 1953, Nam II was ap- 
pointed Foreign Minister of his government 

Nam II was short in stature, slender, and gave the impres- 
sion of considerable nervous energy He spoke forcefully in 
Korean, seeming to spit out his words At no time did he ever 
exhibit the least tendency to humor If he laughed, it was in a 
sarcastic vein His smooth Oriental face rarely revealed emo- 
tion, and if so the emotion was anger or feigned astonishment 
He dressed nattily m the Russian type of uniform of the North 
Korean Army His military boots were highly polished at all 

Nam II did not appear to be at ease during our sessions, pos- 
sibly because he was one of the first Orientals to face a delega- 



tion of Occidentals on equal terms His nervousness was the 
more understandable when one considered that he was merely 
the figurehead of his delegation The actual power was vested 
in Chinese General Hsieh Fang Nam II was ever careful to 
secure an approving nod from Hsieh before launching into his 
long tirades against the United States 

The senior Chinese of the Communist delegation, and the 
de facto chief of the entire Communist group, was the slight 
Manchurian General Hsieh Fang Although the history of his 
background is somewhat uncertain, we know he was bom in 
1904 in Manchuria He was sent to Japan by the "Young 
Marshal" Chang Hsueh-liang, where he graduated from the 
Japanese Military Academy in 1923 He later attended a uni- 
versity in Moscow In 1940 he joined the Japanese puppet 
regime in Peking on orders from the Chinese Communists, 
remaining there until 1945 He is credited, during 1946-1948, 
with bringing about the defection of a number of contingents 
of Chinese Nationalists troops and with playing a leading part 
in the uprising at Changsha, China When appointed to the 
Communist delegation, he was serving as political commissar 
and Chief of Staff of the so-called Chinese People's 'Volun- 
teer" forces in Korea 

Hsieh Fang was thin and angular His nondescript uniform 
folded about his spare frame gracelessly He gave me the im- 
pression of Shakespeare's "Yond Cassms has a lean and hun- 
gry look such men are dangerous " Hsieh was indeed 
dangerous He possessed a bitterly sharp mind, and used it 
effectively His head was radically close-cropped, giving the 
impression of a high forehead Sharp eyes flicked restlessly as 
he watched proceedings Hsieh Fang rarely spoke from pre- 


pared material as Nam II did invariably His remarks were 
extemporaneous and fluent 

Hsieh Fang was markedly the mental superior among the 
Communist delegation He conducted himself in a self-assured 
manner at all times, never "bothering to check his intended re- 
marks with other Communists before making them He was 
the only member of the Communist delegation who seemed to 
be confident of his position with his Communist superiors m 
Peking On the many occasions when it became obvious that 
no progress could be made in the day's meeting, any Commu- 
nist spokesman but Hsieh Fang would feel compelled to de* 
liver a long-winded harangue praising Communist objectives 
and damning those of the United Nations Command Not so 
Hsieh Fang If there was nothing more to be accomplished, 
he simply shut up his brief case and departed Evidently he 
felt no need to make a "record" for his superiors to read and 

Hsieh Fang showed less obedience to the Soviet-Commu- 
nist dogma than other members of the Communist delegation, 
His manner of expressing himself m Chinese was not larded 
with the standard Communist terminology The language he 
used appeared to be his own He had a sharp, clear mind, one 
coldly calculating the accomplishment of his mission I can- 
not help wondering what effect, if any, Hsieh Fang's long 
exposure to our Western ethics and thoughts may have had 
on his Communist convictions 

The only other delegate m the Communist group with 
whom we had serious intercourse was North Korean General 
Lee Sang Jo His background is more obscure, though we know 
that he was born in 1913 in Korea and that he went to China 



in Bis youth and graduated from the Whampoa Military 
Academy, then the Chinese equivalent of the United States 
Military Academy He joined the Communist party m 1940 
and became identified as a trusty henchman of the pro-Soviet 
Korean faction He is also known to have commanded a de- 
tachment of the Korean Volunteer Army which fought in 
China with the Communist forces against the Chinese Na- 
tionalists He is described as one of a group of thirty-six Soviet 
citizens who returned to Korea in 1945 with the Soviet Army 
Just prior to the Armistice Conference, Lee occupied the post 
of Chief of Staff to the North Korean National Defense Min- 
ister Vice Marshal Choe Yong Gun, one of the influential 
leaders of the pro-Soviet North Korean group 

Lee Sang Jo was addicted to endless rambling statements, 
often absolutely irrelevant to the subject under discussion A 
doctrinaire Communist, Lee employed the Communist dogma 
of long, wearisome repetition at every opportunity He was an 
accomplished liar to boot He was short and chunky, often 
dirty and slovenly It fascinated all of us to watch Lee Sang Jo 
permit flies to crawl across his face without brushing them 
away Apparently he thought this showed iron self-control 
For my part, I concluded he was simply accustomed to having 
flies on his person 

The three delegates I have described constituted the vocal 
section of the Communist delegation Making up the total of 
five delegates were another North Korean and another 
Chinese These two never spoke, or otherwise indicated that 
they were more than window dressing 

Two officers of the Communist group who were not dele- 
gates, but staff officers, are worth discussing They were the 



two liaison officers, Colonel Chang of North Korea and Colo- 
nel Tsai of China These two did more of the actual nego- 
tiating than did any one of their superiors, the delegates 
Chang was a hard-faced Korean, short and stocky He spoke 
Korean and Chinese Though he never revealed the fact fully, 
we were convinced that he at least understood English It was 
rumored that Chang stood high m the favor of the Chinese 
and thus swung considerable weight in the Communist dele- 

Colonel Tsai of Red China, the other Communist liaison 
officer, was tall and spare He managed to wear the graceless, 
unadorned umf onn of the Red Chinese "Volunteers" with a 
degree of dignity Both Chang and Tsai were doctrinaire 
Communists, rarely varying from the dogma of the approved 
Communist method There was a considerable difference in 
the reaction of the two in the face of unforeseen events, 
however At the first meeting of haison officers, our United 
Nations Command haison party was made up of Colonels 
Kinney and Murray of the United States, and Lieutenant 
Colonel Lee of the Republic of Korea Chang and Tsai repre- 
sented the Communists When our Lieutenant Colonel Lee 
attempted to seat himself at the conference table on a col- 
lapsible chair, he upset the chair and sprawled on the floor 
Tsai, the Chinese, laughed heartily Chang, the Soviet-trained 
Korean, retained a stony silence On another occasion we had 
sent our Korean haison officer to deliver a message to the 
Communists at Panmunjom Chang and Tsai met Colonel Lee 
there Lee was an able linguist, speaking English, Korean, 
Chinese, Japanese, and some German On this occasion Lee 
chose to speak in English Chang lost his temper "Are you 



not a Korean?" he shouted "Why do you not speak Korean?" 
Lee answered calmly "I will speak m whatever language I 
wish That is what we are fighting for, freedom of speech " 
Tsai seemed somewhat amused by this exchange 

Once during a plenary session of the full delegations, North 
Korean delegate General Lee Sang Jo penciled a note to Nam 
II in Korean characters large enough to be read easily from our 
side of the table It said, "These imperialist errand boys are 
lower than dogs in a morgue " This is the ultimate Korean in- 
sult Our General Paik, delegate of the Republic of Korea, 
very nearly went physically across the table after Lee Sang Jo, 
but managed to restrain himself 

One of the most humorous remarks of the Armistice Con- 
ference was that of our witty Air Force General Turner in 
response to being called a fool General Turner had replaced 
our able Air Force delegate General Craigie Hsieh Fang, after 
an extended argument with Turner, made an audible aside 
remark to Colonel Chang, "This man is a complete fool " Our 
Colonel Kmney, noting this, urged General Turner to scorch 
Hsieh Fang for indulging in personalities and abusive language 
instead of dealing with the issues at hand Turner, however, 
made the following reply to Kinney m a loud, clear voice 
"You say he has called me a fool? No, I will not enter into a 
debate with him on that score He has all the points on his 
side" Colonel Tsai, evidently understanding this perfectly, 
was hardly able to control his laughter Hsieh Fang and Chang 
remained grim 

Throughout the course of the negotiations, two Western- 
world newspapermen lived with and advised the Communist 
delegation These were Wilfred Burchett, who served a Pans 



newspaper, and Alan Wmmngton, the latter reported to be a 
British citizen Wilmington, an effeminate-looking chap, acted 
as public relations officer for the Communists He sought to 
"feed" the Communist version of events to the Western news 
correspondents who accompanied the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation each day to the meeting site It appeared to 
me that he was remarkably unsuccessful in this effort Owing 
to the brilliant management of press affairs by our own public 
information officer, Air Force General William Nuckols, I 
never had occasion to be seriously concerned with the treason- 
able activities of Winmngton 

These were the principal men we dealt with during the 
armistice conference two from Red China, three from North 
Korea It is worth noting that the North Koreans were far 
more slavish in following the Soviet-Communist doctrine than 
were the Red Chinese It is worth repeating that ultimate 
authority in the mixed Communist delegation appeared to be 
in the hands of the Red Chinese 




With the stage set to their lilong, Communists proceed to 
implement the second principle of their negotiating method 
They seek an agenda composed of conclusions favorable to 
their basic objectives Among men who adhere to logic, an 
agenda is understood to be only a list of topics to be discussed, 
concerning which agreed conclusions are later required For 
example, Americans meeting to discuss arrangements for a 
baseball game might adopt an agenda as follows 

1 Place the game is to be played 

2 Time the game is to start 

3 Selection of umpires 

Communists, however, would submit an agenda like this 

1 Agreement that game is to be played in Shanghai 

2 Agreement that game be played at night 

3 Agreement that umpires be Chinese officials 

Thus the Communists seek to place their negotiating op- 
ponents on the defensive from the outset If their ngged 
agenda is carelessly accepted by their opponents, the Commu- 



nists are able to argue that the only questions remaining 
are exactly where in Shanghai the ball game is to be 
played, exactly what tune at night the game is to start, and 
precisely which Chinese are to officiate Notice how the 
Communists sought these advantages by such procedures at 

Consistent with their concept of an agenda as a set of con- 
clusions, the Communists formally proposed the following as 
the first two items for discussion 

1 Establishment of the %8th Parallel as the military de- 
marcation line between both sides, and establishment of a 
demilitarized zone, as basic conditions for the cessation of 
hostilities in Korea 

2 Withdrawal of all armed forces of foreign countries from 

Nam II supported these two points by simply asserting that 
they were "basic and mseparable " He said that withdrawal 
of foreign troops from Korea was "a basic step toward peace " 
Thus the Communist concept of an agenda was a set of con- 
clusions which would restore the situation in Korea to that 
obtaining before they launched their aggression 

In contrast, note the agenda proposals made by the United 
Nations Command on the same day in connection with the 
same two points 

1 Agreement on a demilitarized zone across Korea 

2 Cessation of hostilities and acts of armed force under 
conditions which will assure against resumption of hostilities 
in Korea 

This difference of approach gave rise to a major discussion 
between Nam II and me on the first day of the conference 



ADMIRAL JOY It is the position of the representatives of the 
United Nations Command that the proper order of business 
is to first establish the general topics which both sides agree 
to discuss, then subsequently to determine the specific 
agreement, the details Such a case is that of the demili- 
tarized zone Your delegation has offered a particular de- 
marcation line [the 38th Parallel] and a particular demili- 
tarized zone as an agenda item The delegation of the 
United Nations Command believes that first it should be 
agreed that discussion of some demarcation line and some 
demilitarized zone is desired by and agreeable to both 
parties Once this general topic is agreed on, later meetings 
can approach the question as to which particular hne and 
zone can be agreed upon It is for this reason that the United 
Nations Command agenda contains items which only 
describe the general area of discussion No effort should be 
made to state in an agenda what the details of these arrange- 
ments will be Agreement to place an item on the agenda in 
no way commits either delegation to any specific detail The 
same is the case with the demilitarized zone Both delega- 
tions wish to discuss a demilitarized zone Exactly where 
this zone shall be will become a topic of later discussion 
We both can agree, however, that the general question of a 
demilitarized zone should be one of the items to be dis- 
cussed on the agenda At a later meeting the exact boundary 
definition of the demilitarized zone may be reached I will 
now take up the question of the withdrawal of foreign 
armed forces What do you mean by foreign armed forces? 
What forces do you include? 

GENERAL NAM JL Please go ahead 

ADMIRAL JOT The various governments with armed forces in 



Korea operating with the United Nations Command have 
authorized these armed forces to be in Korea Therefore, 
the withdrawal of these armed forces from Korea must be 
approved by those same governments, as well as by the 
United Nabons itself The delegation of the United Nations 
Command can make arrangements only pertaining to the 
cessation of military action of these armed forces within 
Korea Only after an armistice has been agreed to and 
military action has ceased can the matter of withdrawal of 
foreign armed forces from Korea be discussed with the gov- 
ernments concerned Therefore, it is our view that this 
matter cannot be placed upon an agenda for the military 
representatives to discuss 

GENERAL NAM TL First I am going to answer the question of 
the foreign troops what is meant by the foreign troops By 
"foreign troops" we mean all troops who are here under 
the permission of then: own governments, so the foreign 
troops under the name of United Nations in Korea, they 
are all foreign troops And now I am going to talk about 
using some terms of procedure of meeting 

ADMIRAL JOY You haven't yet finished with the item of foreign 

GENERAL NAM iL Don't interrupt, I have the floor 

About the terms On discussing cease fire today, one side 
is the Korean People's Army and the Chinese Volunteers, 
and the other side is the United Nations forces The term 
"Communists" is not proper here because you are not han- 
dling with the Communist but with the Korean People's 
Army and the Chinese Volunteers It is simple to define the 
term "foreign troops " By "foreign troops in Korea," we 



mean those troops who are not Korean troops, who are not 

the troops composed of the Koreans 
ADMIRAL JOY Of foreign troops not composed of Koreans 

That is what you mean? 
GENERAL NAM IL Troops in Korea which are not Korean 

troops They are the foreign troops 

The next day at Kaesong saw a continuation of the dis- 
pute regarding the nature of an agenda I opened the 

ADMIRAL JOY We do not believe you understand yet what we 
mean by an agenda We wish to specifically define it again 
An agenda is merely a list, in order, of subjects to be dis- 
cussed Is that your understanding of an agenda? 

GENERAL NAM IL We know fully what an agenda means 

The senior delegate of the other party asked me if I 
clearly understood the term "agenda " By agenda it is meant 
the items that will be discussed at a meeting, ordered items 
which will be discussed at a meeting and which must be 
considered first when the agenda is being formed What are 
the important problems to be discussed at a meeting? Then 
the important problems must be discussed first That is to 
say what fend of problems should be discussed and what are 
the central problems, then the central problems are dis- 
cussed first 

ADMIRAL JOY When I use the term "agenda/* I am referring 
to a group of items which are general questions general 
items such as the demilitarized zone You, however, are in 
fact talking about one line [the 38th Parallel] when as a 
matter of fact there are many lines many possible lines 



GENERAL NAM n, We have showed you our line What are the 
possible lines for you? 

ADMIRAL JOY We do not suggest any line yet because 
that is getting into the substance of that item of the 

GENERAL NAM IL As for a line, we proposed a concrete 

ADMIRAL JOY As I understand it, you do not wish to broaden 
the question of a demilitarized zone 

GENERAL NAM IL May I ask what you imply by "broaden"? 

ADMIRAL JOY To make it more general 

GENERAL NAM IL Our proposal is general 

ADMIRAL JOY Referring again to your item on the agenda, we 
cannot agree to have any specific line on the agenda as you 

GENERAL NAM IL You do not agree? 

ADMIRAL JOY We will agree to place on the agenda an item 
calling for the establishment of some demilitarized zone 
The location and limits of that zone can be discussed later 
when the substance of the item is taken up I would like to 
re-emphasize that the work of this meeting on the agenda is 
not to determine solutions of problems, lines, etc , but to 
formulate an agenda in other words, to state the problems 
to be discussed at later meetings 

GENERAL NAM IL We cannot consider the 38th Parallel line 
as an imaginary line The ^Sth Parallel line had existed and 
the war broke out nght on that line Therefore, it is the 
principle that the question of the cease fire must be con- 
cluded also on the 38th Parallel line Therefore, this must 
be on the agenda 



In order to comprehend fully the arrogance of Nam Il's self- 
termed "agenda," it is necessary to recollect the military situa- 
tion as it then existed The line of ground battle extended 
across Korea on the bias, with its western terminus south of the 
38th Parallel and its eastern terminus well north of the 
Parallel (See map ) This line of ground contact constituted 
defensible battle positions from which the United States 
Eighth Army had been launching punishing attacks on the 
Communists The 38th Parallel afforded no such positions In 
the air, the domain of the Fifth Air Force was unchallenged on 
either side of the ground battle line, except along the Yalu 
River far to the north On the sea, United States Naval forces 
held uncontested sway to the northernmost extremities of the 
Korean coast line During the spring of 1951, this combina- 
tion of United Nations Command combat arms had beaten 
the Communists severely, so severely that in June they sought 
an armistice Communist supplies to the ground forces had 
been reduced to a tnclde by the incessant pounding of the 
Navy and the Air Force The Eighth Army was moving ahead 
inexorably, battering the Communist Army with superior fire- 
power, threatening a decisive breakthrough Talk of extending 
United States air action to Manchuna was rampant, complete 
with ominous overtones of the atomic bomb Here, then, was 
a Communist army on the verge of crushing military defeat, 
seeking a respite from our military pressure an armistice It 
was m such circumstances that Nam II mouthed his preten- 
tious agenda 

Nam Il's assertion that the 38th Parallel was indisputably 
the proper truce line between the opposed forces rested ini- 
tially on two logical, but erroneous, premises The first was the 


N O R, T H 


R E A 


Scalt of Mils 
10 20 30 40 50 



fact that Jacob Malik, Soviet Ambassador to the United Na- 
tions, had made a public remark in June, 1951, to the effect 
that both sides m Korea should withdraw from the ;$8th 
Parallel and cease fire Since the United Nations Command 
had taken the direct initiative in seeking an armistice soon 
after Malik's remark, the Communists concluded that Malik's 
suggested truce line was satisfactory to the United States Nam 
IFs second main premise was the fact that the Secretary of 
State of the United States had been reported as saying an 
armistice "on the 38th Parallel" would be satisfactory 

For these reasons Nam II no doubt was confident that seri- 
ous opposition to the 38th Parallel as a truce line either would 
not develop or would not persist Accordingly, Nam II sought 
to "stack" the agenda, presenting therein his conclusion that 
the 38th Parallel was the only possible line of demarcation, or, 
as he put it, "the basis of the armistice " 

Discussion between Nam II and me flowed with all the 
speed of a stiff concrete mix Each statement by Nam II had 
to be translated into English and Chinese, each statement I 
made had to be rendered m Korean and Chinese Interpreters 
stood at the elbows of each senior delegate to perform this 
exacting function Nam II appeared to be somewhat irritated 
by the inevitable delays of translation, and more so by the 
occasional errors made by his own interpreters For our side, 
Lieutenants Horace and Dick Underwood, brothers, handled 
the Korean translation, and Warrant Officer Kenneth Wu 
provided the Chinese They were impeccable linguists, adding 
keen intelligence to their talents as interpreters 

During translations, Nam II chain smoked, fiddled with 
pencils (which he frequently broke), rattled papers, conversed 


in whispers with his Chinese colleagues, and generally con- 
ducted himself like a cat on a hot tin roof The actual power 
in the Communist delegation, shrewd Chinese General Hsieh 
Fang, watched proceedings broodingly Occasionally he passed 
a terse note to Nam II, who invariably seemed to comply with 
the instructions contained therein Hsieh Fang's sole conces- 
sion to the tension of the situation was a nervous bobbing of 
his close-cropped head His saturnine yellow face was a set 
mask, revealing nothing, expressing nothing 

These two men, Nam II of North Korea and Hsieh Fang of 
Red China, were the source of all actions by the Communist 
delegation, with the Chinese taking an increasingly dominant 
role as fame passed Between them they provided unplumbed 
depths of cunning and deviousness as they sought to fasten 
upon the Korean Armistice Conference their 'loaded" agenda 

They failed The agenda finally adopted, after ten plenary 
sessions of bitter argument, contained no conclusions It read 
as follows 

1 Adoption of the agenda 

2 Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides 
so as to establish a demilitarized zone as a basic condition for 
the cessation of hostilities in Korea 

3 Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire 
and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, 
and functions of a supervisory organ for carrying out the terms 
of cease fire and armistice 

4 Arrangements relating to prisoners of war 

5 Recommendations to governments of countries con- 
cerned on both sides 

Despite the success of the United Nations Command dele- 



gafaon m preventing inclusion of Communist "conclusions" in 
the agenda, in retrospect it is clear that we made a grave error 
m forming the agenda, a mistake which ultimately cost us 
dearly We failed to foresee the use that the Communists 
would make of the chronological order of the agenda items 
By allowing the item on "Establishment of a Demarcation 
Line" to precede all others, we opened for the Communists a 
road to a de facto cease fire prior to agreement on other sub- 
stantive questions By agreeing to discuss the position of the 
truce line first, we permitted the Communists to insist that 
this question had to be settled before other agenda items were 
explored As will be discussed m a later chapter, on orders 
from Washington we eventually agreed to a provisional truce 
line with a thirty-day time limit, thereby giving the Com- 
munists a respite from United Nations Command military 
pressure This allowed the Communists a sorely needed breath- 
ing spell in which to dig m and stabilize their battle line 
Consequently, they were able to haggle and delay in respect to 
subsequent agenda items, free from the compulsion of im- 
pending military disaster 

In the end, the second principle of Communist negotiating 
methods, that of "stacking" the agenda, was frustrated I must, 
in honesty, hasten to add that this outcome was not principally 
the result of negotiating skill on the part of the United Na- 
tions Command delegation Rather, it was the result of our 
unmistakably firm refusal to agree to inclusion of Communist 
conclusions in the agenda, and to the crucially important fact 
that the United States Government backed the United Nations 
Command delegation to the hilt m this attitude Probably 
most of all, the result was the product of the heavy pressure 



which had been exerted on the Communist armies by United 
Nations Command offensive operations pnor to the confer- 
ence Nothing is so persuasive to Communists as force 

That the Communist agenda effort failed certainly was not 
a result of a lack of Communist effort at Kaesong, nor does it 
imply an omission of that same effort in the future Attempt- 
ing to ng an agenda with conclusions favorable to their cause 
costs the Communists nothing but the respect of those few 
people who persist in being so naively charitable as to put faith 
in the sincerity of Communist intentions These few the 
Communists will disillusion at future negotiations The rest 
of us will not be surprised. 




Once negotiations have actually begun, Communists are not 
satisfied to allow matters to proceed in a climate of peace and 
calm Rather, they create "incidents" calculated to provide 
advantage for then: negotiating efforts or for their basic propa- 
ganda objectives, or for both Such "incidents" do not simply 
occur they are plotted and triggered by the Communist nego- 
tiating teams Their two purposes, negotiating advantage and 
propaganda, are usually served equally by a. single incident 
Such a case was the first incident at Kaesong 

The strong insistence on equitable conditions at Kaesong 
registered by General Ridgway and me, coupled with tem- 
porary suspension of negotiations, had forced the Communists 
to agree to withdraw their armed personnel from the imme- 
diate vicinity of the Kaesong meeting place and to cease 
interfering with the movements of the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation The Communists had been compelled to 
accept these arrangements when General Ridgway peremp- 
torily halted the negotiations on July i2th He refused to allow 
the United Nations Command delegation to return to Kae- 



song until the Communist commanders agreed to guarantee 
the neutrality of the meeting area Their urgent need for a 
military breathing spell left the Communists no choice except 
that of acceding to General Ridgway's just demands for equity 
at Kaesong This transaction between General Ridgway and 
the Communist commanders was conducted in glaring pub- 
licity, to the keen embarrassment of the Communists 

As a result, the picture so carefully nurtured by the Com- 
munists, the picture of a United Nations Command begging 

' JL OO O 

a truce, had been knocked somewhat askew To Communist 
minds it was clear that the tune had come for an incident It 
was necessary to paint in bold strokes the fact of Communist 
military dominance at Kaesong They went about the job with 
commendable directness 

On the morning of 4 August, the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation was proceeding toward the Kaesong teahouse 
in which the meetings were held Our convoy of jeeps was 
halted in mid-course while an entire company of about one 
hundred heavily armed Chinese, complete with machine guns 
and mortars, marched across our path and through the imme- 
diate conference area This was in flagrant violation of the 
commitments made to General Ridgway by the Communist 
commanders only two weeks earlier The point of this demon- 
stration seemed to be that notwithstanding verbal agreements 
to keep the conference area free of armed men, no one would 
be allowed to forget the hard fact that Communist military 
forces actually surrounded and controlled the area To illus-- 
trate the point, the Communists simply marched an organized 
military force through the conference environs 

On entering the conference room, I immediately registered 



a vigorous protest to Nam II Blandly, he replied that the forces 
in question were "military police" Military police rarely 
march about in groups of 100, carrying heavy machine guns 
and 6o-milhmeter mortars 

On returning to Munsan that evening, I reported the in- 
cident to General Ridgway, advising mm that there could 
be no possible construction placed upon it other than inten- 
tional action designed to emphasize Communist military con- 
trol of Kaesong General Ridgway reacted with characteristic 
vigor Resorting again to open radio broadcast, he announced 
suspension of the negotiations with resumption contingent on 
the creation of a neutral zone around Kaesong into which no 
armed personnel of either side were to be introduced 

The Communists hesitated five days before acceding to 
General Ridgwa/s requirements To accept even justified 
dictation from the United Nations Command, establishing 
equitable conditions at Kaesong, was destructive of the illu- 
sion so painstakingly prepared Those days of hesitation must 
have been a period of dead-end frustration for the Commu- 
nists If they did not accept General Ridgway's requirements, 
the military breathing spell they so badly needed would 
terminate If they did accept General Ridgway's dictum, pre- 
tensions that Communists sat at Kaesong in the seat of victors 
would be difficult to believe At the last they chose what must 
have seemed to them the lesser of the evils They did not do so, 
however, without further efforts to turn even a bad situation 
to then- advantage In replying to General Ridgway by radio 
broadcast in the English language, they politely accepted his 
requirements and requested the United Nations Command 
delegation to return to Kaesong as soon as possible In trans- 


mittrng the same message over their propaganda radios in 
Japanese and Chinese, the wording was very different Instead 
of "requesting" the return of the United Nations Command 
delegation to Kaesong, the message "demanded at once" 
Thus they hoped to preserve some vestige of their battered 
illusion General Ridgway did not allow the Communists even 
this face-saving maneuver Instead, he declared then reply 
evasive and demanded still further assurances of equity at 
Kaesong At the last the Communists were almost literally on 
then: knees, hegging the return of the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation 

I feel sure that such a disastrous miscarriage of their scheme 
to demonstrate military dominance caused the Communists 
to invert the basic pattern of the incidents they instigated 
Thereafter, all incidents were designed to regain "face" by 
disclosing alleged United Nations Command brutality in the 
use of military force around Kaesong, rather than Communist 

The next "incident" unfolded by the Communists violently 
revealed their new pattern On 19 August, Communist liaison 
officers established contact with our own, charging that a 
Chinese "security patrol" in the newly established Kaesong 
neutral zone had been attacked by United Nations Command 
troops Investigation revealed that a Chinese patrol of about 
fifteen men had been fired on from ambush, and the leader 
killed, a short distance within the imaginary circle of neutral- 
ity around Kaesong A joint investigation did not reveal a 
scrap of evidence that United Nations Command troops were 
involved in this action All evidence pointed in the other direc- 
tion For example, it was established beyond question that 



those who executed the ambush were not in uniform, nor did 
they wear steel helmets All United Nations Command troops 
in Korea were fully uniformed and possessed the American 
type of helmet We concluded that this incident was the work 
of partisans living in the seventy-five square miles of the 
neutral zone The Communists had previously informed our 
liaison officers that "individuals hostile to the armistice nego- 
tiations" were living in the Kaesong neutral zone A few 
members of my staff suspected that the Communists might 
have arranged the incident themselves, using their own troops 

Despite all evidence to the contrary, the Communists 
loudly trumpeted a charge of "wanton attack" by the United 
Nations Command The new pattern had emerged The Com- 
munist plan now was to invoke the sympathy of the world by 
alleging fictitious brutalities perpetrated by the United 
Nations Command Since the August i9th incident worked 
out fairly well for the Communists, at least without disastrous 
results, no doubt they felt encouraged Accordingly, they 
hastened to cook up what they probably hoped would be a 
masterpiece In this manner, the Kaesong conference site 
came to be "bombed " 

At midnight of August 22d, our liaison officer, Colonel A J 
Krnney, was requested to come to Kaesong by his Communist 
counterpart, Colonel Chang Chang's message to Krnney 
alleged that United Nations Command aircraft had bombed 
Kaesong in an effort to murder the Communist delegation 
As I watched Kinney and his party depart in the dark and 
in a steady rain, I did not envy them then: task 

While at Kaesong, Kinney was shown a series of displays of 
"evidence" calculated to prove a bombing of Kaesong had 



occurred and had been earned out by United Nations Com- 
mand aircraft Owing to the continuing activities of Air Force, 
Navy, and Marine aircraft in and over the general area, a 
possibility existed that one of our aviators had mistakenly at- 
tacked the neutral zone On the other hand, Kmney, himself 
an aviator, was not much impressed with the "evidence " He 
was first shown a twisted piece of metal covered with oil which 
the Communists stated was a napalm bomb dropped by the 
attacking aircraft There was no napalm jelly about, no scorch- 
ing of the earth, no evidence of an explosion Kmney identified 
the piece of metal as the wing tip of a crashed aircraft At 
another point Kinney was shown a small, unexploded aircraft 
rocket The Communists asserted the attacking aircraft had 
fired this projectile Unhappily for them, United Nations 
Command air forces in Korea had not been issued a rocket of 
that size in nearly a year Thus the show proceeded until 
3 oo A M Standing in the darkness and pouring ram, Kinney 
asked that the investigation be suspended until daylight 
Chang refused, demanding an instant acknowledgment of 
responsibility by the United Nations Command for this 
"dastardly attack" (No one was injured, and nothing was 
damaged by the alleged attack a result not common after a 
United Nations Command air stake ) When Kinney refused 
to acknowledge United Nations Command responsibility for 
this evident sham, Chang then announced the immediate and 
indefinite suspension of the armistice conference 

When Kmney reported the foregoing events to me, one fact 
stood out plainly No individual Communist, not even their 
delegation, would have assumed the responsibility for termi- 
nating the armistice conference without checking such inten- 



faons with higher headquarters Yet Chang was able to make 
his announcement of termination immediately upon hearing 
that Kmney refused to acknowledge responsibility for the 
"bombing" It was inconceivable that higher headquarters 
(Pyongyang and Peiping, if not Moscow) could have been 
reached and could have reacted in the few hours between the 
alleged tune of the bombing and Kinney's disclaimer Accord- 
ingly, the conclusion was inescapable that the decision to 
terminate the conference was reached well before the alleged 
bombing occurred This was the clincher which, along with 
the other technical errors committed by the Communists in 
setting up the "bombing," pointed the finger of responsibility 
straight at themselves 

Why did the Communists arrange the sham bombing of 
Kaesong, with its resultant break-off of the armistice confer- 
ence 7 The answer to this question probably lies in the argu- 
ment over the truce line The initiation of armistice talks early 
in July, amid high hopes in the Western world that hostilities 
would soon cease, had caused a relaxation of United Nabons 
Command military pressure on the Communist forces in 
Korea The grinding attack of the United States Eighth Army 
had been slowed down, granting the Communist forces an 
opportunity to replenish their supplies and reinforce their 
battered units By mid-August the military capabilities of the 
Communist forces were improved over what they had been in 
June Meanwhile, it had become apparent to the Communist 
delegation that we would not accept the 38th Parallel of lati- 
tude as the line of demarcation between both sides If they 
wanted this Parallel as a truce line, they would have to drive 
the battle hue southward in Korea until it became coincident 



with the 38th Parallel This being so, there remained the ques- 
tion of justifying the enormous casualties to be expected from 
a general offensive To their minds it must have seemed desir- 
able to break off the conference under circumstances which 
apparently justified that action, and which also justified an- 
other offensive against the United Nations Command For 
such purposes, what could be better than to show a dastardly 
attempt by the United Nations Command to murder the 
Communist delegation in their beds? As an added fillip, such 
guilt fixed upon the United Nations Command might create 
dissension among the Western allies and weaken then: will to 
resist an armistice on Communist terms 

Because the Communist charges of "bombing" and "at- 
tempted murder" were almost universally rejected throughout 
the Western world, the Communists did not achieve their 
purpose of creating dissension Because those charges no doubt 
were believed throughout the Communist world, they prob- 
ably achieved then: purpose of justifying the attacks launched 
against the Eighth Army and the appalling losses suffered by 
the Chinese as a consequence From that point on, the Com- 
munist plan went completely sour After stopping and then 
containing the initial attacks made by Communist forces, the 
Eighth Army began a counteroffensive of its own By the end 
of September, the enemy was again in deep trouble The line 
of ground contact, far from being moved southward to the 
38th Parallel, had moved northward under the pressure of the 
United Nations Command offensive Seeing this, the Com- 
munists promptly took action to resume the suspended nego- 

Of all "incidents" by which the Communists sought to gain 



advantages, none was so bloody nor so successful as the 
Koje-do nots of prisoners of war By instigating a violent revolt 
of prisoners held by the United Nations Command, the 
Communists created an atmosphere which gravely jeopardized 
the major position of our delegation in the armistice confer- 
encethat relating to the exchange of prisoners How develop- 
ments were affected by this maneuver will be described in a 
later chapter It can be said now, however, that the prisoner 
nots were a consummation of continuous Communist efforts 
to gain negotiating or propaganda advantage by staging in- 
cidents calculated to serve those ends 

I shiver whenever I think by what narrow margins so many 
of their plots were frustrated One thing is certain future 
negotiations with the Communists will be marked by more 
incidents The "incident" is one of then: tested techniques 
Employing it, the Communists fumbled or were tapped up 
many times in the Korean conference But we may be sure 
they learned from those errors For the future, watch out' 




One of the most notable negotiating tactics of the Com- 
munists is to delay progress As a general matter, Communists 
believe that once negotiations have been initiated, to delay 
progress toward consummation of agreements tends to weaken 
the position of their opponents They hope to exploit to their 
advantage the characteristic impatience of Western peoples, 
impatience to complete a task once it has been begun This is 
a shrewd analysis, particularly as it applies to Americans We 
are a people who like to get things done We are taught by 
word and example throughout our lives that once we tackle a 
job, the point is to finish it successfully as soon as possible It 
is probably true that this same quality of impatience made 
America the greatest nation on earth It is certainly true, how- 
ever, that the Communist negotiating method recognizes and 
seeks to gam advantage by aggravating our American tendency 
to impatience through the imposition of endless delays 

Another primary Western characteristic the Communists 
rely upon in executing their delaying technique is our concern 
for human suffering Since they are totally unaffected by 



humane considerations, Communists are willing to impose 
delays on negotiations even if such delays mean greatly in- 
creased human suffering and loss of life At the same time, 
they know well that we of the Western world are unwilling 
to seek negotiating advantages through delays, if such delays 
entail increased human misery Accordingly, Commu- 
nist negotiators act upon the premise that if they delay 
matters long enough, their free-world opponents will recede 
from previously held positions in order to achieve a measure of 
progress, especially in the face of continued war and its at- 
tendant horrors 

An example of the Communist delaying tactics occurred in 
connection with the debate over fixing a line of demarcation 
on which war should cease The United Nations Command 
insisted that this should be in the area of the line of actual 
ground contact, the battle line The Communists clung to 
their proposal that the 38th Parallel be the truce line Bear in 
mind that the Communists ultimately agreed to the line of 
ground contact in fact, this solution probably was never truly 
objectionable to them Still, they sought by extended argu- 
ment to delay matters in the hope of realizing concessions 
from our delegation In this context the following exchange 
took place on 11 August, 1951 

GENERAL NAM IL With regard to your statement yesterday that 
your side is through with discussing our proposal of the 38th 
Parallel, I cannot but consider it as a rude and improper 
declaration that you are not willing to reach a settlement If 
your side really has a senous intention to negotiate an 
armistice and to reach a settlement, you should give up such 



an attitude In accordance with our consistent attitude of 
analyzing and studying the statements of the other side, I 
have again studied your statement of yesterday 

As a result, I cannot but say that our proposal of fixing 
the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is fair and 
reasonable and that it should be discussed and accepted On 
the contrary, your proposal is unacceptable Contrary to 
what you have been stating, our proposal of fixing the 3861 
Parallel as the military demarcation line is first and fore- 
most drawn up and formulated on the basis of real military 

The characteristics and trend of the development of the 
war in the past seven months during this year, and the pres- 
ent situation in which both sides occupy sectors similar in 
area south and north of the 38th Parallel, reflect the mili- 
tary realities of the battle front at the present stage There- 
fore, to fix the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line 
between both sides is the most logical and workable pro- 

But you are not willing to give a concrete answer in your 
refutation of our proposal, which has been proven to be 
correct by both reason and facts, but you merely insist that 
the sole purpose of our proposal of fixing the 38th Parallel 
as the military demarcation line is the political division of 
Korea Such a statement itself is a demonstration of your 
deliberate ignorance of our repeatedly expressed views We 
have clearly stated on 3 August that our proposal of fixing 
the 38th Parallel as the military demarcation line is merely 
to make it the military demarcation line to be observed by 
both sides during the armistice 



From its name alone, one should be able to understand 
that it is not to be a political demarcation line But what 
is more, we have further stated that the domestic problems 
in Korea, including the problem of its unification, should be 
settled by the Korean people themselves by peaceful and 
democratic means after the realization of an armistice agree- 
ment in Korea and the withdrawal of foreign armed forces 
from Korea 

Your persistent opposition to our statements and explana- 
tions cannot but raise the question in our mind that since 
you have no reason for your opposition, you are using such 
statements which are contrary to facts to cover up your 
inability to find an argument, and to cover up the real 
motive of your insistence on pushing the military demarca- 
tion line wholly to the north of the 38th Parallel I have 
pointed out that your insistence on placing the military de- 
marcation line to the north of the 38th Parallel and within 
our positions proves that it is you who have malicious 
political intentions All that I would like to say is that such 
intention of yours can in no way be realized 

You said again yesterday that we proposed to make the 
38th Parallel the military demarcation line in order to save 
face, but the plain truth is that we insist upon this proposal 
simply because it reflects the military realities of the battle 
front at the present stage, and is reasonable and fair to both 
sides, and at the same time favorable to the peaceful settle- 
ment of the Korean question 

We insist upon the truth and intend to do nothing else 
This allegation of yours is a fabrication and is inappropriate 
We do not wish to hear again such discourteous remarks 



As a matter of fact, the people who really wanted to save 
face with respect to the military situation are those who 
seek to attain by means of absurd theories what they have 
not won, and the people who wanted to save face with re- 
spect to the political situation are those who have crossed 
the ocean to intervene in the domesbc affairs of another 
country, not those who fight the foreign interventionists 
heroically and selflessly It is clear enough, and requires no 
further explanation 

Yesterday, you also said that we deny completely the total 
effect of your air and naval forces As a matter of fact, we 
have never denied it On the contrary, we have given it due 
appraisal What we are against is your attempt to secure 
compensation on the ground by exaggerating the effective- 
ness of your air and naval forces, and thus to place the mili- 
tary demarcation line north of the 38th Parallel and within 
our positions 

We say that if it were not for the indiscriminate bombing 
and bombardment by your air and naval forces, your army 
would have long ago been driven out of the Korean Penin- 
sula by our mighty and superior ground forces That is our 
fairly high appraisal of the effectiveness of your air and 
naval forces Moreover, ever since 27 July, we have repeat- 
edly explained by logic and by facts this self-evident situa- 
tion Yet, you have never given any concrete reply to our 
explanation and instead still insisted upon the independ- 
ence and superiority of your air and naval forces, and upon 
the compensation you must get for it when drawing the 
military demarcation line on the ground This is not a com- 
mendable attitude 



Could you explain how your proposal can still stand when 
the premise upon which your proposal has been conceived 
and raised has already been refuted and is no longer exist- 
ent? It is indeed entirely unjustifiable that up until now you 
should still cling to your proposal To insist upon doing 
what is itself entirely unjustifiable, is this not for the pur- 
pose of attaining some malignant political desire? 

From your statements we really cannot see that your pro- 
posal is a proposal of the so-called armistice at the current 
battle line Sometimes you claim that your proposed mili- 
tary demarcation line and demilitarized zone are based on 
the present battle line Sometimes you say that your pro- 
posed demilitarized zone is located in the general area of 
the battle line You also deliberately confuse the military 
demarcation line with the battle line 

If your proposal were m reality, as you claim it to be, the 
military demarcation line you proposed should have been 
the present battle line itself Yet the military demarcation 
line you draw on the map is deep within our area north of 
the 38th Parallel I do not understand why you have not 
been willing to clarify this point frankly 

You say your proposed demilitarized zone may be ad- 
justed This we have noted Then why have I not been 
responsive? For what actually is the nature of your so-called 
adjustment? Actually, such adjustments are only for you to 
occupy an area slightly less than 12,000 square kilometers 
which we would give up if we withdrew from the present 
battle line in accordance with your proposal 

Do you suppose it possible for us to take an inter- 
est in such adjustments? If you allege that I have not 



understood you correctly, will you point out the exact 

You have indeed stated more than once that you are 
always willing to discuss your demilitarized zone on the 
basis of the present battle line and the military situation or 
military realities, as you sometimes call them 

But to my knowledge your proposed demilitarized zone is 
the area between the lines drawn on your map, and those 
three lines are north of the 38th Parallel, above the present 
battle line, and within our positions Consequently, such a 
statement on your part is just empty words without any 
actual meaning 

For the above reasons, we contend that the arguments 
supporting your proposal are untenable and, therefore, your 
proposal is unreasonable, unfair, and indeed absurd Hence 
it cannot be considered 

Finally, I wish to state again that a demilitarized zone 
based on the 38th Parallel is fair and reasonable As soon as 
we determine the pnnciple of fixing the 38th Parallel as the 
military demarcation line, the details of the demilitarized 
zone will not be difficult to negotiate when it comes to the 
discussion of a demihtanzed zone 

ADMIRAL JOY Yesterday you stated "Has it occurred to you, 
that according to your logic, should our army, acknowledged 
as mighty and supenor by the whole world, stop fighting so 
that your troops will escape the fate of annihilation, are we 
not entitled to an even greater compensation and to pro- 
pose a demarcation line and demihtanzed zone to the 
neighborhood of the Naktong River?" Again today you 
mention your mighty and supenor ground forces 



We do not now, nor have we ever disputed the great 
numerical preponderance of your ground forces However, 
in view of your progress northward since February, we 
ridicule your use of the word "superior" We are quite 
willing to let the world judge that point 

We also recognize as self-evident the fact that the cap- 
abilities of these already numerically greater ground forces, 
available to you, will begin to increase the day an armistice 
goes into effect These same capabilities will continue to 
materially increase each week the armistice is in effect It is 
during this period when our air and naval forces must re- 
main inactive that your ground troops could be rested and 
re-equipped without interference They could be positioned 
at your leisure 

We know well that once these ground forces are fully 
reconditioned they have the capability, which presently is 
restricted, of launching and sustaining an attack that could 
be disastrous to any force not in a naturally strong and well 
defensive position We know that you recognize that fact 

It is exactly for the reasons you have stated that this dele- 
gation has consistently pointed out that the United Nations 
Command requires adequate natural defense positions with 
sufficient depth to ensure that they cannot be quickly over- 
run by a numerically greater ground force We realize that 
it would take several weeks of full-time operation for our air 
and naval forces to agam create the situation in your rear 
areas that presently prohibit the full utilization of your 
numerically greater ground forces 

It is precisely for these stated reasons that the United 



Nations Command delegation has consistently held that the 
military realities which govern the present situation justify 
improvement m the defensive position of our ground forces 
as a just compensation for the withdrawal of our strong air 
and naval forces 

You have criticized our proposed demilitarized zone We 
would welcome an exposition of your conception of a de- 
militarized zone based on the present battle line and the 
over-all military situation Will you provide us a map show- 
ing such a zone? 

GENERAL NAM IL Is that all? 

ADMIRAL JOY That is all 

GENERAL NAM IL We have repeatedly explained the military 
demarcation line and also the demilitarized zone We 
clearly explained that the 3 8th Parallel should be fixed as 
the military demarcation line and troops of both sides 
should withdraw ten kilometers on each side and establish 
a zone of twenty lolometers as the demilitarized zone 

The 38th Parallel appears clearly on the map The with- 
drawal of ten kilometers north and south of the 38th 
Parallel, that is so clear that one does not have to look it 
up on a map 

In my statement this morning, I have again made clear 
the content of our proposal and pointed out that your pro- 
posal is unacceptable 

You have deliberately maintained, in order to confuse 
people, that the military demarcation line and the demil- 
itarized zone you proposed are based on the present battle 
line and that they are located in the general area of the 
battle line You have also deliberately confused the military 



demarcation line, the southern boundary of the de- 
militarized zone and the present battle line 

In order to support your proposal of pushing the military 
demarcation line to the north of the 38th Parallel, deep into 
our positions, you have persistently emphasized the so- 
called superiority of your naval and air forces and that, 
therefore, you must be compensated on the ground 

Yet, today you have presented a new and strange argu- 
ment that since our army is already superior at present, it 
will be more so after armistice and, therefore, you should be 
again compensated for reasons of security In using these 
self-contradictory arguments in support of your proposal, do 
you not feel ridiculous? 

You said that because your air and naval forces were 
strong you should be compensated, and now you admit that 
your army is weak, but again you claim that you should be 
compensated Just imagine, you need compensation no mat- 
ter whether you are strong or weak Is that not completely 
without reason, and wholly nonsense? 

It has been proved that your proposal is untenable and 
that our proposal is based on reason Therefore, whatever 
novel and ridiculous arguments you should fabricate, they 
would never bolster up your proposal 

I can tell you frankly that as long as you do not abandon 
your unreasonable proposal, it will not be possible for our 
conference to make any progress 

As for our proposal, its reasons are irrefutable, therefore it 
is unshakable We insist on our proposal of making the 38th 
Parallel the military demarcation line 
ADMIRAL JOY Yesterday you used the word "arrogant" in con- 



nection with a proposal the United Nations Command 
delegation now has before this conference The United 
Nations Command delegation has been in search of an ex- 
pression which conveys the haughty intransigence, the 
arbitrary inflexibility, and the unreasoning stubbornness of 
your attitude Arrogance is indeed the word for it 

From the first day of these conferences your arguments 
have reflected the very essence of arrogance You stated, in 
your opening remarks, that your view in regard to a military 
line of demarcation had to be accepted You have made the 
same statement over and over again Once more yesterday, 
you stated that your solution to the question of a demarca- 
tion Ime "must be accepted " Your attitude has been that of 
an arrogant dictator, not that of a negotiator seeking in 
good faith an end of hostilities. 

By your obdurate and unreasoning refusal to negotiate 
you have brought these meetings to a standstill You have 
slammed every door leading to possible progress By trying 
to deceive the world into believing that you have defeated 
the United Nations Command, you have delayed and 
stalled these meetings You refuse to negotiate except on 
your own terms, thus seeking to falsely portray yourself as a 
victor dictating to the vanquished 

When the United Nations Command delegation pre- 
sented its original proposal regarding a demarcation line, 
you rejected it summarily You stated you would not give it 
serious consideration You contemptuously knocked aside 
the map we offered for your consideration 

When the United Nations Command delegation pro- 
posed that possible adjustments of the demarcation line 



based on the battle line be considered you flatly rejected this 
proposal You implied there was no need to study the physi- 
cal location of a demilitarized line, since you had already 
provided a solution you unilaterally considered suitable 

When the United Nations Command delegation urged 
you to join it m studying the proposed demilitarized zone 
from a map, you refused The United Nations Command 
delegation pointed out that to study the proposed demili- 
tarized zone on a map would at least clear up any possible 
misunderstanding concerning the proposal You rejected 
even that 

Yesterday you placed a conclusive cap on your record of 
arrogance You stated, and I quote "We oppose the scheme 
of fixing the military demarcation line at the present battle 
line/' unquote You thus revealed clearly the fact that you 
engaged in these conferences only to present demands, not 
to negotiate solutions You seek to gain a political division 
of Korea by mere repetition of your arrogant demands You 
offer no logic because you have none You merely state, 
restate, and state again your peremptory demands 

All the world realizes that a military armistice is a device 
to halt the fighting until the issues which caused the fight- 
ing to start are settled All the world knows, therefore, that 
military armistices are and ought to be a reflection of the 
over-all military situation at the time the armistice is put in 
effect Yet you, in your absurd arrogance, oppose a military 
demarcation line conforming with present military reali- 

The United Nations Command delegation has thus been 
unable to negotiate the question of a demarcation line with 



you who refuse to negotiate As a result, the United Nations 
Command delegation yesterday proposed to shift discussion 
to Item 3 of our agreed agenda, dealing with Concrete 
Arrangements for the Cessation of Hostilities The United 
Nations Command delegation explained to you its hope 
that by putting aside temporarily the question of a demarca- 
tion line and delving into the details of stopping hostilities, 
a later return to the matter of a demarcation line might find 
a favorable atmosphere Using a previously prepared state- 
ment you rejected this also In addition to rejecting the pro- 
posal to discuss concrete arrangements for ceasing hos- 
tilities, you gratuitously rejected discussion of Item 4, deal- 
ing with relieving the suffering of prisoners of war I ask you 
to reconsider these decisions 

In adhering to your futile fixation on an effort to divide 
Korea by cloaking political maneuvers under the guise of a 
military armistice, ^ou have blocked every earnest effort of 
the United Nations Command delegation to make progress 
toward a cessation of bloodshed and suffering Your cold 
calculations take no account of such matters as the pitiful 
suffering of the Korean people 

Ruthlessly, arrogantly, and with the assumed air of a 
victor, you baldly assert that your demands must be met 
The record of these proceedings has become your unanswer- 
able accuser You did not come here to stop the fighting 
You did not come here to negotiate an armistice You came 
here to state your price your political price for which you 
are willing to sell the people of Korea a temporary respite 
from pain You have tned to camouflage your purpose in 
words cleverly designed to trap the unwary You are failing 



Your arrogance and your bad faith stain through every at- 
tempted deception The immutable facts hold you guilty of 
having delayed, and of continuing to delay, the end of hos- 
tilities in Korea I do not envy you the place to which Truth 
assigns you 

Today we have again made no progress I trust the pro- 
ceedings have provided you an opportunity to reflect on the 
unreasonableness of your inflexible position, and of your 
refusal to give serious consideration to any but your own 
ideas I trust they have impressed upon you the firmness of 
the rejection by the United Nations Command delegation 
of your effort to negotiate a political division of Korea I 
hope they have brought to your mind those who die in the 
continuing warfare, victims of your refusal to discuss a mili- 
tary solution to a military problem I hope they have raised 
in you a desire for the end of bloodshed which would attend 
a cessation of hostilities If so, the way is open to you I 
leave these thoughts with you 

I propose a recess until 1100 hours our time tomorrow 
ENERAL NAM XL There is nothing new in your statement 
Your statement does not frighten us and cannot change our 
stand As our proposal of making the 38th Parallel the mili- 
tary demarcation line and our proposal of establishing a 
demilitarized zone is fan:, reasonable, and proper, we will 
continue to insist upon it 

We agree to your proposal of recessing until tomorrow, 
1000 our tune, and 1100 your tune 

The most extended delay imposed upon the Korean Armis- 
tice Conference by the Communists was in connection with 



the exchange of prisoners of war The United Nations Com- 
mand took the position that all prisoners of war should be 
"screened," that is, questioned individually as to whether they 
wished to return to the side of their origin We contended 
that if a prisoner refused to return to Communism, we should 
not force him to do so at gun point This was the procedure 
of "screening" and the principle of "no forced repatriation" 
of prisoners advocated by the United Nations Command dele- 
gation The Communists attacked the "screening" process as 
one the United Nations Command conducted under a 
reign of terror Violent nots plotted and executed by the 
Communist prisoners held by the United Nations Command 
had resulted inevitably in some injuries and deaths among 
these prisoners Thus the Communists provided themselves 
with excellent propaganda with which to denounce our 
screening process and our principle of "no forced repatria- 

For more than a year the Communists refused to accept this 
procedure and this principle In the end they did accept them, 
unchanged in any significant detail from then- substance of a 
year earlier, when first advanced This delay cost all involved 
more than fourteen months of war in Korea Casualties result- 
ing in that period ran into hundreds of thousands Yet, 
throughout, the Communists clung to the hope that their de- 
laying tactics would so impose upon either the impatience or 
the humanity of the Western governments as to cause us to 
abandon the principle of no forced repatriation When they 
finally came to the conclusion that such an erosion was not 
going to occur, the armistice was achieved As an illustration 
of the unchanging nature of the United Nations Command 



position on prisoner exchange, consider the following discus- 
sion These exchanges took place more than a year before the 
armistice was signed Bear in mind that the ultimate exchange 
of prisoners did not involve forcing unwilling prisoners to 
return to the side of their origin 

GENERAL NAM IL The iron-clad fact is that your side has ear- 
ned out violence against our captured personnel and pushed 
through your so-called screening by force in an attempt to 
retain forcibly our captured personnel as your cannon fod- 
der The reason is perfectly clear If the criminal acts 
committed by your side in pushing through by violent 
means your so-called screening among our captured per- 
sonnel had not reached an intolerable degree, our captured 
personnel would not have run the risk of mass murder by 
raising their just demands to your side Your side has em- 
ployed violence, conducted forcible screening to retain our 
captured personnel, and rearmed them to serve as your 
cannon fodder 

The responsible authorities of your side attempted to 
deceive the world by claiming that your side would not buy 
an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or 
slavery But it is exactly your side who would not hesitate 
to pay the cost of an armistice in Korea for the forceful re- 
tention of captured personnel to be subjected to your mur- 
der and slavery And in order to attain this objective your 
side has already subjected our captured personnel to con- 
stant slaughter and slavery 

Can your side deny that the criminal acts of "insults, 
torture, forcible writing of petitions in blood, threatening, 



confinement, mass murder, shooting and machine gunning, 
making experiments on prisoners of war with poison gas, 
germ weapons, and atomic bombs" earned out by your side 
against our captured personnel in disregard of the Geneva 
Convention relating to prisoners of war and repudiating the 
minimum standard of human behavior are all concrete facts 
of slaughter and slavery? 

To retain our captured personnel for your murder and 
slavery, that is the substance of your unilateral and unrea- 
sonable proposition on the question of prisoners of war 
embodied in your proposal The heroic struggles of our 
captured personnel have revealed to the whole world the 
substance of your proposal 

Your side has no longer any pretext to continue to insist 
on your unilateral and unreasonable proposal, to delay the 
armistice negotiations, and to block the realization of an 
armistice in Korea Our side has pointed out long ago that 
it is an inescapable and absolute obligation of the com- 
manders of both sides to repatriate unconditionally all the 
prisoners of war in their custody following the armistice, 
and that it is totally impermissible to conduct any screening 
of the war prisoners 

The so-called screening is in itself absurd It is in viola- 
tion of the explicit stipulations of the Geneva Convention 
relating to prisoners of war, and in contravention of all 
international laws Screening itself is absolutely impermis- 
sible It becomes even more so when your pnsoner-of-war 
camps are fraught with overt and covert maltreatment and 
persecution and intimidation, when there is no freedom at 
all in your pnsoner-of-war camps for our captured personnel 



to express their free will, but only freedom for your side to 
perpetrate violence and acts of murder and to coerce our 
captured personnel by overt and covert and direct and in- 
direct means, and when no genuinely impartial organization 
would go to your prisoner-of-war camps to conduct the so- 
called rescreenmg, which is utterly impermissible, and to be 
deceived and suffer insults by your side 

Your so-called screening is only a direct design to deceive 
the people both on our side and your side, and by which 
you attempt to retain forcibly our captured personnel Our 
side is firmly and unshakably opposed to it 

In these conferences your side has persistently taken the 
peremptory attitude of refusing to reason, refusing to nego- 
tiate, and refusing to carry out discussions, and attempting 
by this to force our side to accept your unilateral and un- 
reasonable proposition Outside of the conferences, your 
side has successfully earned out frequent provocative acts in 
violation of agreement, including strafing against your own 
captured personnel, attacking vehicles serving our delega- 
tion and attacking the Kaesong neutral area, resulting in 
repeated serious incidents of bloodshed Your such per- 
emptory attitude and provocative acts will avail nothing 
except to reveal to the people throughout the world your 
intention to delay and even to disrupt the armistice negotia- 
tions And the responsibility for delaying the armistice 
negotiations rests entirely upon your side 

Our side has categorically rejected your unilateral and un 
reasonable proposal Our proposal is the only reasonable 
basis for the settlement of the question of the prisoners of 
war and the attainment of an armistice The question of 



prisoners of war is now, in effect, the only question blocking 
the realization of an armistice in Korea 

ADMIRAL JOY It has been our thought that in a very short 
time your propaganda would become so transparently 
ridiculous as to condemn itself Your statement today con- 
firms that judgment Will you agree to put your wild 
charges to the test of fact by repeating the screening process 
under the joint supervision of both sides, or do you fear the 
outcome? We are willing to repeat the screening of pris- 
oners under conditions of strict equity as between your side 
and ours What you object to is not the screening process 
but its results 

As long as you continue to have nothing constructive to 
offer, I suggest a recess until such tame as you desire to meet 

GENERAL NAM iL How can it be wasting time when we ask 
you to deal responsibly with your clear violation of the 
agreement, and how can it be a waste of fame when we ask 
your side to accept our proposal for the settlement of the 
question and when we point out your illegal actions? We 
have all the rights to point out at the conference all the 
serious incidents in which your side has successively violated 
the agreement and we have the right to ask you for a respon- 
sible settlement of them 

Your attempt to use the word "propaganda" to cover up 
the iron-clad facts which are detrimental to your proposition 
only serves to show that your side has already run out of any 
reason or argument, that your side cannot look into the eyes 
of the people of the world 
Your side has taken the peremptory attitude of refusing 



to reason and refusing to negotiate, and all people through- 
out the world can make the judgment that it is exactly your 
side and only your side which is delaying and even trying to 
disrupt the negotiations 

As I have already pointed out, the so-called screening in 
itself is impermissible, the forced screening conducted by 
your side among our captured personnel is a criminal act 
No sober or just-minded person would enter your prisoner- 
of-war camps under overt or covert or direct or indirect 
pressure, thus to legalize the criminal acts perpetrated by 
your side 

In order to realize the ardent wish of the peace-loving 
people of the world for an armistice in Korea, it is our duty, 
which should not be evaded by either side, to come to these 
conferences and conduct discussion In accordance with our 
consistent stand of striving for an armistice in Korea, our 
side insists on the normal holding of conferences However, 
I must point out that the conferences are held through 
agreement by both sides If your side is determined to dis- 
rupt the armistice negotiations, your side is free to declare 
that you are not coming to meet with us, but unless your 
side officially announces the disruption of the conferences, 
our side will continue to insist upon the normal holding of 
conferences to explain day after day our reasonable pro- 
posal, to refute your unilateral and unreasonable proposi- 
tion, and to insist upon settling the issues confronting the 
conferences through reasoning and negotiating 

Our side proposes that the conferences be continued at 
the usual time tomorrow 
ADMIRAL JOY Very well, we agree 



In total, the Communists utilized delaying tactics to string 
out the Korean Armistice Conference for more than two years 
A period covering seventeen days was required to reach agree- 
ment on what was to be discussed The conference was sus- 
pended by Communist action over the previously descnbed 
Kaesong "bombing" incident for a cumulative period of ap- 
proximately two months Agreement to use the actual battle 
line as a cease-fire line was finally reached more than four 
months after the conference began Agreement to refrain from 
forcibly returning prisoners to the side of their origin was 
wrung from the Communists after two years of delay In each 
of these cases, the delay imposed on the conference was the 
direct result of Communist tactics, since in each case the ulti- 
mate solution was substantially that which had been originally 
proposed by the United Nations Command, months or years 

To the uninitiated it may seem inequitable to charge the 
Communists with deliberately delaying the conference during 
periods in which they argued for their proposed solution of a 
particular issue as against the solution proposed by the United 
Nations Command One must consider the nature of the pro- 
posals involved, however, to determine responsibility We 
Americans tend strongly to a line of action that we call "being 
reasonable " This means that each party to a dispute should 
be prepared to modify his position somewhat in an effort to 
achieve an agreeable solution Yet, such an attitude is based 
on the implicit assumption that each party to the dispute 
sincerely believes his position is the correct one. We do not 
compromise with a man who insists that 2 plus 2 equal 6 Nor 
would we seriously consider the view of one who presented us 



a bill for $10,000 in connection with repairing our television 
set The point is that the relative reasonableness of initial 
positions taken must be considered before we decide that both 
parties in a dispute should give a little 

Initially the United Nations Command delegation pro- 
posed a trace line north of the line of ground contact We 
contended that a northward adjustment of the ground-contact 
line was necessary to compensate for the withdrawal of United 
Nations Command air and naval operations, which ranged 
hundreds of miles north of the embattled ground forces This 
was a bargaining position, and even while proposing it we made 
plain our interest in a solution on the line of ground contact 
The Communists, however, insisted on the 38th Parallel 

Thus the effective proposal of the United Nations Com- 
mand was that the truce line conform to the line of ground 
contact between the two opposing armies This proposal re- 
quired neither side to withdraw its ground forces from the 
positions then held, to surrender no territory then controlled 
It did require the United Nations Command to withdraw its 
air and naval forces from areas in which they were freely 
operabng In contrast, the Communists insisted on a truce 
line, the 38th Parallel, that would have required a general 
withdrawal of the United States Eighth Army twenty to fifty 
miles, with a corresponding advance of the Communist army 
With this solubon, the Communists would have achieved the 
capture of a large territory they had not been able to win in 

It is apparent that the two solutions of the trace line ques- 
tion cited above cannot be considered rough equivalents, 
representing two differing but equally sincere views The 



battle-line solution was, in itself, a substantial concession to 
the Communist viewpoint, in that the United Nations Com- 
mand agreed to suspend the activities of our air and naval 
forces deep in the Communist rear By accepting this solution, 
the Communists received at least equity The months they 
expended in an attempt to gam advantages far in excess of 
equity must be charged to them as delaying tactics. 

Because of our American tendency to feel that a deadlocked 
issue should be solved by mutual concessions, the Com- 
munists are on favorable ground in applying their delaying 
tactics By proposing that 2 plus 2 equal 6, and by then delay- 
ing an agreement mtermrnably, the Communists hope to lead 
us to agree that 2 plus 2 equal 5 



Communists realize that negotiations must necessarily result 
in some few agreements that are objectionable from their 
point of view They know that the very nature of the act of 
negotiating involves accepting some of their opponent's pro 
posals either in whole or in part Since they appreciate this as 
inevitable, Communists seek to reduce the magnitude of com- 
mitments they are compelled to make and which they intend 
to dishonor They aspire to reduce the scope of investigations 
which may anse from their premeditated violations of agree- 
ments There is no question in my mind that this dark 
thought lies behind the current Communist refusal to accept 
effective inspection and supervision of any international agree- 
ment to disarm 

To illustrate the cunous Communist concept we are now 
considering, let us take a hypothesis that a town existed in 
which there was no police force, no organization of any land 
devoted to maintaining law and order In such a case let us 
suppose that the respectable people of the town insisted upon 
the establishment of a police force If the criminal element 



was unable to prevent the formation of a police force, would 
not these criminals seek to restrict its size 7 Since the criminal 
element intended to continue the practice of crime, how much 
better for them would it be if the police force consisted of 
only one officer? This is analogous to the Communist ap- 
proach to agreements they intend to dishonor They strive to 
reduce the effectiveness of the supervisory and investigating 
capabilities applying to agreements 

Perhaps the most staking example of this Communist tactic 
occurred in connection with determination of the number of 
"ports of entry/' during the debates on Agenda Item 3 This 
agenda item dealt with setting up armistice safeguards against 
either side increasing its military capabilities during the truce 
period Agreement had been reached between the two delega- 
tions limiting the resupply of war materials and replacement 
of military personnel to that necessary to sustain the existing 
levels in Korea at the time the armistice went into effect No 
increases in levels of war materials or personnel were to be per- 
mitted As a result of this agreement, it became necessary to 
specify the cities, or ports of entry, through which permissible 
resupply was to be effected, and to provide groups of observers 
"policemen" at each entry port to supervise the resupply 
activities This would mean that all permissible resupply must 
pass through the specified entry ports, there to be checked by 
the observers appointed from neutral nations which had not 
participated in the Korean War For this purpose, the Com- 
munists proposed one city in North Korea, one in South 

In order to appreciate the meaning of this Communist pro- 
posal, one must recall that the Communist army in Korea 



numbered nearly one million men All military supplies for 
this force came from outside Korea To sustain a force of such 
numbers, even under conditions of truce, through one entry 
port in North Korea was and is a logistic fantasy Calculations 
by the logisticians of the United States Far East Command 
indicated that a minimum of five ports of entry would be re- 
quired to support the United Nations Command forces m 
Korea, despite the fact it numbered less than half the Com- 
munist strength With all due respect for the ingenuity of the 
Communists in solving their logistics problems, it could not 
be accepted that they were ten fames as capable as the United 
Nations Command We, therefore, were forced to conclude 
that they had no intention of abiding by the agreement to use 
only the specified ports of entry, regardless of the number In 
furtherance of this intention they sought to limit the number 
of ports of entry, since by doing so they would reduce the 
number of neutral observers behind then- lines, and thus 
gam greater freedom to violate the agreements regarding 

Being intent on honoring the resupply agreement scrupu- 
lously, and having no fear of any number of neutral observers, 
the United Nations Command initially proposed ten ports of 
entry on each side The Communists absolutely refused to 
consider this They wanted no such number as ten neutral 
observer teams stationed in their rear areas, and embarrassing 
their opportunities to violate agreements 

After extended debate the Communists altered their original 
proposal to provide for three ports of entry on each side In 
seeking to gain our acceptance of this insufficient number, the 
Communists expended more than a month of conference 



effort It was apparent they were quite anxious to have no 
more neutral observer teams in their rear areas than could not 
be avoided For our part, we realized that the Communists 
probably had no intention of honoring the agreement on ports 
of entry, but since the United Nations Command intended to 
comply with that agreement we had to insist on enough ports 
of entry to render our compliance possible After many weeks 
of debate, agreement on five ports of entry was finally reached 
In like manner, the Communists argued stubbornly against 
the United Nations Command proposals regarding allowances 
for the rotabon of personnel Rotation allowances were in- 
tended to provide authority for the replacement of personnel 
as they were withdrawn from Korea on completion of tours of 
duty It must be remembered that the basic conditions being 
sought by the armistice conference were those of truce, not of 
peace Accordingly, it was necessary to sustain the military 
strength of the United Nations Command during the period 
of truce, and until a peace settlement was reached Without 
rotabon allowances, the individuals in Korea would be obliged 
to remain there indefinitely, or alternabvely the force would 
have faded out of existence as a result of routine complebon 
of tours of duty The United Nabons Command policies pro- 
vided for one year of duty in Korea for each military man, at 
the end of which the individual was withdrawn and another 
took his place As a result, it was necessary to replace about 
35,000 men each month In this manner a force of 420,000 
men could be completely replaced in a year's tune Yet, with a 
force in Korea of about 1,000,000 men, the Communists 
initially proposed a rotabon rate of only 5,000 per month 
This would have meant a tour of duty of seven years for 



American soldiers in Korea, and a tour of about fifteen years 
for Chinese soldiers in Korea Despite the obvious nonsense of 
this proposal, the Communists held to it for months Their 
purpose was a dual one First, by holding personnel rotation 
allowances to a grossly insufficient figure, they hoped to ac- 
complish the attrition of United Nations Command forces 
until none remained in Korea Second, the Communists hoped 
to reduce the number of neutral observers needed in then 
rear areas by curtailing the scope of the activities to be ob- 
served They did not succeed On the question of rotation 
allowances, Washington for once permitted the United Na- 
tions Command delegation to hold firm In the end the Com- 
munists grudgingly accepted our figure of 35,000 for monthly 
rotation of personnel 

At the root of the Communist attitude toward such ques- 
tions as the ports of entry, rotation allowances, and related 
neutral observer teams lay their settled intent to circumvent 
any aspect of the armistice agreement that did not operate 
to their advantage It was with this same intent in mind that 
they approached the question of airfield reconstruction 

The United Nations Command delegation proposed to the 
Communists that as of the fame the truce was signed, no new 
construction or rehabilitation of airfields should take place on 
either side This proposal was consistent with the spirit of 
other proposals already accepted by the Communists Our 
intent was to freeze the military situation m Korea as it existed 
when the armistice went into effect Agreements to limit re- 
supply of military mate'nel and replacement of personnel were 
designed to prohibit an increase of combat effectiveness by 
either side The article agreed to by the Communists m re- 



spect to resupply of mate'riel specified that replacement of 
military equipment should be earned out on an item-for-item 
basis, "without increase of combat effectiveness " Obviously, 
to build military airfields constituted an increase in combat 
effectiveness, since the capabilities of air power are a function 
of aircraft and bases This was especially true in the case of the 
Communists, who possessed not a single continuously opera- 
tional airfield in North Korea The Communist MIG aircraft 
that operated along the Yalu River did so from bases in Man- 
churia, immune from attack Airfields in North Korea, how- 
ever, were regularly bombed by United Nations Command 
aircraft and had not been "combat effective'* during any 
significant period of the Korean War It did not make military 
sense, therefore, to allow the Communists to utilize the respite 
from bombardment afforded by a truce in rebuilding de- 
stroyed airfields or in building new ones With restored air- 
fields in North Korea from which to operate, the short-ranged 
MIG jet fighter could sweep down out of the Manchunan 
sanctuary, refuel on the North Korean bases, and launch heavy 
attacks deep into South Korea This capability depended com- 
pletely on the existence of operational North Korean bases 
Such bases did not exist during the Korean War We of the 
United Nations Command delegation could see no reason why 
the Communists should be allowed to develop an important 
military capability during the period of truce We felt that to 
allow such action regarding airfields was not greatly different 
than to allow the introduction of additional infantry divisions 
into Korea, or any other action which would materially in- 
crease Communist military capabilities We had to consider 
the inescapable possibility that the armistice might not en- 



dure, and therefore we could not willingly accept substantial 
augmentation of our enemy's strength during the truce 

The Communists attempted to imply by vague statements 
that they really had no intention of building up military air- 
fields during the truce period, but simply could not agree to 
what they termed "unwarranted interference in our internal 
affairs" (After the armistice was signed, the Communists 
built more than twenty military airfields in North Korea ) 
They contended that the United Nations Command sought 
to perpetuate the damage done by its "wanton bombings" 
which, according to the Communists, had not really damaged 
airfields, but instead had only killed innocent women and 
children and laid hospitals and cultural buildings in rums 
Still, they insisted on their right to rehabilitate the airfields 
which, they inferred, we had failed to damage Listen to 
Nam II on this point 

GENERAL NAM JL I will make a statement In your statement 
yesterday you once more put forth the proposal of the so- 
called limitation on the increase of military f acihties of both 
sides during the period of the armistice, and the view that 
the supervising organ should have free access to all parts of 
Korea I must point out once more that this proposal and 
this view obviously involve political questions, and that the 
military armistice conference absolutely should not and can- 
not make decisions on them Such a proposal and view con- 
stitute a direct interference m the internal affairs of the 
other side, and are absolutely not to be tolerated 

You say, "It is incredible that with good faith you could 
propose inclusion into the armistice agreement of provisions 



which would permit you to build up your military power " 
I must emphatically point out that it is entirely a matter of 
internal affairs of the Korean people to deal with then* own 
defensive facilities during the armistice, and that there is 
entirely no necessity to require that the provisions for this 
permission should be made in the armistice agreement. 

Whose air force has been carrying out inhuman and wan- 
ton bombing in Korea, and whose air force has been 
heroically fighting in self-defense against such inhuman 
and wanton bombing is well known to the peoples through- 
out the world It is exactly because of the fact that OUT ania- 
arr-raid facilities are as yet not so universal as to cover the 
whole of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea that 
the wanton bombing of peaceful Korean towns and villages 
by your an* force could have brought the Korean people such 
a disaster as they shall never forget And yet your side 
openly refuses to withdraw from Korea, during the military 
armistice, the air force of your side which is used for offen- 
sive purposes, and even refuses to discuss this question 
What reason then can you have to interfere with the sacred 
and inviolate right of the Korean people to defend them- 
selves by arranging their defensive facilities? 

The view put forth by your side that the supervising 
organ shall have free access to all parts of Korea likewise 
constitutes an interference in the internal affairs which our 
side absolutely cannot tolerate I have already pointed out 
that, under any circumstances whatsoever, it would be in- 
conceivable and even less warranted that during the mili- 
tary armistice, when the state of war is yet to be terminated, 
one of the belligerents should establish observation posts 



for conducting ground, sea, and air observation beyond the 
demilitarized zone at principal cities, ports, and commu- 
nication centers of the other side which is an independent 
sovereign state, that it should have freedom of movement 
over the principal lines of communication in the rear of the 
other side, and that it should carry out aerial observation 
and photographic reconnaissance throughout the rear of the 
other side You state that your side would welcome observa- 
tion by our side, but our side has no intention whatsoever 
to carry out reconnaissance in the so-called area under 
your control, nor does our side have the intention to inter- 
fere in the internal affairs of the so-called area under your 
control, nor in any case will we agree to your attempt to 
have free access to the territory of our side to carry out 

ADMIRAL JOY You have offered nothing new in your state- 
ment We have heard the same propaganda before Your 
statement only convinces us of the purposes you have in 
mind during the armistice From what you have said this 
morning, it is clear that you don't want an armistice All 
you want is a total cease fire so as to permit you to increase 
your military capability to the extent you desire and at will 
Our idea of an armistice is a simple one that neither side 
gam a military advantage over the other during the period 
of the armistice This is the only basis upon which we can 
agree It should be the only basis upon which you should 
agree if you were sincere in desiring an armistice As military 
men, you should recognize that the United Nations Com- 
mand cannot enter into an armistice with you which does 
not involve an understanding by both sides to refrain from 



attempting to gain a military advantage during the suspen- 
sion of fighting 

GENERAL NAM iL The question of the military faculties is an 
internal question, and is not a question to be discussed at 
the armistice conference As to the observation question, 
too, you want to have a freedom of movement in observing 
in the rear of our side, but that is also an interference in the 
internal affairs of our side Outside of the demilitarized 
zone agreed upon by both sides, you have no nght to ob- 
serve freely in the rear of our side You said that we, too, 
could make observation in your rear, but we do not make 
any such demand and we are not accustomed to doing so. 
We hope you will clearly understand such stand of ours 

It was tie full expectation of the United Nations Command 
that if the Communists were allowed to build airfields in North 
Korea, they would then secretly introduce jet aircraft into 
Korea, violating the armistice terms thereby, and thus as- 
semble a formidable jet an* force m North Korea Today this 
expectation is a fact A powerful MIG force now operates 
from a multitude of air bases in North Korea Before the 
truce was signed, this deadly Communist capability did not 

In dealing with the airfield question, the Communists 
could not settle for mere reduction of the magnitude of an 
agreement they intended to violate They could entertain no 
agreement at all on this subject Their apparent reasoning 
was flawless It is an easy thing for them secretly to introduce 
into North Korea more tanks or guns than the armistice agree- 
ment allows, and even easier to keep the presence of such un- 



authorized tanks or guns hidden from the eyes of neutral 
observers Airfields, however, are impossible to hide Accord- 
ingly, the Communists flatly refused agreement to refrain 
from building airfields Weak as was their argument regarding 
"interference in internal affairs/' the Communists clung to 
it until higher authorities in Washington finally directed the 
United Nations Command delegation to concede the issue to 
the Communists This concession utterly departed from the 
basic principle on which the United Nations Command dele- 
gation had been trying to arrange the armistice the principle 
of freezing the military capabilities of both sides so that 
neither could add substantially to its strength during the 
period of truce 

In order to explain the attitude of the United Nations 
Command delegation on the airfield question, I am compelled 
to deal briefly with the basic philosophy of an armistice as 
we understood it First of all, an armistice is not enduring 
peace, it is a cessation of hostilities, quite possibly only a tem- 
porary cease fire Technically, a state of war continues to exist 
during an armistice During the period of cease fire, the gov- 
ernments involved attempt to arrange a peace permanently 
terminating hostilities It must be kept in mind, however, that 
the governments involved may not be able to agree on peace 
terms, as indeed they have not in respect to Korea It is con- 
ceivable hostilities may then be resumed and continue for an 
indeterminate period Accordingly, our concept of an armis- 
tice was that of a cease fire arranged under conditions preclud- 
ing substantial change in the relative military strengths of the 
opposing sides Thus, if hostilities were resumed after a period 
of truce, no significant advantage would have been achieved 



by either side This concept supported the entire complex of 
agreements by which we sought to safeguard the armistice It 
was also the basis of the United Nations Command insistence 
upon a line of demarcation providing defensible battle posi- 
tions for the ground forces and was the principle reason we 
opposed the 38th Parallel solution offered by the Commu- 

When Washington decided, in a final effort to achieve an 
armistice, to allow the Communists to build airfields in North 
Korea during the truce period, the basic premise upon which 
the armistice had been designed went up in a wisp of smoke 
With that acbon, there was no longer any chance to prevent 
the military capabilities of Communist forces in Korea from 
increasing in a major degree during the truce And so they 
have, fulfilling the criminal premeditation of the Communist 
negotiators at Kaesong and Fanmunjom 




When their attempts to avoid agreements tending to restrict 
them are not entirely successful, and their efforts to reduce 
the magnitude of agreements they intend to dishonor have 
teen pressed as far as possible, the Communists then seek to 
retain a veto on all machinery of enforcement of agreements 
In the discussions on Agenda Item 3, relating to the super- 
vision of the Korean armistice, the Communist interest in re- 
taining the veto power became apparent Over the steady 
objections of our adversaries, we of the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation had insisted upon the creation of supervisory 
organs to check the compliance of both sides with terms of the 
armistice Two organizations were visualized One, a Military 
Armistice Commission, was to supervise, among other things, 
proceedings in the narrow neutral strip between the two op- 
posed armies after the cease fire went into effect The other, a 
Supervisory Commission, was to be charged with the inspec- 
tion of activities of each side in the rear areas This latter 
commission would conduct its inspections by means of a num- 



ber of observer teams permanently located at ports of entry, 
and by another group of mobile observer teams which could 
be sent anywhere to investigate reported armistice viola- 
tions In order to facilitate the functions of these mobile neu- 
tral observers, we had proposed that the observers be afforded 
the right to reconnoiter by air any area of Korea The Com- 
munists refused to agree They insisted on a two-edged veto 
First, they proposed that the activities of the supervisory 
bodies be contingent upon unanimous agreement of the mem- 
bers A dissent by one of the Communist members would 
constitute a veto Second, they refused to allow aerial recon- 
naissance Thus, even if all Communist members of the super- 
visory organ voted in favor of investigation, the observer teams 
on the ground could be effectively frustrated through lack of 
aenal reconnaissance 

Discussions between the full delegations in plenary sessions 
had resulted in some agreement on general principles dealing 
with armistice supervision On the other hand, discussions of 
the armistice safeguards mentioned in the foregoing para- 
graph, as well as other related matters, had proved unprofit- 
able Accordingly, I had proposed to the Communists that 
subdelegations be formed composed of only one or two dele- 
gates, and that these less formal groups be charged by the 
main delegations to resolve matters at issue The following 
excerpts are from a meeting of such a subdelegation on 15 
December, 1951 For the United Nations Command, Major 
General H M Turner, USAF, and Major General H I 
Hodes, USA, were the delegates For the Communists there 
were that formidable Chinese Hsieh Fang and the omni- 
present North Korean liaison officer Colonel Chang 



GENERAL TURNER Do you have the answers to our questions 

of yesterday 7 

GENERAL HSIEH You have asked "Does your proposal con- 
template that the military armistice commission will have 
directing and control authority over the neutral observation 
teams?" The inspection teams of neutral nations are under 
the supervisory commission of neutral nations That is to 
say, above the inspecbon teams of neutral nations there is 
the supervisory commission of neutral nations The super- 
visory commission of neutral nations entrusted by the Mili- 
tary Armistice Commission will dispatch inspection teams 
of neutral nations to carry out the functions of supervision 
and inspections as stipulated by the armistice agreement 
The Military Armistice Commission and the supervisory 
commission of neutral nations are on an equal footing, and 
the relationship between them is one between the entruster 
and the entrustee It is not a relation between a superior 
and a subordinate 

You have also asked 'What do you mean by according 
full convenience to the neutral teams 7 " My answer is that 
both sides, both your side and our side, should accord the 
inspection teams of neutral nations full convenience in 
performing their duties in performing their functions By 
full convenience, we include the convenience in traveling 
over the lines of communication as agreed upon by both 

In another question you ask '*You say the Military 
Armistice Commission must approve rotation requests 
Does this mean all members of the Military Armistice Com- 
mission must agree to this?" Our answer is In order to 



prove that either side really has the need for rotating its 
military personnel, and that it is not introducing into Korea 
reinforcing forces, ground, naval, or air, there must be 
reasons stated and tabular data given for such requests 
Such requests should be agreed upon by both sides, that is, 
approved by the representatives of both sides on the Mili- 
tary Armistice Commission before the rotation can be ear- 
ned out 

With regard to your question "How did you arrive at 
your figure of 5,000 a month in relation to rotation?" Our 
answer is that the number of personnel to be rotated should 
not exceed 5,000 monthly That is, 5,000 is the maximum 
figure and it refers to the rotation both ways 5,000 to come 
in monthly and 5,000 to go out monthly and our side con- 
siders that this figure is sufficient for meeting the require- 
ment of the rotation of your military personnel 

With regard to your question "Does your proposal con- 
template the use of aenal observation by the neutral ob- 
server teams?" Our answer is that the duties and the rights 
of the supervisory organ of neutral nations are limited to 
supervising the adherence to the inspection of any violations 
of the armistice agreement which have occurred outside the 
demilitarized zone Therefore, we think it is not necessary 
for this supervisory organ of neutral nations to carry out 
aenal observation and, also, this aenal observation is im- 

GENERAL TURNER In those instances where you have given us 
a specific answer to our specific questions, you have merely 
accentuated the differences existing between our two 
sides In those cases wherein you have evaded giving a 



specific answer, I shall make no further comment at this 

You call a major concession your proposal that rotation 
he earned on only with the approval of the Military Armis- 
tice Commission Your members of the Military Armistice 
Commission can, of course, refuse to agree Therefore, you 
retain the right to preclude, unilaterally, any rotation at 
all Now is this a difference from your former view 7 

For the past week we have refuted your arguments time 
and again Once more I shall try to clarify our stand on 
matters of disagreement 

On the question of no rotation and replacement of per- 
sonnel, we have heard your explanation, "There should be 
only outgoing and no incoming of military forces," so many 
times that you need not repeat it again You know the figure 
of 5,000 is wholly inadequate We know as well as you 
know that this is your idea of forcing a withdrawal of troops 
by the attrition process You are well aware of our firm 
stand against the withdrawal of troops from Korea since 
the beginning of the armistice talks We do not intend to 
change our stand All your talk about "contradictions" and 
"increasing the military capabilities" has no validity, and 
you know it It is your side that has been inconsistent and 
contradictory about these matters You blandly state that 
you intend to increase your military capabilities during the 
armistice by rehabilitation and construction of airfields, 
since this is an internal affair of yours Then in the same 
breath you insist the United Nations Command must re- 
duce its military capabilities by not introducing replace- 
ments of personnel for rotation purposes, except for the 



token number of 5,000 monthly, and even that you could 
prohibit by use of the veto We'll not be responsive to this 
illogical argument any longer 

Next, the question of internal affairs You have persist- 
ently stated that our principle which prohibits the rehabili- 
tation, expansion, and improvement of existing airfields 
and aviation facilities, and construction of new airfields and 
new aviation facilities, interferes m the internal affairs of 
your side You have also stated many times that effective 
inspection such as aerial reconnaissance is your internal 
problem However you may clothe in words your desires to 
increase your aviation capabilities, the bare fact is that you 
seek to increase your military capability during an armistice 
You wish to gain a military capability you do not now have 
That is inadmissible It is only with the recognition of this 
important fact that we can achieve an effective armistice 

We have assured you any number of times that the 
United Nations Command has no desire whatsoever to in- 
terfere with your internal affairs However, we have no in- 
tention of letting you build up your airfields and aviation 
so as to increase your air-force capabilities during the armis- 
tice, and we expect to see that aerial reconnaissance is em- 
ployed as one of the means of determining compliance with 

It is not because we are interfering with your internal 
affairs that you keep bringing this subject up Rather, it is 
very clear that you have ulterior motives We would like to 
know just what your motives are for wanting to rehabilitate, 
expand, and improve your airfields and aviation facilities 
and just what is your reason for not wanbng effective in- 



specfaon by aenal photography and aenal reconnaissance 
As you well know, this inspection will be earned out by the 
neutral nations inspecting teams, and this will not interfere 
with your internal affairs, unless you are planning to violate 
the agreements of the armistice Therefore, the restriction 
of construction of new airfields, air facilities, rehabilitation, 
expansion and improvement of existing airfields and air 
facilities, and a thorough observation throughout Korea as 
agreed upon, is the only answer to a successful execution of 
the armistice Now, the question of inspection in the rear 
Many times in the past few days you have made the state- 
ment that the inspection of the rear is our idea We accept 
that and will continue to praise its merits This we will do 
because this principle is the main safeguard against viola- 
tion and evasion of the terms of the armistice But inspec- 
tions of the rear by neutral observers instead of by the 
belligerents was your own thought, as you well know 

Your proposals accept only partial observation in the rear 
areas of both sides By so doing you are obviously limiting 
the effectiveness of the armistice It is indeed nearsighted- 
ness to believe that adherence to the terms of the armistice 
can be checked only at ports of entry If observation is to be 
effective, it must also be conducted at selected communica- 
tion centers and over all of Korea through aenal reconnais- 
sance These measures are essential to adequate observation 

It is difficult for us to conceive how your side can insist 
upon a fair, reasonable, and effective armistice and then 
contradict your implication of this sincenty by refusing to 
accept measures which will make it effective 

Now, I hope you fully understand our firm position in 



these matters and will refrain from using your old argu- 
ments over and over again I have fully refuted them If we 
should hear them again, you can expect to hear these same 
final refutations again It will gam you nothing and will 
only delay progress 

That is all 

GENERAL HSiEH After listening to General Turner's long state- 
ment, it has brought to my mind many questions But be- 
fore I would ask for clarification on these questions and 
before I make comments on your statement, I would like 
first of all to clarify your attitude toward these negotiations, 
because your attitude toward the negotiations is directly 
connected with the progress of the negotiations For 
example, your statement just now is a repetitious and un- 
reasonable statement, just as the statements you have made 
before And yet I took the attitude of carefully listening 
and seriously analyzing your statement However, your side 
takes the attitude entirely to the contrary Of course, you 
are calling anything which is not to your taste "illogical " 
At the end of your statement, you stated you are not willing 
to listen to us I must point out that such statements are an 
indication of your attitude of refusing to negotiate, and I 
must point out also that such an indication is given after 
our side has made our proposal 

It is not from today that you start this attitude of refus- 
ing to negotiate Since 12 December you took this attitude 
and for four days successively you have been taking this 
attitude We want to call your attention to this and 
suggest that you review the proceedings of the past four 
<days You can see that so long as your side continues to use 



such an attitude of refusing to negotiate, then there will be 
no progress in these negotiations As soon as you give up 
such an attitude to our position, we will make some progress 
It is because you have assumed this attitude of refusing to 
negotiate for four days successively, and because in your 
statement this morning you employed such words as I have 
pointed out and showed such an attitude, that our side 
cannot but doubt what is your real attitude toward the 
armistice negotiations Before I continue the discussions, 
I would like to clear up this point I want to clear up what 
you mean by using such words I wish to have your answer 
to this question first 

GENERAL TURNER From the noise you have made over the 
words that I have used, I believe that you pretty clearly 
understand what I mean We are willing to negotiate We 
have patiently listened to your illogical arguments We do 
not care to listen to them again Let us negotiate What 
have you to offer that can be considered a forward step in 
the negotiations? So far you have only been stalling and 
wasting time Let us make some progress today 

GENERAL HSBEH I could have used the same land of words I 
could have said that your statement made just now is a 
statement which I have listened to patiently, and is an 
illogical statement for stalling and delaying the negotiations 
and wasting time It is particularly because you still un- 
reasonably and illogically insisted upon your views that you 
made me doubt what is your attitude toward the negotia- 
tions Of course, you said that before me, but I can assure 
you that our side will not take the same attitude of refusing 
to negotiate as you do and we will not think that such an 



attitude is reasonable Of course, you have the right to 
choose such an attitude of refusing to negotiate, "but if that 
is what you really mean, you should make a resolution and 
seriously state that you will not continue the discussions if 
we do not accept your positions 

I wish to remind you of just one thing, rotation of per- 
sonnel is surely an increase of military forces You have 
indicated that in order to continue to increase your military 
force and to raise the morale of your troops, you must 
rotate, you must have more rotation, you must shorten 
your period of rotation hy two months or three months It 
is clear from this that rotation is urgently needed by your 
side Our proposal made the concession on the point of ro- 
tation in taking account of the interests of your troops and 
the peoples of your countries That is a major concession, 
and yet you do not admit that there is anything new in our 
proposal Such is your logic If you do not admit such a 
concession as a step forward, as something new, then there 
is no necessity for us to carry on more discussions If that is 
really what you mean, and you mean to msist upon such 
attitude, then whatever our side will suggest could be re- 
fused consideration by your side I wish you to clarify this 
point seriously 

GENERAL TURNER As to irrelevant remarks about my attitude, 
I dismiss and ignore them as propaganda deserving no com- 
ment You have made a number of statements attempting 
to show that principles advocated by the United Nations 
Command are unfair, unreasonable, and unwarranted You 
condemn our insistence on prohibiting the rehabilitation 
and reconstruction of airfields as being interference in your 



internal affairs You object to our intention to rotate and 
replenish our forces in Korea You object to aerial observa- 
tion as being more interference in your internal affairs On 
the other hand, we defend these principles as insuring 
against an increase of military capabilities during the armis- 
tice and thereby a threat to the stability of the armistice 

Now let's look at the situation as it is today You are not 
threatening our rear in any way You are not preventing us 
from rehabilitating airfields or building new ones You are 
not conducting aenal surveillance of our communication 
centers You are not preventing unlimited rotation and 
replenishment of our forces You do not interfere in the 
internal affairs of our side in any way Under the conditions 
of combat, as they exist today, you do none of these things 
and we have no fear that you might You do none of these 
things because you cannot you lack the military capability 
to do them 

But how do you find the situation today on your side? 
We do keep your airfields unusable We do conduct aerial 
surveillance throughout your rear We do limit the extent 
to which you can replenish your forces We do interfere in 
your so-called internal affairs by disrupting your internal 
communications systems and by destroying communication 
centers in your rear We do these things today because we 
have the military capability to do them Until the armistice 
is signed we will keep on doing them 

Now, to preserve the existing situation as to military 
capabilities, to replace the effect of the United Nations 
Command military operations, we propose only that during 
the armistice you shall not gain a military capability which 



you do not now possess We go even further We agree to 
apply the same restrictions to ourselves, even though you 
lack the military capability today to implement these re- 
strictions by force of arms But you complain this is unfair 
You who are unable to impose any of these military restric- 
tions upon our side by your own strength' You complain 
that it is unfair for us to insist on continuing restrictions 
through armistice terms which we are fully able to impose, 
and are imposing on you by military means during hostil- 
ities In short, you seek to gain, through negotiations, what 
you could not win through fighting You seek to avoid, 
through negotiations, what you could not avoid through 

In accepting the restrictions advocated by the United 
Nations Command you merely accept a continuation of 
limits on your military capabilities which exist today as a 
result of United Nations Command military operations 
Your capabilities should continue to be limited by the terms 
of the armistice You lose nothing You gam much, for these 
same limits are applied to the United Nations Command, 
even though you cannot today effect them by military 

It is clear, therefore, that our proposed principles are 
more than fair to you they are wholly to your advantage as 
compared to the situation existing today Once agam I 
repeat we are willing to give serious consideration to any 
proposal you may make which provides for effective super- 
vision of, and adherence to, the armistice terms, and for 
prohibition of increasing the military capabilities We are 
talking about military realities upon which this armistice 



must be based Now let us get down to negotiating What 
have you to offer? 

GENERAL HsiEH I am greatly disappointed at your statement 
this afternoon I thought you would change your attitude 
this afternoon from the attitude you took this morning 
But my impression from your statement is that you have 
even accentuated your attitude of refusing to negotiate 
Your statement gave me the impression that you once again 
reveal your attitude of assuming to be a victor in these armis- 
tice negotiations You reveal to me once again that you aim 
at maintaining the state of war m the Korean battlefields 
and you fear the arrival of genuine peace You reveal to me 
once again that you refuse to take the attitude of nego- 

Your statement merely repeated your hackneyed, unrea- 
sonable and absurd statements at the beginning of July 
when you came to this conference table It is a pity that you 
attempt to harp on your hackneyed tunes of July But after 
the lapse of five months your voice is not as loud as it was 
You have retreated very much Since you say that we have 
no military capabilities, then why do you fear that we might 
have it? Since you take the attitude of a victor, why should 
you come to negotiate? If you intend to use such an attitude 
as a threat on your part in these negotiations, I tell you you 
must take back that attitude If you intend to use your 
statement as propaganda, I suggest that you publish the 
whole statement to the world and let the people judge 

For four days successively you refused to negotiate, and 
this afternoon you went to the length of openly bragging 
of your military capabilities Whom do you attempt to awe? 



If you do not attempt to change your attitude, there will "be 
no result from these negotiations and the responsibility for 
delaying of the armistice is entirely on your shoulders So 
long as you do not change your attitude we have nothing to 
offer or to say today 

I hope you will change your attitude Are you insisting 
on this attitude of refusing to negotiate? Are you attempt- 
ing to use coercion to make me accept the whole of your 

GENERAL TURNER. I shall reread two statements that I just 
made We are talking as realists We want a genuine armis- 
tice leading to a genuine peace Once again, I say we are 
willing to give serious consideration to any proposal you 
may make which provides for effective supervision of, and 
adherence to, the armistice terms, and for prohibition of 
increase in military capabilities If you are not willing to 
carry on the negotiations today, then will you please set a 
tune when you are willing to carry on these negotiations 

GENERAL HSiEH You have missed the point Your last question 
is the question I have asked you It is not for you to ask me 

GENERAL TURNER I have answered your question Do you have 
anything new to present? 

GENERAL HSIEH You have not yet answered my question Are 
you still refusing to negotiate or are you using coercion, try- 
ing to force us to accept the whole of your unreasonable 
proposals? If you take back and change your attitude, I have 
never refused to carry on discussions, but if you attempt 
coercion, I advise you to take back this attitude quick and 

GENERAL TURNER I shall take back not one word of what I 



said f If you are ready to negotiate, proceed' We are ready 
on our side 

Thus the Communists fought to retain a veto on the essen- 
tial machinery of armistice supervision, a veto on initiation of 
supervisory action and on effective means of executing investi- 
gations Later on, Washington required the United Nations 
Command delegation to concede the question of aerial re- 
connaissance to the Communists As a result, though we 
did eventually win grudging Communist agreement to 
procedures not contingent upon unanimity in the super- 
visory organizations, our victory was hollow We lost the 
most effective means of investigating violations of armistice 
terms, violations that the Communists began to per- 
petrate as soon as the truce was signed Without aenal 
reconnaissance, armistice supervision becomes blind Being 
blind, the supervisory organs have proved to be as ineffective 
as a sightless floor detective in a department store With the 
result foreseen, we of the delegation protested to higher 
authorities against the decision to abandon insistence upon 
aenal reconnaissance When we reluctantly did concede that 
equitable and necessary element of armistice supervision, 
the subject of rear-area inspections became academic The 
Communists had their veto, and well have they used it to their 




A basic negotiating technique of Communists is to introduce 
spurious issues and use them as bargaining points To illus- 
trate, imagine that two men are discussing the sale of an auto- 
mobile Suppose that the seller demands $1,000 for his car the 
buyer offers $700 If the seller followed the Communist 
method, something hke the following would occur The Com- 
munist seller would propose that the buyer agree in writing 
to purchase all his future automobiles from the same Commu- 
nist salesman The buyer rejects this, pointing out how un- 
reasonable such an undertaking on his part would be The 
Communist seller insists, however, that the buyer should 
accept the proposal, and continues to so argue over an ex- 
tended period of time Naturally, under such circumstances, 
you or I would terminate the discussion peremptorily and 
find another source of the automobile we need This is not 
possible in international negotiations, however, since matters 
of life and death are at stake Accordingly, our analogy must 
continue After pressing his proposal to commit the auto- 
mobile buyer forever to buy from only one source, himself, 



the Communist seller at last states that he will withdraw his 
proposal only if the buyer will agree to pay $1,000 for the car 
in question When the buyer protests, the Communist seller 
contends that he has made a great concession in withdrawing 
his proposal, therefore, the buyer should be willing to make 
a concession on the price of the car If this sounds fantastic, 
read further and observe it in practice 

After long opposition to any kind of armistice supervision 
agency, the Communists at last proposed the principle that a 
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission should be estab- 
lished This commission, to be composed of representatives of 
nations neutral in the Korean War, was to have the task of 
supervising execution of armistice terms by both belligerent 
sides To this much, both delegations were agreed The only 
question remaining was to agree on the specific nations to 
compose the commission Each side was to nominate three 
neutral nations acceptable to the other side The United Na- 
tions Command nominated Sweden, Switzerland, and Nor- 

Allied to the question of composition of the Neutral 
Nations Supervisory Commission was that of airfield re- 
habilitation The Communists had already made it evident 
that they would not agree to be limited in building or repair- 
ing their military airfields during the truce period They 
needed a negotiating device with which to bargain for United 
Nations Command agreement which would allow them to 
construct military airfields in North Korea after the armistice 
was put into effect To this end the Communists dredged up 
the most absurd red herring it has ever been my misfortune 
to encounter they proposed that the Soviet Union, along with 



Poland and Czechoslovakia, be named as members of the 
Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission In effect, they 
asked the United Nations Command to agree that the Soviet 
Union had been and was neutral in respect to the Korean 

The guns, the aircraft, the tanks, the marme mines, the 
ammunition, the fuel, the trucks, and the military advice that 
had been used by Communist forces in the Korean War came 
from the Soviet Union When my senior liaison officer first 
established contact with the Communists at Kaesong, he was 
held at the point of Russian machine guns, conveyed to the 
meeting place in a Russian jeep, even offered a bottle of vodka 
It was the Soviet Union that attempted to prevent United 
Nations assistance to South Korea It was the Soviet Govern- 
ment that sought to block United Nations resolutions con- 
demning North Korea and Red China as aggressors and call- 
ing on all United Nations members to assist the victims of 
their aggression This was the government proposed by the 
Communists as a neutral m the Korean War 

There is not a doubt in my mind that the Communists 
realized fully how unacceptable the Soviet Union was to the 
United Nations Command They knew that we would oppose 
then* nomination of the Soviet Union as a neutral nation, and 
they intended to withdraw that nomination at a later date in 
return for favorable resolution of the airfield issue Exactly 
that ensued The Communists must have been astounded, 
however, at one aspect of the developments with regard to 
their red hemng They accrued a bonus they could not have 
expected The United States Government declined to base its 
opposition to Soviet membership in the Neutral Nations 



Supervisory Commission on the frank and solid argument that 
the Soviet Union was not a neutral in the Korean conflict 
Instead, the United Nations Command delegation was di- 
rected to object to Soviet membership on the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission on the grounds that the Soviet Union 
had a common border with North Korea While this was an 
unassailable fact of geography, it had little relevance to the 
issue at hand 

The fact that the United Nations Command delegation 
could not denounce the Soviet Union for what it was the 
mainspring and logistic base of aggression in Korea soon 
became apparent to the Communists Gleefully they exploited 
the situation Again and again the Communist negotiators 
taunted us 

<r Why do you give no logical reason for opposing the 
great, peace-loving USSR as a member of the Neutral 
Nations? You give no reason because you have none You 
are unable to deny that the USSR is a true neutral in the 
Korean conflict " 

And so it went day after day for many weeks Meanwhile, 
Washington offered us further ammunition of the "common- 
border" variety We were authorized to point out that the 
Soviet Union participated in the liberation of Korea from 
Japanese forces at the end of World War II, and, therefore, 
should be excluded from the Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission The Communists ridiculed this lame argument 
as enthusiastically as they had lambasted the "common bor- 
der" offering I could not understand the reasoning of those 
m Washington who felt that we should refrain from declaring 
the truth, of objecting to the Soviet Union because that gov- 



eminent was a party to the aggression in Korea After some 
years of reflecting, I have been unable to perceive any sound 
reason for such timidity, nor observe any worth-while fruits 
of that attitude There is stall a great deal to be said for f orth- 
nghtness, even in international negotiations 

Discussion of the issues by senior officers of the two dele- 
gations soon reached a point of complete impasse. In an effort 
to make progress, the United Nations Command delegation 
proposed, and the Communists agreed, to direct the staff offi- 
cers of each side to carry on the discussions Accordingly, 
Colonels Darrow and Kinney for the United Nations Com- 
mand and Colonels Chang and Pu for the Communists 
tackled the thorny question of the Soviet Union as a neutral 
nation The following excerpts from February, 1952, meetings 
of these staff officers indicate the manner in which the Com- 
munists exploited our inability to state flatly that the Soviet 
Union was no neutral in the Korean War 

COLONEL CHANG I would like to make a statement I submit 
hereby the names of three neutral nations which the Korean 
People's Army and the Chinese People's Volunteers are 
prepared to invite, namely, the Soviet Union, Poland, and 
Czechoslovakia At the same time, I formally propose in 
regard to the solution of this problem that both sides agree 
mutually and simultaneously to the submitted neutral na- 
tions of both sides 

COLONEL DARROW I am authorized to state that the neutral 
nations of Poland and Czechoslovakia are acceptable to the 
United Nations Command The Soviet Union is not accept- 



COLONEL CHANG I am sure that your side has understood the 
thought of our side in making the foregoing proposal in 
resolving this question I am also sure that if one side re- 
fused something without supporting it with appropriate 
reasons, the other party would fail to understand such re- 

COLONEL DARROW I should think it would he obvious to your 
side why the Soviet Union is not acceptable as a neutral 
nation and we shall give you the reasons therefor at a later 

COLONEL CHANG Our side f ails to discover any reason by which 
your side opposes those neutral nations which our side has 
submitted I must point out first of all that such an attitude 
on your side is not solving the question but is stalling this 

COLONEL DARROW There are a great many neutral nations 
which your side could invite which would be acceptable to 
our side However, the Soviet Union is not one of them I 
shall be prepared to give you full reasons and amplify my 
remarks at the next meeting 

COLONEL CHANG I again point out the fact that the suggested 
three neutral nations are in full compliance with the defini- 
tion of the neutral nations that both sides understand We 
fail to find any reason that your side should oppose our 
suggestion Such an opposition on your part will only in- 
evitably lead to show that your side is attempting not to re- 
solve this question 

COLONEL KTNNEY The principle already agreed to m plenary 
sessions is as follows "Both sides agree to invite neutral 
nations acceptable to both sides which have not partici- 



pated in the Korean War" The agreement specifically 
states that these neutral nations must be acceptable to both 

COLONEL CHANG By interpreting the principle reached upon 
by both sides, our side cannot find any reason that the other 
side should oppose these suggested neutral nations 

COLONEL DABRQW As I stated before, we cannot accept your 
proposal with the neutral nations that you have submitted 
I haven't anything further on this matter today 

COLONEL CHANG Once again I request that your side should 
give very serious consideration to our proposal m order that 
we may resolve this question 

I would like to inquire as to how your side could possibly 
resolve this question if your side only engages in refusals 
instead of giving any concrete reason at all for rejecting the 
proposal that the other side has made with regard to the 
matter of the nominations of neutral nations Our side sub- 
mitted the proposal that both sides shall agree mutually and 
simultaneously to the proposals submitted by both sides re- 
garding the nominations of neutral nations I, therefore, 
am against your attitude in refusing the proposal that our 
side has submitted with regard to the question of the nomi- 
nations of neutral nations, without giving any reasonable 
substantiation for your refusal Accordingly, I request that 
your side should retract such a stand, which is only un- 
reasonably blocking the progress of the negotiations I make 
this request with a view to facilitate the resolution of this 
question as soon as possible 

COLONEL KTNNEY Colonel Chang, as your side has said many 
tunes, the representatives of the neutral nations in the Super- 



visory Commission have a status in the area under the con- 
trol of both sides as guests You have made that point on a 
number of occasions These persons are to enter the area 
that we control as guests We agree to your view on that 

Now, what you are attempting to do is to force on our 
side an unwanted guest Not only are you attempting to 
force on our side an unwanted guest, but you inquire as to 
the reasons why this particular person is an unwanted 

I am sure that you perceive that this action on your part 
is quite inconsistent with the proprieties The Soviet Union 
does not fit the criteria established by agreement between 
the delegates, and your failure to nominate a nation which 
does fit those criteria, including the criterion that the na- 
tions shall be acceptable to our side, is in direct violation of 
the agreement reached between the delegates and in viola- 
tion of the instructions given to the staff meetings 

COLONEL DARROW I might further point out, Colonel Chang, 
that it was your side which suggested that neutral nations 
be used It was also your side that suggested and stated that 
the neutral nations which would be invited would be agreed 
to and acceptable to both sides With this understanding, 
we did agree to your suggestion of inviting neutral nations 
which would be acceptable to both sides You are now ask- 
ing us to go back on the understanding that was originally 
proposed by your side and accept a nation that is not accept- 
able to our side 

COLONEL CHANG If the statement Colonel Kinney has just 
made is an official one, I cannot but come to the conclusion 



that your side is not interested in the resolution of the 
points at issue now, but rather, is attempting to delay the 
negotiations by availing yourselves of this question as a 
stumbling block on your part 

If it was not a mistake on the part of the interpreter it 
must surely have been a mistake on the part of Colonel 

Our proposal of nominating neutral nations, none of 
which may be excluded, is worked out in accordance with 
the stipulations made in the agreement of the principles 
and with the understanding thereof by both sides None of 
the neutral nations that our side has nominated is an excep- 
tion to the rule in complying with the principle and under- 

# # # 

COLONEL DARROW Your side has said many times that we have 
no reason and cannot give any reason for objecting to the 
nomination of the Soviet Union as one of the neutral 

We have carefully considered these statements made by 
you The United Nations Command does have reasons for 
rejecting the Soviet Union as one of the nations to par- 
ticipate in the Supervisory Commission The reasons are 
clear, cogent and irrefutable 

I should like to point out, however, that neither side is 
obhgated to state reasons for the acceptance or rejection of 
any particular nation Both sides agreed to invite neutral 
nations acceptable to both sides The acceptability or non- 
acceptability of any given nation, therefore, is a unilateral 
matter beyond the purview of these discussions 



In the furtherance of understanding, however, and so that 
our position may be unmistakably clear to you, we will give 
our reasons for staring unequivocally that the Soviet Union 
is not acceptable to our side 

The United Nations Command holds that it is in the 
interest of all concerned that members of the Supervisory 
Commission should be drawn from those nations not in 
close proximity to Korea and without a record of past par- 
ticipation in the Korean question 

This is not the introduction of a new principle It is our 
rightful and unilateral application of logic to the problem 
of selecting nations acceptable to both sides I repeat, the 
Soviet Union is not acceptable to our side 
COLONEL PU The so-called reasons given by your side are 
indeed surprising What is the logic upon which your side 
attempts to exclude nations who are in close proximity to 
Korea as neutral nations? 

If the neutral nations nominated by our side have any 
record of participation in the Korean question, it is the 
record that they strongly oppose any intervention in the 
Korean war It is the record that they firmly support a 
peaceful settlement of the Korean question 

Can your side deny that any of the neutral nations 
nominated by our side is consistent with the definition 
agreed upon by both sides? Can your side deny that the 
Soviet Union is a nation which is most strongly against any 
intervention in the Korean war and which is most strongly 
in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Korean ques- 

Your side cannot give, neither does it have, any reasons 



for objecting to any of the neutral nations nominated by 
our side 

We suggest that your side seriously reconsider the reason- 
able method of solution proposed by our side 
COLONEL DAKROW Our statement is clear and stands on its 
own merits We do not propose to enter into endless dis- 
cussion of matters which are self-evident We strongly 
recommend that you give our statement serious considera- 

The Communists also applied their red-hemng technique 
to an issue concerning the activities of neutral observer teams. 
These neutral observer teams were to be stationed at ports of 
entry, there to check the flow of military personnel and ma- 
t&iel into and out of Korea The United Nations Command 
delegation wished these observers to have the maximum prac- 
ticable latitude in executing their tasks The Communists, on 
the other hand, sought to limit strictly the areas in which the 
observers could operate It was the Communist concept that 
the neutral observers would remain closely confined to certain 
specified buildings and points within the city named as a port 
of entry They conceived that the neutral observers would be 
notified by the local authorities when a shipment was to enter 
Korea, and could tfien proceed to the railway station, dock, or 
airfield being used The neutral observers could then, and only 
then, check the entry or exit involved 

It is only too apparent how ineffective the neutral ob- 
servers would be under the Communist concept of their ac- 
tivities All inspections depended upon the honesty of the 
local Communist military authorities in notifying the neutral 



teams of the impending exchange of personnel or mate"nel 
We in the United Nations Command delegation were more 
than dubious about Communist honesty We preferred to 
allow the neutral observer teams complete freedom to roam 
as they would within and around each port of entry, checking 
activities at random and without notice 

Seeing that a difficulty with the United Nations Command 
delegation was arising in connection with the relative freedom 
of neutral observers, the Communists produced another red 
hemng They proposed that the neutral observers be author- 
ized to inspect every detail of military equipment as they 
checked it in or out Since the "neutral" teams were to have 
Communist members, such a procedure would have exposed 
all United States technological secrets to our enemies The 
bombsights and electronic gunsights of our aircraft, the direct- 
ing mechanisms of our antiaircraft guns, the inner workings 
of our radar sets all of these would have been divulged to 
Communists' eyes On the other hand, Communist aircraft 
and radar were in Manchuna, exempt from investigation by 
neutral observers 

It was utterly fantastic to expect that any nation would ex- 
pose its most critical military secrets to the eyes of its enemies 
The Communists knew this They hammered away, therefore, 
insisting upon unrestricted nghts of examination of our equip- 
ment by their Communist members of the observer teams 
After a period of such insistence, they withdrew this phony 
proposal, contingent upon the United Nations Command ac- 
cepting limits on the general activities of the neutral nations 
Thus, the effectiveness of the neutral observer teams was 
foredoomed to nnpotency in North Korea Events since the 



armistice was signed have overwhelmingly demonstrated that 
ineffectiveness The Communist red hemng has spawned in- 
security for United Nations Command forces in Korea and 
degradation for the prestige of the United States in Asia Not 
bad fishmongers, these Communists 




Communists have two techniques with which to deal with 
truth One they deny it Two they distort it The flat denial 
of truth is the less frequent tactic of Communists, because 
they have learned that truth is buoyant submerged, it will 
pop to the surface at embarrassing moments Therefore, the 
Communists much prefer to employ the tactic of distorting 

The distortion of truth as practiced by the Communists is 
a science The basic procedure is to select out of the whole 
truth certain parts, which, if put together in a particular way, 
produce a conclusion exactly contradictory of the whole truth 
An example might be the story of the witness of a street 
fight A man was accused of mayhem, it being alleged that 
during a street fight he had bitten off the ear of his opponent 
There was only one witness to this fracas The witness was 
put on the stand by the lawyer for the accused The lawyer 

"Did you see my client bite off the ear of this man during 
the fight?" 



The witness replied, "I did not " 

The lawyer for the accused, being encouraged, then pursued 
the point further 

"I want this to be very clear You witnessed the entire 
fight, but you did not see my client bite off his opponent's 

The witness replied, "No, but I saw him spit it out " 

Now the Communist would never have allowed that kst 
statement to appear He would have halted the record at the 
witness' first reply, leaving an utterly false conclusion to the 

The simple fact is that with all respect to the military power 
of the free world, Truth is Communism's most dangerous 
enemy Communism knows this, and therefore has become 
expert at fencing with Truth Communists cannot afford to 
allow the full truth to appear unchallenged at any time If 
necessary, they deny it outright, especially when they are confi- 
dent the full truth is not known to their adversaries or, if 
known, cannot be proved beyond doubt Such was their pro- 
cedure in connection with prisoners of war said by the Com- 
munists to have been "released at the front " 

By February, 1952, the unresolved issues between the two 
delegations had narrowed to three (i) The Soviet Union as 
a "neutral", (2) the question of building airfields during the 
truce, (3) the exchange of prisoners of war The pnsoner-of- 
war question became the main stumbling block of the armis- 
tice effort, delaying a truce for over a year In December, 1951, 
however, we had not entered this raging issue fully Tentative 
discussions were beginning Almost at once the Communists 
began to twist truth 



During the course of the Korean War, nearly 100,000 sol- 
diers of the United Nations Command had been listed as 
missing m action The vast majority of these were troops of 
the Republic of Korea Our own estimates of total numbers 
captured had been roughly validated by propaganda boasts 
uttered over their radios by the Communists On several occa- 
sions the Communist propaganda radio had claimed that 
around 65,000 United Nations Command troops had been 
captured Knowing the barbaric nature of the Communist 
prison camps, the United Nations Command did not expect 
to receive back the full 100,000 who were missing in action 
Some would have died of natural causes, some would have 
been murdered But we were not prepared for the Commu- 
nist distortion we encountered When the two delegations 
exchanged lists of prisoners, the Communists reported they 
had on hand only 11,599 prisoners of war After recovering 
from our amazement, we inquired where the remainder were 
some 55,000 a figure based on the Communists' own radio 
claims How the Communists responded with a weird distortion 
of truth is exemplified in the following extracts from meetings 
of the subdelegations dealing with the prisoner-of-war issue 

ADMIRAL LIBBY The Republic of Korea Army has a total of 
88,000 persons officially reported as missing in action You 
say you have only 7,142 of these men, which is less than 9% 
The United States alone has 11,500 men missing m action 
You say you have only 3,198 That is only 28% 

These percentage relationships between the number of 
prisoners of war admittedly held by you and the number of 
men missing in action are extremely revealing 9% of the 



Republic of Korea Army missing in action and 28% of the 
United States soldiers missing in action are admitted by you 
to be prisoners of war against some 62% of your missing 
in action who are in our custody as prisoners of war Now, 
if we should assume that you captured 62% of our missing 
in action, you would have almost 62,000 prisoners of war 
Now, remember, in the first nine months of hostilities your 
General Headquarters announced capturing 65,363 pris- 
oners Now, in the face of either of these figures, the 65,363 
officially reported by your General Headquarters for the 
first nine months of hostilities, or the 62,000 which is a 
reasonable estimate based on expected percentages, you now 
list only 1 1,559 for ^ e enr ire period of hostilities Certainly 
there can be no actual discrepancy of this magnitude We 
are convinced that you are holding thousands of prisoners 
of war, United Nations and Republic of Korea, for whom 
you have failed to account We request your explanation 
As we said yesterday afternoon, this is the first order of 
business today We request that you account for the mini- 
mum of some 50,000 prisoners of war missing from your 
list I repeat, we request that you account for the mini- 
mum of some 50,000 prisoners of war missing from your 

GENERAL LEE SANG jo Today, too, basing upon your figure 
of missing persons, you calculated the figure that we should 
possess of your prisoners of war held by us That is illogical 
You yourself know it's a fact that it is unscientific and un- 
reasonable to request from the other side the figure of the 
detained prisoners of war with the figure of your missing 
persons, Of course, basing upon a certain basis we can 



calculate out a certain figure But in doing so you can calcu- 
late out relatively accurate figures only when you consider 
the necessary conditions and only when you make use of the 
necessary conditions 

When you consider this question, what conditions must 
be considered? Firstly, you must understand that last year, 
before and after September, there was a sudden change in 
the state of war, that the hostilities went on under a radical 
change That is to say, there was a large-scale movement on 
the front You must remember that under such circum- 
stances we meant not to retain so many prisoners of war, 
and in accordance with our traditional policy towards the 
prisoners of war we released a large number of prisoners of 
war immediately at the front At that time we released 
many, many prisoners of war directly at the front At that 
tame most of the prisoners we had held in Seoul, and m 
regions south of Seoul, were released You must know that 
it is a fact that we captured many prisoners at the front, 
but you must also know that the movements of our troops 
were being done at night And you must know that the dis- 
tance between our front and your positions is not far This 
is a fact which I witnessed at the front myself In transport- 
nig a large number of prisoners of war, it was done with very 
few of our escorts During such movements at night we 
often suffered from your night air raids What does it mean? 
You must understand there is the possibility that with a 
small number of escorts and with the transportation of the 
prisoners of war at night, the prisoners of war can be dis- 
persed, that they can desert, that they can run away Ac- 
cordingly, the fact that the hst we handed over to you con- 



tains not so many prisoners of war is not a bad or strange 
phenomenon as you say 

At the front, when we talked with the prisoners of war and 
found that they are opposed to the war and that they wished 
to go back home, it was then our policy to release most of 
them That we have been continuously doing and that we 
will do We don't think that it is the increase of the military 
forces, as you think, to return the military forces directly 
from the front I tell you that we think it is right Our policy 
of releasing the prisoners of war en masse was right, it was for 
the benefit of the prisoners of war and better than detaining 
so many prisoners of war Accordingly, we do not think 
that the smallness of our list which we handed over to you 
was inappropriate or not good as you think On the con- 
trary, we rather think it was a good thing Those many 
persons who are released and who have gone back home and 
are enjoying a comfortable hfe will certainly know that we 
are really serving the people, that we are working for the 
people Accordingly, you shouldn't ask why we have so few 
prisoners of war in our prison camps, but you should know 
that they are leading a family life at home 

Accordingly, you shouldn't ask us about persons which 
we do not detain in our prisoner of war camps but instead, 
if you are really humanitanan, you should congratulate the 
released people on their hfe at home 

ADMIRAL LEBBY With respect to General Lee's statement You 
have stated that one reason for the extremely small list of 
prisoners of war that you hold is that you have released 
many, many prisoners at the front. Our inf ormation shows 
that exactly 177 prisoners of war were released by you at the 



front That is the number that have returned to our lines, 
177 We have indicated that on the chart The number is 
too small to be shown on the scale but the number is there 
177 They are scarcely a drop in the bucket in the 50,000 
plus, that we consider you must account for Now, you 
stated that owing to the fact that a large number of pris- 
oners of war were moved at night under various conditions 
and with a small number of escorts, some of them could run 
away or escape Surely you don't contend you mislaid some 
50,000 prisoners of war in this manner? We have not avail- 
able at the moment the exact number of escapees that 
returned to our lines, but it is a safe estimate that it will 
not exceed 100 at the most With respect to your conten- 
tion about our use of missing in action figures as a basis of 
calculation to your contention that it is unscientific and 
untenable admittedly the percentage ratio is not definitive 
but it is most certainly indicative 

With respect to the condition of combat mentioned in 
General Lee's statement There were large-scale movements 
on the front after September, 1950 In general, and over-all 
since then, your forces have been retiring and defending It 
is characteristic of a retrograde movement that the missmg- 
in-action figure is relatively high The missing-in-achon 
figure is relatively high because some soldiers who are actu- 
ally lolled in action are listed as missing in action since no 
one has knowledge that they were killed, and the rearward 
movement prevents recovery of the body Thus, the missrng- 
in-action figure tends to be overestimated by the retiring 
force, whereas the missuag-in-action figure is known quite 
accurately for the pursuing force, which is able to find all its 



killed in action Thus, under the over-all combat conditions 
since September, 1950, your missing-in-action figure is 
inflated while ours is the more accurate Yet we hold a 
minimum of 62% of those you carry as missing in action, 
while you admit to holding only 9% of the Republic of 
Korea Army missing in action and only 28% of the United 
States missing in action So much for conditions of combat 
However, we are willing to drop for the fame being further 
consideration of the ratio between killed in action and miss- 
ing in action, if you prefer, and to base our case on your own 
official General Headquarters reports Now, let us sum- 
marize the situation 

Your General Headquarters official claims are that your 
side captured 65,363 United Nations Command prisoners 
of war in the first nine months of the war Yesterday you 
insisted that this was an accurate and reliable figure You 
listed exactly 11,559 United Nations Command prisoners 
on the prisoner-of-war list you gave us We asked you about 
the remaining 53,804 and you replied that you released 
"many, many" at the front Our information shows that this 
"many, many" consisted of exactly 177 This leaves you 
with at least 65,186 prisoners of war to account for, based 
on your official General Headquarters claims and giving you 
credit for the number who came back to us after having 
been released at the front You claimed that there were a 
large number of people who escaped How many escaped 
and where are they now 7 Yet your pnsoner-of-war list still 
accounts for only 11,559 tota ^ Therefore, using the most 
optimistic figure for your side that we can generate by any 
process of logic known to us, we still maintain that there are 



upwards of 50,000 prisoners of war admittedly taken by you 
for whom you have not given any accounting Now let the 
eyes of the world observe your account for these people We 
would like to know where they are We would like a con- 
vincing, factual accounting 

GENERAL LEE Today in your two statements you did mention 
two facts One fact is that you hold many prisoners of war 
The other is that we hold a small number of prisoners of 
war Your arguments are not sound They are arguments 
which ignore many facts 

We tell you again that the figure published by our Gen- 
eral Headquarters, as well as by our government, is correct 
With the figure you have published, you are trying to give 
us the impression that the ratio of prisoners of war held by 
you is great, but you have forgotten the fact that in the 
figure you published and in the lists you have given us, 
many other persons are included You forget the fact that 
should you include the figure of the persons you kidnaped 
from our side, it would be an astonishing figure, and com- 
paring it with the figure which you have given us, your 
figure is even more astonishing You think it is strange that 
our list of the prisoners of war is small 

And with a view to obtaining a certain motive you say 
that the people released by us amount to only 177 There 
is no doubt that this does not coincide with the facts It is 
a preparation for ignoring an important fact It is no more 
than your aim of underestimating the fact that we released 
so many prisoners of war directly at the front If we had, like 
you, detained all the persons we captured, it would be pos- 
sible that we would have the 50,000 you mentioned But we 



allowed those who wanted to go back home and who did 
not want to join a war against their country to go back 
home and lead a peaceful life at home And we directly 
released at the front those foreign prisoners of war who did 
not want to join the war against people who fight for then* 
real independence, who fight for their own people These 
measures of ours are perfectly nght and I tell you that the 
righteous people of the world praise this revolutionary 
policy of ours towards the prisoners of war 

Now you doubt our right and humanitarian measures and 
our most revolutionary measures of releasing the prisoners 
of war, and you deliberately try to give us and others the 
impression that that was not real Whether you recognize 
that fact or not, that is an unshakable fact This is no more 
than your scheme of justifying your unfair insistence on 
retaining part of the prisoners of war, and not releasing 
them, with the reason that the figure of the prisoners of war 
held by us is small whereas the figure of prisoners of war 
held by your side is large Then, speaking concretely, tell us 
what persons we did not release 7 

ADMIRAL LTBBY General Lee, you referred to what our aim was 
in this discussion Our aim is extremely simple We are not 
trying to twist or distort your figures We are using your 
official figures, plus such additional facts and I emphasize 
facts as we have, to arrive at our best estimate as to how 
many of our prisoners of war your side has never accounted 
for by any means whatsoever We are seeking a simple, 
factual accounting for people We have no dark aims or 
hidden motives, we are seeking a simple, factual accounting 
for people, people we believe you hold and have not re- 



ported So I must set the record straight in one very 
important particular You said, General Lee, in your state- 
ment, and I quote as accurately as possible "In searching 
for an objective you say only 177 were released by us " 
What I actually said was, and what I would like to repeat 
is, that of the "many, many" you say you released at the 
front, a total of 177 got back to our lines You say that you 
allowed many, you allowed all those that wanted to go 
home, to go home Since all we are seeking is an accounting, 
we ask you to account for these that you allowed to go 
home We asked you how many were allowed to go home 
Give us a list of their names Since they were obviously 
nationals of the Republic of Korea and the countries of the 
United Nations Command, if you let them go home and 
they had gone home, we should have known about it We 
do not know where they are or who they are Give us an 
accounting of these people 

So we come up against the incontrovertible fact that of 
all the "many, many" people prisoners of war that you 
released at the front according to your assertion, only 177 
ever reached our front lines and none that we know of ever 
reached their homes They have disappeared from the face 
of the earth according to all the facts available to us We 
should like an accounting of those people We should like 
an accounting of the upwards of 50,000 men who, according 
to your own figures and the facts available to us, should be 
in your pnsoner-of-war camps 

GENERAL LEE You asked us to give you the name list of those 
whom we released You must understand that among the 
prisoners of war whom we released, there were those who 



were released directly at the front, and those who were 
brought to the rear and then sent to the front and released 
Therefore, as to the majority of the prisoners of war whom 
we directly released at the front, we did not keep a name 
list and it was not necessary for us to make a name 

ADMIRAL LTBBY The United Nations Command knows, and 
your side knows that we know, that you have captured many 
more soldiers of the Republic of Korea than the 7,142 listed 
in your data Where are all these soldiers now? Some of 
them who have succeeded m making their way back to our 
lines have told us of having been forced to fight against their 
own army until they managed to escape But thousands of 
others are still serving in your army You say they are all 
volunteers We are by no means convinced that this is so, in 
the light of what those returned soldiers have told us In 
any case, these captured soldiers are, and always have been, 
entitled to the status of prisoners of war This means that 
they should never have been used to do work directly con- 
nected with military operations This means that you should 
have shielded them and protected them from the effects of 
military action Obviously, these two rights the right of all 
prisoners of war not to participate in work which con- 
tributes directly to the conduct of the war and the right to 
be protected from the effect of military operations pre- 
clude the use of prisoners of war in actual military service 
against their own forces We feel that your side has fla- 
grantly violated these basic precepts by impressing prisoners 
of war mto your own forces We believe that you have 
further violated their rights as individuals by striking their 



names from the list of the prisoners of war that you handed 
to us And by this action you would deny them the right to 
be repatriated dunng an armistice In other words, having 
used them illegally dunng a war, you would continue to use 
them illegally dunng and after an armistice Now, quite 
apart from the effects of this practice upon the individuals 
concerned, what is its effect upon the basis of exchange of 
the prisoners of war? It constitutes, in our view, a rather 
transparent and fraudulent attempt to get something for 
nothing Having deliberately presented incomplete lists 
from which many thousands of names are missing, you then 
come to this meeting and demand an all-for-all exchange of 
pnsoners of war As I told you yesterday, when you include 
in your lists all the pnsoners of war that you actually hold, 
then your proposal for an all-for-all exchange, however un- 
sound from a military point of view in a military armistice, 
would at least be honest 

GENERAL LEE You want to know where, when, and how many 
pnsoners we released I think your insistence is no more 
than an insistence on not trying to solve the question but 
trying to continue the useless arguments You again make 
such groundless statement that we should possess about 
twenty tunes as much as we actually possess at present The 
fact is certain that of a large amount of prisoners of war 
released, some may be in your army and some may be living 
their family life at home To release all the pnsoners of war 
directly at the front during hostilities is possible only for an 
army which fights only for the people, that you may find 
it hard to understand 



So the arguments continued for many months The United 
Nations Command representative daily demanded an honest 
accounting of the Communist-held prisoners In spite of our 
persistent efforts to ferret out the truth, our opponents clung 
stubbornly to their fantastic he that the question of the "miss- 
ing" 50,000 men no longer existed because they "had been 
released at the front and were home leading peaceful hves " 

On repeated occasions, the United Nations Command dele- 
gation asked the Communists directly whether any prisoners 
held by them were in China On each of these many occasions 
the Communists denied that any prisoners were being held 
outside of Korea Admiral Libby even cited intelligence reports 
to the Communists, showing that American prisoners had 
been seen in China The Communists flatly stated these re- 
ports were fictitious Recent releases of American prisoners 
from China are comment enough on this question But at Pan- 
munjom, the Communist story was one of injured innocence 

ADMIRAL LIBBY Military personnel of your side whom we have 
captured have related that they were members of details 
which escorted United Nations Command personnel to 
pnsoner-of-war camps in China One such individual even 
described in detail a pnsoner-of-war processing center in 
Harbin, China, to which he personally had helped escort 
captured United Nations Command personnel Yet your 
side has, across this table, categoncally denied that you ever 
transported any of our personnel outside of Korea 

GENERAL LEE Judging from your statement of today, you have 
not only not given up your attempt to fabricate non-existent 
facts continually, but have indicated that you are extending 



your continuous absurd position and trying to fabricate 
more fundamentally non-existent facts 

Your attitude of trying not to settle the question but to 
delay the meeting is shown clearly by your saying that we 
have transported prisoners of war outside of Korea, or by 
your saying that you knew something from the propaganda 
made at the front by such rumors which you spread not 
only at the conference table but also outside the conference 

One of the wildest distortions of truth resorted to by the 
Communists arose early in the armistice conference, when we 
were attempting to fix a truce line across Korea In their efforts 
to gain acceptance of a truce line more favorable to their 
ultimate purposes, the Communists sought to degrade the 
combat capabilities of the United Nations Command They 
became contemptuous of American strength in Korea, espe- 
cially of the effect of our air and naval strength When re- 
minded that it was basically United States naval and air 
strength that had brought Japan to surrender in World War 
II, the Communists asserted that United States military efforts 
against Japan failed, and that it was only after the Soviet 
Union entered the war that the Japanese surrendered Notice 
that the last part of this statement is historically correct The 
implication is, of course, grossly false Japanese efforts to 
arrange a surrender to the United States began many months 
before the Soviet Union entered the Pacific War Japan would 
have been forced to surrender to the United States even had 
the Soviet Union entered the Pacific War on the side of Japan 
Yet the Communists sought to use the half-truth that the 
Japanese surrendered one week after the Soviets entered the 



fray to create an illusion totally contradictory to the actual 
facts Listen to the voice of the Communist mouthpiece as he 
utters this distortion 

"You said that in the last war Japan was defeated as a 

result of blows inflicted by your naval and air forces 

Your forces fought Japan for nearly four years without bemg 

able to defeat them It was only by the Soviet Army that a 

crushing blow was dealt and Japan was finally defeated " 

On occasion the Communists had to rely on flat denial of 

truth Such an occasion arose when the details of the truce line 

were bemg fixed It had been agreed that the demarcation line 

would be the actual line of ground contact between the two 

opposing armies The question remained. Where, exactly, was 

this line of contact 7 Staff officers were assigned to work out on 

a map the actualities of the battle situation Colonels Kmney 

and Murray for the United Nations Command delegation met 

with Colonels Chang and Tsai of the Communist group to 

accomplish this task 

Kmney and Murray were promptly presented with a Com- 
munist map showing the battle line about twenty miles be- 
hind the front-line positions of the United States Eighth 
Army Some points on the Communist "line of contact" were 
even behind the division headquarters of our front-line divi- 
sions Our staff officers recognized the futility of debating with 
Communists who were deliberately choosing to deny facts 
Accordingly, they proposed to Colonels Chang and Tsai that 
all four officers proceed by helicopter along the battle line, 
indenfafymg by actual examination the location of key points 
held by one side or the other The Communists refused to do 
this, knowing that such a procedure would invalidate their 



position They simply continued to deny that the battle line 
was where it in fact lay One point claimed by the Com- 
munists lay some five miles south of Panmunjom, where the 
negotiations were being held The Communist map showed 
the battle line crossing the crest of a mountain at that point 
Actually, the line of contact was five miles to the north, as 
attested by the fact that a vicious battle was raging there even 
as the staff officers talked Knowing this, Kmney and Murray 
proposed that the Communist officers join them m going 
immediately to the site of the battle then in progress, thus to 
determine the actual line of contact at that point The Com- 
munists refused They wanted no close contact with truth 

Americans find it difficult to visualize a breed of men who 
fight Truth at every turn, not just occasionally, but always and 
repeatedly Yet, the Communists are such a breed Nothing is 
so perilous to their dark designs as the full, unveiled truth I 
sometimes thought they would rather lie than tell the truth 
even when the truth would make a better case for them By 
whatever means are most effective, they assault Truth Indeed, 
dedicated as they are to the ascendancy of the greatest lie of 
history, they can do no other 




Communists regard any concession made by then: opponents 
as a sign of weakness Many Westerners entertain the notion 
that to accept some part of a Communist negotiating proposal 
will encourage the Communists to respond in kind On the 
contrary, such action is likely to induce an even more adamant 
attitude on their part The Communists reason that their 
opponents would not accept any part of Communist proposals 
if any other choice were available Communists expect their 
opponents to accept their proposals only when compelled to 
do so, or when an exchange of concessions by each side is 
involved Therefore, if Western negotiators simply agree to a 
Communist proposal without insisting on an equal concession 
on another point, the Communists conclude that their op- 
ponents are in a weak general position With this conclusion 
in mind, the Communists become more aggressive, demand- 
ing more, and conceding nothing 

Communists will never accept a Western proposal, or 
recede from one of their own, simply because logic or truth 
indicated such action, or merely to make progress in a con- 



ference Accordingly, they will not credit their opponents with 
being motivated by logic or by a sincere desire to make 
progress Whenever Western negotiators make a concession to 
Communist views for the purpose of making progress, Com- 
munists consider this action is evidence of a deteriorating 
Western position Therefore, they press even more strongly for 
further concessions, and become more confident that fame 
plays on their side 

It has been described earlier how the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation sought to gain Communist acceptance of 
aerial observation of the truce Our purpose was to provide a 
means of checking, by fast and reliable means, the activities of 
both sides in abiding by truce terms The Communists, how- 
ever, objected strenuously to this procedure Apparently, they 
knew that though they could completely frustrate ground 
observation of then* intended violations of the truce terms, 
aenal observation would be most difficult to circumvent 
Based upon considerable experience with Communists in 
Korea, the United Nations Command held fast to its proposal 
of aenal observation as an essential to safeguard the armistice 
terms A stalemate resulted, with both sides eyeing each other 
for signs of recession Excerpts from the ensuing discussion 
follow (General Ferenbaugh of the United States Army was 
the United Nations Command spokesman at this tune ) 

GENERAL HsiEH Will you cancel your proposal "In addition, 
such periodic aenal reconnaissance, observation, and photo- 
graphic flights as are required will be performed by the non- 
combatant observer teams"? 

GENERAL FERENBAUGH We think our proposal has great ment 



Our side has every right to he concerned for the security of 
our forces during the time of the armistice 

GENERAL HsiEH You will not take away that stumbling block 7 

GENERAL FERENBAUGH We gave you a proposal which will in- 
crease the stability of the armistice It is your refusal to 
accept such a provision that causes the deadlock, stumbling 
block, roadblock, or as you choose to designate it It is your 
side that blocks progress by opposing a stable armistice 

GENERAL HSIEH I cannot but point out that you have reversed 
right and wrong Your proposal is an interference HI our 
internal affairs That proposal, every sentence and every 
word, was put there by your side As I have repeatedly 
pointed out, the side that invites suspicion in these armistice 
negotiations and in the attitude toward the entire settle- 
ment of the Korean question is your side The deadlock is 
created by your side and it is entirely up to you to break this 

GENERAL FERENBAUGH I have a couple of thoughts Why do 
you object to noncombatant observer teams, noncombatant 
pilots with noncombatant crews and noncombat airplanes, 
performing in the same manner as the ground observer 
teams will do 7 

GENERAL HSIEH Our side holds that there should be no intro- 
duction of military forces in Korea Therefore, inspection of 
ports of entry in the rear through which military forces can 
be introduced is sufficient There is no need for flights and 
aenal inspection all over the country 

GENERAL FERENBAUGH Let's take a hypothetical case. How do 
you expect observer teams to inspect the some 570 miles of 
the Yalu River? 



GENERAL HSIEH There is no need for me to answer that ques- 

GENERAL KERENBAUGH I have another thought then We are 
not concerned with whether we interfere with your internal 
affairs when the alternative to that is to increase greatly the 
threat to our forces in other words, the threat of your in- 
creased military capabilities Security comes first during an 

GENERAL HSIEH This quesbon has been answered by me many 
tunes I have said that the side that invites suspicion is not 
our side but your side 

GENERAL PERENBAUGH Let's carry this a bit further Who in- 
vites suspicion? Who invites suspicion by wanting to re- 
habilitate airfields 7 Who is to decide nght from wrong? 

GENERAL HSIEH It is not the right of any military armistice to 
discuss the questions of internal facilities of an independent 
and sovereign state, even less, to make any decision on it 
Your side raised such unreasonable demands, we have a 
perfect nght to refuse to discuss them I tell you I am not 
here to negotiate this point the question as to what can be 
rehabilitated and what cannot You had better not harbor 
such an illusion 

GENERAL FERENBAXTGH General Hsieh, you might as well ac- 
cept the fact the United Nations Command is going to keep 
on insisting on a safeguard, insurance if you will, against the 
threat of the development of a military air capability on 
your side during the armistice 

GENERAL HSIEH Your side should be well aware of our attitude 
on the settlement of the Korean quesbon Our posibon on 
this quesbon consbtutes no threat at all to your side 



GENERAL FEKENBATJGH We think there is a lot of good hard 
common sense in our statement I suggest that you apply 
this in reading our proposal I suggest that you give earnest 
consideration in connection with that proposal 

GENERAL HsrEH There is a prerequisite to our consideration 
If your side insists on including the proposal for aerial ob- 
servation, we will not give any consideration to your pro- 

As mentioned before, the United Nations Command dele- 
gation (over its objections) received orders from Washington 
to renounce its position favoring aenal observation of the 
truce Evidently, Washington believed that a no-strings- 
attached backdown by the United Nations Command delega- 
tion would produce a better atmosphere at the conference 
table, leading to greater progress toward a truce Nothing 
could have been more removed from reality 

No sooner did the Communists witness the United Nations 
Command concession on aerial observation of the truce than 
they stiffened noticeably in their opposition to the United 
Nations Command proposal on airfield rehabilitation We 
were seeking to prohibit the construction or rehabilitation of 
military airfields in Korea during the armistice The Com- 
munists opposed this proposal Until the United Nations 
Command delegation conceded the question of aenal observa- 
tion, however, the Communists' arguments regarding airfield 
reconstruction were somewhat less than categoric After our 
concession on the aenal observation issue, the Communist 
position on airfield reconstruction became absolutely inflex- 
ible They never did yield on the question of airfields The 



armistice agreement as finally signed contained no provision 
for aerial observation and no prohibition of airfield construc- 
tion Thus by a "naked" concession on one issue we gained 
nothing and prejudiced another 

A similar sequence of events occurred in connection with 
the setting up of an organization to supervise the armistice 
The United Nations Command delegation advocated a joint 
supervisory commission composed of representatives of the 
two belligerent forces in Korea The Communists initially 
opposed any land of armistice supervisory agency, other than 
the Armistice Commission itself which would be empowered 
only to supervise the demilitarized zone Later, however, they 
proposed a "neutral nations" commission We were well 
aware that the Communist conception of a "neutral" would 
be a Communist state We could see nothing but hypocrisy 
and disadvantage for the United States in an armistice super- 
visory agency made up of "neutrals" who were Soviet satellites 
When the question reached a point of impasse, Washington 
directed the United Nations Command delegation to accept 
the "neutral nations" concept, although we had warned that 
inspection by neutral teams would be nothing more than a 
gesture with respect to the principle of inspection 

When the Communists were apprised of our recession on 
the composition of the supervisory agency they pondered the 
matter for several weeks As described previously, at the end of 
this period they proposed the Soviet Union as a neutral-nation 
member of the supervisory commission I felt that the Com- 
munists took this action somewhat with tongue in cheek 
They could scarcely have believed that we would accept the 



Soviet Union as a "neutral " They must have wished to probe 
Western weakness in order to discover whether it had a hot- 
torn In any event, the issue of the Soviet Union as a "neutral" 
grew directly from our concession regarding the composition 
of the supervisory organization Give the Communists an inch 
and they seek to take a mile 

Perhaps the greatest smgle blunder of which the Western 
world was guilty in the Korean Armistice Conference arose 
from the fallacy of "concessions " The first mistake in this 
connection occurred when the demarcation line, or truce line 
separating the two sides, was being established As mentioned 
before, from the standpoint of hindsight, the United Nations 
Command delegation made a major error in allowing determi- 
nation of the truce line to precede other agenda items We 
could have recovered from this error, however, had we been 
permitted to do so But the error was compounded and made 
irrevocable by a directive from Washington 

When the United Nations Command delegation ap- 
proached the question of a truce line across Korea, we came to 
an early conclusion that there should be no firm identification 
of that line until just prior to the signing of the armistice 
agreement We recognized that to specify a particular line on 
the map as the truce line would tend to freeze the combat 
situation, relieving the Communists of military pressure Ac- 
cordingly, we sought agreement m principle that the truce line 
should be the line of contact between the ground forces at the 
time the armistice agreement -was signed 

Such an agreement would leave the Eighth Army free to 
continue its northward advance and thus to exert continuing 



pressure on the Communists to reach an early armistice agree- 
ment The more the Communists delayed, the more they 
would lose in Korea 

The Communists recognized the implications of a free- 
wheeling truce line as well as we did They were insistent, 
therefore, that the truce line be fixed once and for all They 
realized that once a line was finally set and agreed upon, the 
United Nations Command would not he free to conduct mili- 
tary operations and to seize territory that would have to he 
surrendered again at the time the truce was signed Further- 
more, the casualties inevitably resulting could not be justified 
In short, they wanted a "de facto" cease fire as a relief from 
the Eighth Army's pressure 

In order to secure a "de facto" cease fire, the Communists 
sought the agreement of our General Hodes and Admiral 
Burke to fix the truce line at once Listen to Communist Gen- 
eral Lee Sang Jo 

GENERAL LEE SANG jo Our enfare position on Item 2 of the 
agenda cannot be fairer or more reasonable We propose 
that we strictly abide by the present line of contact with 
necessary adjustments in fixing the military demarcation 
hne and establishing the demilitarized zone If only you 
agree to abide strictly by the contact hne, we could proceed 
swiftly to checking the existing line of contact according to 
factual data 

GENERAL HODES I want to straighten you out on one point 
nght quickly We did not say at any fame that we would 
agree that any line of contact or demarcation line could be 
fixed only during the period of discussion of Item 2 of the 



agenda and neither will we agree to any such fixation We 
made it very clear to you, and until today we have under- 
stood that you were in full agreement, that any changes in 
the line of contact at any tune prior to the final signing of 
the armistice would be reflected in the demilitarized zone 
In other words, since the line of contact is not fixed, the 
demilitarized zone is not fixed until the armistice is signed 
I hope that is very clear 

GENERAL LEE SANG jo You either misunderstood or twisted 
our statements By repeating a statement we can correct 
your misunderstanding 

GENERAL MODES The part that is particularly difficult for us to 
understand is why you want to take the fame necessary now 
to determine exactly the line of contact for mutual agree- 
ments as of now when we must determine where it is at the 
fame we finalize the agreement for an armistice Of course, 
it can be done We think that since it must be done at the 
proper fame there is nothing to be gained by doing it at this 

GENERAL LEE SANG jo The question is Can we determine the 
military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone here 
or not? I think we can reach an agreement on that here But 
in spite of that you say you cannot determine it and that 
you are not going to have any final decision at this time 
The question of determining this is the question of laying 
the foundation for the armistice negotiations. Although the 
delegations have not yet determined and signed the agree- 
ment, if they reach an agreement there can be no great 
change in the battle front The question of whether either 
delegation brings forth changes after the determination is 



the quesfaon of their good faith towards the armistice Sup- 
pose there is a line on which both sides agree, than it will 
not be necessary to make changes in the line both have 
agreed to, since if this line is determined the foundation for 
the armistice has been reached and the other questions will 
be easily settled 

ADMIRAL BURKE This morning you have raised a new problem 
This further complicates an already difficult question Con- 
trary to our previous understanding of the expectation of 
both sides that the armistice agreements must be based on 
conditions existing at the time of signing, you now state you 
want to fix a line of contact now and that line of contact 
will not be subject to change between the time of fixing the 
line and the signing of the armistice 

In July, when the conference was started, we believed that 
an armistice would be obtained in a short tame We had 
hopes the fighting would cease soon Our hopes did not 
materialize, 118 days have passed since the conference be- 
gan Do you believe that anyone then could have prophesied 
that the line of contact would be where it is today, four 
months later? Neither we, nor you, nor anyone have any 
way of knowing now how much tune will elapse before we 
reach an agreement on how much conditions will change 
An armistice agreement must be based on conditions exist- 
ing at about the time the armistice is signed 

The question at issue in these premises was not one of real 
estate It was a question of military pressure, without which 
we doubted that the Communists could be compelled to nego- 
tiate reasonably On the other hand, we felt sure that if our 



United Nations Command attack was kept up in full strength 
the Communists would have no choice but to accept equitable 
armistice terms within a reasonable time It was evident to us 
that the Communist negotiators analyzed the situation like- 

At this point the United Nations Command delegation, 
over our and General Ridgway's strenuous objections, received 
instructions from Washington directing us to agree to im- 
mediate delineation of a truce line across Korea These in- 
structions specified that we should require the Communists 
to agree to a provisional truce line conforming to the battle 
line which would hold good for thirty days, after which the 
truce line would become the battle line at the time the armis- 
tice was signed In effect, this decision gave the Communists 
what they had been seeking a "de facto" cease fire for thirty 
days which enabled them to dig in and stabilize their bat- 
tle line This concession to the Communists was the turn- 
ing point of the armistice conference Thereafter, because the 
fighting slackened, we lacked the essential military pressure 
with which to enforce a reasonable attitude toward the nego- 
tiations Our delegation no longer had a strong lever to use 
against Communist intransigence Thereafter we were con- 
fronted with Communist stalling and delaying tactics at every 
turn It is my considered judgment that this error in offering a 
concession to gam nothing more than apparent (and illusory) 
progress m the negotiations cost the United States a full year 
of war in Korea and armistice terms far more disadvantageous 
than otherwise could have been obtained I hope our govern- 
ment learned a lesson Certainly we paid a monstrous price for 
the schooling 




Communist negotiating procedure is replete with devices de- 
signed to avoid agreements in any way prejudicial to their 
objectives Yet when these have been fully employed the Com- 
munists have not shot their final bolt Communists are not 
embarrassed in the least to deny an agreement already reached 
It makes little difference that such agreements may be in 
written form If so, the Communists simply state that your 
interpretation is an incorrect one 

Communist tactics in welshing on agreements are often 
identical to those of the man who was required to state, under 
oath, whether a certain written sentence was correct The 
sentence was, "Jones said Smith was the guilty party " The 
man certified under oath that this statement was correct Later 
he decided to change his position on the matter in question 
Consequently, he then stated that the correct version was, 
"Jones," said Smith, "was the guilty party " By inserting punc- 
tuation he changed the sense of the sentence 180 degrees 
With people who are capable of such tncky reversals of their 
field, having agreements in writing helps very little 



As discussed in the preceding chapter, the first major agree- 
ment reached m the Korean Armistice Conference was to use 
the ground battle line as the truce line Staff officers labored 
for weeks to reach an agreed version of where this line of con- 
tact lay After seemingly interminable haggling by the Com- 
munists, a line was finally marked out, mile by tortured mile, 
on a huge map of Korea Each point on the line was disputed^ 
until finally one side or the other conceded the position After 
long days and nights of such crawling progress, at last a line 
existed on the map that had been accepted in all parts by both 
groups of staff officers No sooner had the last section been 
drawn in, completing the line to the sea, than the Communist 
staff officers began welshing on their agreements Colonel Tsai 
turned to previously agreed sections of the map and an- 
nounced that he could not accept the positions marked 
thereon The first point he indicated as unacceptable was con- 
tamed in a section of the line that he himself had marked in 
with a red pencil Thus, Tsai denounced as unacceptable to 
his side a section of the truce line he himself had ]ust entered 
on the map and which had been agreed to by our United 
Nations Command staff officers Colonel Murray, our United 
Nations Command staff officer who had developed the line 
along with Tsai, slammed down his fist on the conference 
table and grated at the Chinese "Why, you damned buffoon' 
You deny agreements you entered into not an hour ago, in 
fact one you yourself offered'" This outburst by Murray, a 
formidable-looking Marine officer, caused Tsai to retire to the 
far corner of the tent muttering that he could not be bullied. 
In the upshot, the disputed points were resolved, but not 
without extended wrangling 



Some months later, the question of exchanging prisoners 
of war arose in all its complications As will be discussed later, 
on instructions from Washington the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation adopted the position that only those pris- 
oners who would not forcibly resist repatriation should be 
returned to the Communists This principle required that a 
screening of all United Nations Command-held prisoners be 
accomplished to determine which ones were to return to the 
Communists After objecting for many weeks to such a pro- 
cedure, as well as to the principle of no forced repatriation, 
the Communists tacitly agreed to the screening process They 
even proceeded to assist the United Nations Command in 
executing the screening by providing a letter to be read to all 
prisoners urging them to return to the Communist fold The 
letter stated in part 

"We wholeheartedly welcome the return of all of our 
captured personnel to the arms of the motherland, we have 
further guaranteed, in an agreement reached with the other 
side, that all captured personnel shall, after their repatria- 
tion, rejoin their families to participate in peaceful con- 
struction and live a peaceful life " 

Thus the Communist negotiators contributed to the screen- 
ing process before the screening of prisoners was accomplished 
and before results displeasing to them became known Now 
hear them on this same point after the screening count had 
come in, showing that the majority of the prisoners did not 
wish to return to Communism 

GENERAL NAM EL We absolutely do not recognize any of the 
so-called screening and its results conducted by your side' 



Our side absolutely cannot agree to any such course of 
action taken by your side' This figure, which does not in the 
least represent actual facts, is meaningless and our side 
absolutely cannot consider it' In taking such a course of 
action and presenting such an absurd figure, your side is in 
effect attempting to make our side accept completely, 
through this round figure, the principle of so-called "volun- 
tary repatriation" of your side That principle of "voluntary 
repatriation" is, in effect, a principle of forced retention of 
the captured personnel of our side It has met with firm 
opposition from our side for the past four months and that 
is what our side absolutely cannot accept Your side has 
overthrown the basis for further negotiations' Such in- 
sistence by your side on our acceptance of your absurd and 
unreasonable proposition of forced retention of the captured 
personnel of our side will not have its way and will not 
achieve its aim Such insistence by your side only makes us 
more doubtful whether your side really intends to settle 
questions through negotiations and to reach an armistice at 
any early date 

Our side is firmly opposed to the retention of our cap- 
tured personnel by your side and to any screening which is 
designed for the retention of our captured personnel. It is 
inconceivable and nobody would believe that our side, who 
is firmly opposed to the retention of our captured personnel 
by your side under whatever name, could have agreed di- 
rectly to your so-called screening' 

The question now is whether your side would choose to 
insist upon your unilateral and unreasonable proposition to 
retain our captured personnel rather than reach an armistice 



in Korea If you do this, you will be condemned by the 
families of tens of thousands of war prisoners by both sides 
and by the peace-loving people throughout the world 

ADMIRAL JOY You furnished our side for use in our screening 
process a statement of amnesty from your official sources In 
short, you knew that screening was to take place, you 
acquiesced in its accomplishment, and only when its result 
was not to your hkmg and expectation did you decide to 
object to it Had the results been to your liking, you would 
have enthusiastically welcomed the product of the screening 
Thus it is clear that your complaint that the screening of 
prisoners of war was illegal is a hypocritical complaint, 
based on your unwillingness publicly to acknowledge the 

GENERAL NAM XL Our side has always been opposed to your 
screening of our captured personnel Our side opposed it in 
the past, opposes it now, and will oppose it in the future 
But you have the audacity to say that, "The screening of 
prisoners was entered into in good faith and was done with 
your full knowledge and acquiescence " I must point out 
with emphasis that this is completely fabrication and 
slander The record of the discussions of the pnsoner-of-war 
question thoroughly behes such unfounded fabrications of 

Thus the Communists executed denials of agreements they 
had entered To them the matter is very simple An agreement 
has no special validity of its own, no matter how solemnly 
ratified An agreement is binding on Communists only if it 
operates to the advantage of their purposes If they discover 



that an agreement works to the disadvantage of Communism, 
then it is invalid To their devious minds, it is irrational to 
abide by an undertaking that is working out badly for their 
cause, no matter what dishonor might attend the act of 
welshing Whoever rests his faith on the reliability of Com- 
munist agreements hangs perilously by a frayed rope 

A somewhat amusing indication of the Communist tend- 
ency to welsh occurred in February, 1952, when we took up 
Item 5 of the agenda This item was cryptically stated as 
"Recommendations to the governments concerned" The 
Communists wished to incorporate in this item all manner of 
proposals relating to the general situation in the Far East 
The United Nations Command delegation firmly maintained, 
however, that the "charter" of the Korean armistice confer- 
ence limited it strictly to Korea Finally, the Communists sub- 
mitted a proposal regarding Item 5 The sense of this proposal 
was substantially that after the armistice was signed, a political 
conference should be held to discuss such matters as with- 
drawal of foreign troops from Korea, a peace treaty for Korea, 
and related matters 

Our delegation considered the Communist proposal from the 
standpoint that, after all, it constituted no more than a recom- 
mendation to the governments involved in the Korean War 
Those governments could accept or reject the recommenda- 
tions as they saw fit Therefore, we promptly accepted tie 
Communist proposal 

When I informed Nam II that our side accepted his word- 
ing for Item 5, the Communist delegation went into a state 
of confusion Not only had the United Nations Command 
delegation accepted their wording for Agenda Item 5, we had 



accepted it quickly. The Communists were all suspicion 
Where had they blundered? Nam II asked for a forty-minute 

At the end of the recess, Nam II asked that the recess be 
extended until the following day On the following day, the 
Communists again extended the recess for another twenty-four 

When we met again with the Communists, Nam II deliv- 
ered a long statement full of escape clauses affecting his own 
proposal At the end of this, still apparently uncertain about 
his own proposal, Nam II proposed that staff officers be 
directed to discuss Item 5 further Colonels Chang and 
Kmney were delegated to this task, but I instructed Kinney 
not to agree to any substantive change in the Communists' 
proposal No further meetings were ever held on this subject 

The Communists did not actually welsh on their own pro- 
posal regarding Item 5, but I think it is obvious they thought 
long and hard about doing so Though they had submitted 
theu: proposal in writing and argued for it in vigorous fashion, 
none of us in the United Nations Command delegation would 
have been at all surprised if they had denounced it utterly 
when our meetings were resumed Perhaps the moral of this 
story is Never trust a Communist promise, however given 
trust only Communist deeds 




Allied with all other Communist techniques heretofore con- 
sidered, and invariably used m conjunction therewith, is the 
Communist procedure of endless, stupid repetition of their de- 
mands By "stupid'* I do not mean to imply that their pro- 
cedure as a whole is senseless Far from it Altogether too 
often, mere repetition of their demands gams Communist 
objectives The substance of the statements used in repetition 
of demands introduces the imtatingly stupid element On day 
after barren day the Communists will regurgitate the identical 
statements, the same arguments, used endlessly before They 
seem to follow the philosophy of the small lad who had a 
dollar bill changed into pennies at one bank, then back into 
a bill at another bank, then back into pennies, ad infimtum 
When asked why he pursued this seemingly senseless practice, 
the lad replied, "Sometime somebody is gomg to make a mis- 
take, and it isn't going to be me " 

It has been described earlier how the Communists sought 
to impose on the Korean Armistice their idea that the 38th 
Parallel of latitude should be the truce line The arguments 



they advanced to support this proposal were few, simple, and 
utterly fallacious Their chief point was that since the war 
began on the 38th Parallel, it should end there Such a policy 
applied to our war with Japan would have resulted in our 
surrendering every area of the Pacific we had won in battle 
back to Pearl Harbor, since it was at Pearl Harbor that the 
war began Despite the nonsense of their proposal, the Com- 
munists held to it, repeated it, replayed the same old broken 
record over a period of four and one-half months It would be 
impossible to describe the unutterable boredom of listening to 
the same hollow arguments that long In an effort to break the 
singsong monotony of Communist speeches, and with a hope 
of making better progress, the United Nations Command 
delegation first proposed recessing the full meetings of dele- 
gates into meetings of subdelegafaons Hearing the same story 
at these subdelegafaon meetings, we then proposed recessing 
into meetings of staff officers Always, however, the arguments 
presented by the Communists were almost letter-perfect re- 
petitions of those presented earlier Our own interpreters 
hardly needed to follow the current declamations of the Com- 
munist spokesmen they knew them by memory 

Each morning, prior to proceeding to Kaesong or Panmun- 
jom for the day's events, the delegation held an informal 
meeting to discuss what should be done during that day's con- 
ference At one of these, our fine young interpreter, Lieutenant 
Kenneth Wu, reeled off a long statement which he predicted 
would be made by the Communists at the forthcoming ses- 
sion He may have missed it by a comma, but not more 

When negotiations at Kaesong were suspended by Com- 
munist action they called off all meetings "indefinitely" a 



period ensued in which the respective liaison officers met in an 
effort to arrange resumption of the conference The United 
Nations Command position was flat and clear we would 
resume anytime, anywhere, except at Kaesong Their sole argu- 
ment was that the conference had begun at Kaesong and 
should therefore continue at Kaesong The United Nations 
Command delegation, through our liaison officers, explained 
that the Kaesong site had a record of three major interruptions 
of the conference, owing to circumstances peculiar to Kaesong 
We would not return to that site, hut would meet anywhere 
else that provided a more neutral setting 

After stating our case against Kaesong, our liaison officers 
met daily with the Communists between August 2zd and 
October 25th, hstenmg to the same Communist tune Come 
back to Kaesong I have no idea how long the Communists 
might have continued to repeat themselves regarding a return 
to Kaesong had it not been for the following salutary turn 
of events 

During the course of the liaison officers' meetings, the 
United Nations Command resumed its check-reined offensive 
against the Communist armies in Korea All United Nations 
Command forces ground, naval, and air opened up their 
powerful attack Soon the Communist forces were reeling 
from these heavy blows No sooner had this condition been 
created by our military action than the Communists became 
most reasonable at the conference table Suddenly my liaison 
officers were able to achieve marvels of negotiating skill 
Chang, for the Communists, became a model of cooperative- 
ness Sitting in my tent at Munsan after a day of unprece- 
dented progress at Panmunjom, and cocking an ear at the 



sound of our shells and bombs crunching against Communist 
positions, our Colonel Kinney remarked to me, "Those [the 
explosions] are your most effective arguments " I am convinced 
beyond any doubt that had our powerful offensive during the 
autumn of 1951 been continued, we would have had an armis- 
tice in Korea a year earlier than we did 

The pnsoner-of-war issue was the backdrop against which 
we listened to the Communist technique of repetition ad 
nauseam. On December nth, 1951, debate on the prisoner-of- 
war question began It continued for eighteen months Com- 
munist arguments against our United Nations Command 
principle of "no forced repatriation of prisoners" were re- 
peated, I would say, at least a thousand fames Literally, there 
were millions of words spoken by the Communist negotiators 
condemning the United Nations Command for refusing to 
return prisoners to Communism at bayonet point Consider 
the following three speeches by Communist spokesmen, each 
given at a different fame, each replete with untruths and dis- 

On 25 April, 1952 

COLONEL TSAI Your side insists on the application of the so- 
called "voluntary repatriation" to all of the captured person- 
nel of our side, but the ami of your side that is, the 
ultimate result which you are pursuing is forced retention 
of more than 100,000 of the captured personnel of our side 
You have made use of the Chiang Kai-shek and Syngman 
Rhee special agents to perpetrate all kinds of criminal activ- 
ities in the pnsoner-of-war camps of your side, tattooing the 
captured personnel of our side, forcing them to write pefa- 



bons in blood, and even not hesitating to resort to bloody 
massacres and to carry out bloody criminal activities These 
facts are well known to all the people of the world You 
must know that the captured personnel of our side are 
under the military control of your side, and that such crim- 
inal acts of yours are in open and direct violation of the 
Geneva Convention, and will not be permitted by just 
people all over the world 

Your side, however, unreasonably insists upon this prop- 
osition of so-called "voluntary repatriation" which is not at 
all tenable Under your military control, how could there 
be the conditions for expression of free will and purpose? 
There has never been anything as "voluntary repatriation" 
throughout history This proposition is in itself invalid It is 
a direct violation of the Geneva Convention, from which 
your side has been quoting so readily and frequently I think 
that in your hearts you yourselves are also aware that your 
proposition is in no way justifiable As a result, the discus- 
sions on the question of prisoners of war during the period 
from December 11, 1951, to March 5, 1952, has yielded no 

In fact, the ami of your side is not to solve the question 
through negotiations on a fair and reasonable basis Your 
side is not in the least concerned with the interests of the 
tens of thousands of captured personnel of our side and 
their families Your true purpose is to delay these negotia- 
tions, or even to wreck them, so as to satisfy your desire of 
gathering cannon fodder for your further extending the war 
in collaboration with your friends Chiang Kai-shek and 
Syugman Rhee 



On 18 May, 1952 

GENERAL NAM IL To release and repatnate all war prisoners m 
the custody of "both sides after the cessation of hostilities is a 
matter of course, and is also explicitly required by the 
Geneva Convention If this self-evident principle is fol- 
lowed, the question of war prisoners should have been 
settled speedily and reasonably long ago The reason why 
the question of war prisoners is not yet settled is entirely 
due to your insistence on the absurd proposition of retaining 
our captured personnel as your cannon fodder, against the 
natural desire of war prisoners to return home to lead a 
peaceful life, and against the stipulation of the Geneva 
Convention as recognized by the whole world 

In order to reach your objective of forcibly retaining our 
captured personnel, your side has long since used Chiang 
Kai-shek's gangsters and Syngman Rhee's agents to maltreat 
our captured personnel employing every barbarous method 
and even creating world-known bloodshed to screen our 
captured personnel by force and subject them to your slav- 
ery Your criminal acts against the law and against humanity 
have developed to such a notorious extent that they are 
impossible for you to hide 

You should know that your proposition of retaining our 
captured personnel by force under the name of "voluntary 
repatriation" is itself in total violation of the Geneva War 
Prisoner Convention Your such unilateral and unreason- 
able proposition is absolutely unacceptable Your side dis- 
regards the urgent desire of your own captured personnel to 
go home and lead a peaceful life Your side chooses to insist 



upon your proposition of retaining our captured personnel 
rather than stopping the Korean War 

On 21 May, 1952 

GENERAL NAM EL Your side has not yet made any account for 
the repeated massacre of our captured personnel perpetrated 
by your side Yet your side once again carried out bloody 
murder of our captured personnel The serious sanguinary 
incident of May zoth, m which your side inflicted eighty-six 
casualties among our barehanded, captured personnel in 
your prisoner-of-war camp at Pusan, once again exposed be- 
fore the whole world that your so-called voluntary repatria- 
tion and screening are a great hoax and your so-called 
respect for "fundamental human rights" and "personal dig- 
nity" and "humane principles" is a big lie 

After your design to retain our captured personnel by 
force collapsed in bankruptcy, you have taken a series of 
measures of terror against them to retrieve your bankrupt 

It is obvious that you have overestimated the ability of 
the Chiang Kai-shek gangsters and Syngman Rhee's agents 
in coercing our captured personnel You have underestim- 
ated the struggle and the unbending will of resistance of 
our captured personnel 

In order to manufacture the so-called results of screening, 
your side directly prompted the Chiang Kai-shek and Syng- 
man Rhee agents to coerce our captured personnel into 
tattooing their own bodies, writing blood petitions, and 
fingerprinting Your special agents mauled and beat our 
captured personnel unconscious and then dipped their 



hands in tiieir own blood to put their fingerprints on your 
lists of so-called "Prisoners of War Resisting Repatriation " 
Is that youi consideration of the dignity of the human per- 
son? Your side treats our captured personnel inhumanly, 
and continuously subjects them to massacre in an attempt 
to force them to accept your forcible retention and serve as 
your cannon fodder But the firm will of our captured per- 
sonnel to return home to lead a peaceful hf e is unshakable 
Your principle of so-called voluntary repatriation and the 
screening activities stemming from that principle not only 
repudiated the charter of the United Nations and consti- 
tuted a direct violation of the Geneva Convention but even 
does not represent the stand of all the nations which you 
claim it represents They are only the absurd ideas against 
law and humanity held by a small number of bellicose ele- 
ments of your side designed to wreck the Korean armistice 
In the face of the heroic and righteous resistance of our 
captured personnel, and before undeniable facts, your so- 
called voluntary repatriation and screening have collapsed 
in utter bankruptcy M the last struggles for their salvage 
will be in vain 

Thus the Communists sought to wear away the stone by 
constant drippings On the three issues I have used as exam- 
ples, the stone held fast But the Communists know that 
though their wearisome, grinding process of repetition may 
fail them in respect to the direct issue at hand, the weariness 
of the Western world remains and may be exploited on later 
issues I must note that though the United Nations Command 
successfully resisted Communist repetitions of their demand 



that the 38th Parallel be made the truce line, we fell soon 
thereafter into the error of agreeing to fixing a truce line (the 
battle line) across Korea before other issues were settled 
Though the Western world successfully resisted Communist 
tedious repetitions about prisoners of war, we gave up the 
principles of no airfield construction during the truce and 
aenal observation of the truce terms The Communists could 
justly count their "wearying 7 ' tactics something better than a 
complete failure 



Preceding sections of this account of Communist techniques 
in the Korean Armistice Conference have followed a set pat- 
tern In each section I have discussed a recurrent Communist 
tactic and illustrated that particular tactic from the record of 
events This procedure will now be abandoned The reason 
for this change is that the basic attitude of the Communists 
on the prisoner-of-war issue is not susceptible to exposure as a 
lying, deceitful, or fraudulent technique Throughout the long 
arguments over the exchange of prisoners of war, the Com- 
munists engaged in every nefarious practice known to them 
They lied, they blustered, they became vindictive, they 
welshed, they twisted, distorted, and denied truth, they de- 
layed, they threatened Even though all these despicable de- 
vices were resorted to by the Communists, thus clouding the 
true issue before the conference, in their basic argument on 
the pnsoner-of-war question they had some sound reasons on 
their side Basing their arguments on then: interpretation of 
the Geneva Conventions, the Communists contended that the 
United Nations Command had no nght to withhold repatna- 



tion of certain prisoners of war merely because those prisoners 
expressed opposition to being repatriated The United Nations 
Command contended that it had the right and the duty to 
refuse to repatriate those prisoners who could not be returned 
to the side of their origin without the use of force On this I 
believe there is cause for thoughtful reflection Accordingly, I 
will relate the story of the pnsoner-of-war issue chronologically, 
rather than in a pattern of Communist malevolence at the 
conference table 

I must stipulate one general reservation I feel certain the 
Communists did not adopt the attitude they maintained 
toward the pnsoner-of-war question because it was sound and 
correct They were not motivated by sincere interest in the 
welfare of prisoners, nor by conviction that law and reason 
supported their stand Instead, they were motivated by the 
basest of considerations an advantage for Communism Even 
so, we must not abandon our minds to the cliche* that what 
is advantageous to Communism is therefore necessarily unrea- 
sonable and wrong It is possible to be right, even with the 
worst of motivations It is possible to be wrong, even with the 
best Judge for yourself 

During the course of the war, the United Nations Com- 
mand had captured 176,000 prisoners of war In accord with 
the Geneva Conventions we had promptly reported the names 
of these prisoners to Geneva An important fact to remember 
about these captured personnel is that they were captured 
The overwhelming majority of these people did not come 
rushing into our arms voluntarily Most of them were taken 
in General MacArthur's giant net, fashioned by the Inchon 
flanking operation early in the war Almost all had been taken 



prisoner at the point of United Nations Command guns Prior 
to that time, they had been energetically kiUing, wounding, or 
firing at United Nations Command personnel Only a minute 
number were "surrendered personnel" who had come to our 
side because of hope for a better life They were prisoners of 
war in the truest sense of the phrase 

During the same period, the Communists had captured ap- 
proximately 100,000 United Nations Command personnel, 
most of them troops of the Republic of Korea The Com- 
munists had reported only no names to Geneva for reasons 
best known to them They had boasted, however, on then 
propaganda radios of capturing 65,000 United Nations Com- 
mand troops Although the Communists had reported only 
no names to Geneva, they released 177 United Nations Com- 
mand personnel held by them "at the front " By "release at 
the front" is meant they brought groups of prisoners to within 
sight of our front lines and told them they were free to go All 
of these 177 men proceeded directly to our side and were 

The opening gun of the prisoner-of-war debate was fired on 
27 November, 1951, when I asked Nam II to agree to the 
exchange of names of prisoners held by each side The Com- 
munists evaded this proposal by simply ignoring it 

On December 4, 1951, 1 suggested that a subdelegafaon be 
formed to initiate discussion of the exchange of prisoners 
After considering the matter a week, the Communists agreed 
Meetings of the subdelegation began on 11 December 

Admiral R E Libby, senior member of the United Nations 
Command subdelegation, pointed the first week of discussions 
at the objective of exchanging lists of names of prisoners At 



last the Communists agreed to do this We furnished a list of 
132,000 names, about 20,000 Chinese and the remainder 
Korean The Communists furnished a list of only 11,559 
names, including 3,198 United States personnel Obviously 
there were discrepancies between the totals previously an- 
nounced by both sides and the numbers provided by name 
The United Nations Command had reported 176,000 names 
to Geneva, but submitted a list to the Communists of only 
132,000 The Communists had boasted of capturing 65,000 
United Nations Command personnel, but submitted a list to 
us of less than 12,000 These differences needed explanation 

During the rapid advance of the United Nations Command 
forces northward to the Yalu in 1950, many Koreans whose 
identity was questionable were swept into our military custody 
The press and confusion of war made it most difficult to 
determine who was a guerrilla, who was not This situation 
was the more confounded by the fact that North Korean 
troopers, faced with imminent capture, would shuck their uni- 
forms and mingle with the Korean populace When a screen- 
ing was later performed under the auspices of the Interna- 
tional Committee of the Red Cross, 38,000 of those in our 
custody were found to be bona fide citizens of the Republic 
of Korea These were reclassified as civilian internees, but we 
continued to hold them in custody against the necessity of 
having to account for them Removal of this group from our 
reported total of 176,000 brought the figure down to 138,000 
Deaths and escapes occurring in two years reduced the total 
to 132,000 This total was submitted to the Communists 

On the Communist side, the story was a weird one The 
difference between their radio claims of 65,000 prisoners and 



their submission to us of 11,559 names about 53,000 men- 
was explained away by Lee Sang Jo of the Communists with 
the bald untruth that these 53,000 were "released at the 
front" Actually most of the 53,000 had been impressed into 
the North Korean Army Such was the statistical situation 
when the great debate on prisoners of war began 

Originally it was the intent of the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation to propose an all-for-all exchange of pris- 
oners This seemed the most promising approach to ensure 
beyond doubt the recovery of all the United Nations Com- 
mand personnel held by the Communists We felt morally 
obligated to recover all United Nations Command personnel 
and to recover them as soon as possible We felt that any 
qualification of an all-for-all exchange principle might be an 
opening wedge for the Communists to use in holding back 
our people In Washington, however, other concepts were 
being entertained 

The United Nations Command delegation received instruc- 
tions from Washington to propose that prisoners be ex- 
changed on the basis of "voluntary repatriation/' that is, each 
prisoner was to express his desire whether to return to the side 
of his origin or to remain with the side that held him captive 
Later the principle was renamed "no forced repatriation " To 
the delegation, this concept posed severe dangers 

First, the "voluntary repatriation" principle would jeopard- 
ize the recovery of all United Nations Command personnel 
Second, it would extend the negotiations, thus extending the 
period of captivity for the prisoners, and extending the war 
with its attendant casualties Third, the principle of voluntary 
repatriation was an arbitrary one, commanding no solid sup- 



port in the Geneva Conventions except by unilateral inter- 
pretation of that covenant (Articles 7 and 118 of Geneva 
Conventions * ) Fourth, to require prisoners to make a highly 
important and permanent choice under the conditions of im- 
prisonment was to ask of them a decision they were probably 
not best prepared to make Fifth, voluntary repatriation would 
establish a dangerous precedent which might well react to OUT 
disadvantage in future conflicts with Communist powers 
should they ever hold a preponderance of prisoners We would 
have no recourse if they refused neutral visits to their prisoner 
camps and said that none of our men wished to be repatriated 
Sixth, it was a political issue which strictly had no place in a 
military armistice agreement A military armistice agreement 
should be no more than an agreement between opposing com- 
manders to stop fighting It should never be concerned with 
political questions 

The other side of this case was based on strong human- 
itarian considerations It was assumed that the Communists 
would at least maltreat if not execute the prisoners they re- 
covered This was particularly feared in respect to those 
pnsoners who had announced their desire to remain with our 
side Some had even tattooed legends on their bodies declaim- 
ing their repudiation of Communism Some of us believed the 
United Nations Command had a moral obligation to such 
pnsoners not to hand them over to possible Communist 
kangaroo trials and probable death 

* "Article 7 Prisoners of war may in no circumstances renounce in part or 
in entirety the nghts secured to them by the present Con- 

"Article 118 Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without 
delay after the cessation of active hostilities " 



It must be admitted, however, that besides humanitarian 
considerations, the major objective of the Washington deci- 
sion to insist on voluntary repatriation was to inflict upon the 
Communists a propaganda defeat which might deter them 
from further aggression It was thought that if any substantial 
portion of the ex-Commumst soldiers refused to return to 
Communism, a huge setback to Communist subversive activ- 
ities would ensue I regret to say this does not seem to have 
been a valid point There have been no wholesale defections 
from Asiatic Communism flowing from our demonstration 
that asylum would be granted Nor has our demonstration 
deterred the Communists from their aggression in Indochina 
and their present warlike intentions pointing to Formosa 
Whatever temporary loss of prestige in Asia Communism 
suffered from the results of "voluntary repatriation" has long 
since been overtaken by Communism's subsequent victory in 
that area 

'Voluntary repatriation" placed the welfare of ex-Com- 
mumst soldiers above that of our own United Nations Com- 
mand personnel in Communist prison camps, and above that 
of our United Nations Command personnel still on the battle 
luie in Korea I wanted our own men back as soon as we could 
get them Since we were not allowed to achieve a victory, I 
wanted the war halted Voluntary repatriation cost us over a 
year of war, and cost our United Nations Command prisoners 
in Communist camps a year of captivity The United Nations 
Command suffered at least 50,000 casualties in the continuing 
Korean War while we argued to protect a lesser number of ex- 
Commumsts who did not wish to return to Communism 

Washington directed that we pursue the voluntary repatna- 


tion principle The Communists objected to it vigorously 
They pointed out that the Geneva Convention required the 
return of all prisoners to the side of their origin a correct 
literal interpretation of that covenant We argued that the 
spirit of the Geneva Conventions was to protect the best inter- 
ests of prisoners, and that our proposal did that As described 
previously, after many weeks of wrangling, the Communists 
agreed to provide us with an amnesty proclamation to be read 
to all prisoners held by us prior to screening them to deter- 
mine their desires Thus, the Communists lent themselves to 
the initial screening of prisoners, perhaps hoping that the 
results would not be too unpleasant from their point of 

The screening of prisoners introduced severe difficulties 
Many groups of Communist prisoners, still fanatic Com- 
munists, refused to be screened Certain compounds of these 
fanatics held in our big prisoner-of-war camp on the island of 
Koje-do would not submit to questioning by our screening 
teams, and would not budge out of their compounds These 
compounds were therefore considered 100 per cent Com- 
munist Other compounds were dominated by thoroughly in- 
doctrinated and equally fanatic anti-Communists These 
leaders so intimidated weaker willed prisoners that many were 
fearful of expressing their desire for repatriation When the 
totals of the screening process were taken and reported to the 
delegation we were all amazed Only about 70,000 of the total 
132,000 prisoners agreed to return to Communism 

On hearing these results the Communist delegation went 
through the overhead of the tent at Panmunjom They 
charged the United Nations Command with every manner 



D cnme relative to the prisoners They contended that the 
iCreenrng was done under conditions forcing the prisoners to 
-eject Communism Admiral Libby remarked to me, "We 
have passed the point of no return " Listen for a moment to 
the voice of our opponents as they raged over our alleged 

SENERAL NAM XL Everybody knows that for a long period of 
tune you have been using Chiang Kai-shek's gangsters and 
Syngman Rhee's agents to take aU kinds of barbarous meas- 
ures to coerce our captured personnel into refusing repatria- 
tion You have not hesitated to use methods of bloodshed 
and murder to gain your infamous aim You have not yet 
made an account for the incidents of February i8th and 
March i3th, when your side twice massacred our captured 

In order to assist you to gain the arm of retaining our 
captured personnel, the Chiang Kai-shek ring repeatedly 
directed their agents to force our captured personnel to start 
the so-called movement of refusing repatriation by writing 
blood petitions, making appeals, and even by announcing 
collective suicide For all these facts, our side is in possession 
of incontestable evidence Your activities in employing 
barbarous methods in an attempt to retain our captured per- 
sonnel by force have already reached such an extent as 
makes it impossible for you to hide or deny them 

To strengthen your rule of bloodshed and violence over 
our captured personnel, your side recently moved large 
amounts of reinforcing forces to the locality of your pris- 
oner-of-war camp, for further suppression of the just 



resistance of our captured personnel The fact now placed 
before the people of the whole world is that in spite of your 
such barbarous measures, you violated the will of the cap- 
tured personnel of our side Thousands of them would 
rather die than yield to your forcible retention Your side 
dares not face this fact In order to cover up this fact, your 
side has invented the myth that our captured personnel 
were not willing to be repatriated 

While the Communists talked, they were laying plans 
Through then* effective "grapevine" communications system 
with the United Nations Command prisoner compounds at 
Koje-do, they triggered massive nots of the prisoners Our 
pnson-camp commandant, a United States Army general, was 
taken prisoner in a Communist compound and held hostage 
His replacement, another United States Army general, signed 
a paper prepared by the Communist prisoners in order to 
effect the release of the captured camp commandant This 
paper said in effect that there would be no more forced screen- 
ing, no more terrorization of the prisoners This was the am- 
munition needed by the Communist delegation Listen to 
them use it 

GENERAL NAM IL The former commandant of your pnsoner- 
of-war camp openly admitted that your side used all sorts of 
violence to screen our captured personnel by force in an 
attempt to retain them as your cannon fodder The newly 
appointed commandant of your pnsoner-of-war camp openly 
implied to our captured personnel that no further criminal 
activities in violation of the Geneva Conventions would be 
perpetrated Is it not a fact that your side, in order to carry 



out forcible screening, committed all kinds of atrocities, 
even including mass massacre against our captured person- 
nel in disregard of the Geneva Conventions and repudiating 
the minimum standard of human behavior? Is it not a fact 
that the commandant of your prisoner-of-war camp prom- 
ised our captured personnel that "There will be no more 
forcible screening" 7 You cannot deny these facts 

Seeing that the pnsoner-of-war issue was beyond negotia- 
tion, I submitted to the Communists on 28 April what we 
called our final package proposal It was a complete armistice 
agreement containing sixty-two paragraphs, sixty-one of which 
had been originated by the United Nations Command dele- 
gation In it, we conceded the question of airfield rehabilita- 
tion, omitted the Soviet Union and Norway as members of 
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission, and held firm 
to our principle of voluntary repatriation I told the Com- 
munists that that was the end of negotiating, thenceforward 
the question was simply one of take it or leave it For our part, 
there were to be no more concessions, no substantive changes 
in the draft armistice agreement That was it 

In bidding farewell to the Communists on 22 May, 1952, I 
had this to say 

ADMIRAL JOY At the first Plenary Session of our two delega- 
tions, on the loth of July of last year, I said, "The success 
or failure of the negotiations begun here today depends 
directly upon the good faith of the delegations present " 
These words constituted both a promise and a warning a 
promise of good faith by our side and a warning that we 



would expect good faith from your side Today, at the 65th 
Plenary Session, my opening remarks on the subject of good 
faith are more than ever pertinent 

It has hecome increasingly clear through these long- 
drawn-out conferences that any hope that your side would 
bring good faith to these meetings was forlorn indeed From 
the very start, you have caviled over procedural details, you 
have manufactured spurious issues and placed them in con- 
troversy for bargaining purposes, you have denied the exist- 
ence of agreements made between us when you found the 
fulfillment thereof not to your hking, you have made false 
charges based on crimes invented for your purposes, and 
you have indulged in abuse and invective when all other 
tactics proved ineffective Through a constant succession of 
delays, fraudulent arguments, and artificial attitudes you 
have obstructed the attainment of an armistice which easily 
lay within our grasp had there been equal honesty on both 
sides of this conference table Nowhere in the record is there 
a single action of your side which indicates a real and sincere 
desire to attain the objective for which these conferences 
were designed Instead, you have increasingly presented 
evidence before the world that you did not enter these nego- 
tiations with sincerity and high purpose, but rather that you 
entered into them to gain time to repair your shattered 
forces and to try to accomplish at the conference table what 
your armies could not accomplish in the field It is an 
enormous misfortune that you are constitutionally incapable 
of understanding the fair and dignified attitude of the 
United Nations Command Apparently you cannot com- 
prehend that strong and proud and free nations can make 



costly sacrifices for principles because they are strong, can 
be dignified in the face of abuse and deceit because they are 
proud, and can speak honestly because they are free and do 
not fear the truth Instead, you impute to the United Na- 
tions Command the same suspicion, greed, and deviousness 
which are your stock in trade You search every word for a 
hidden meaning and every agreement for a hidden trap It 
would be charitable for me to say that you do these things 
by instinct, but you are people of intelligence and it is 
probably truer to say that you do these things with purpose 
and design 

From the very first, the United Nations Command has 
had but one objective in Korea To bring an end to the 
Korean war so that a permanent and enduring peace might 
be established as quickly as possible This has been the pre- 
cise objective of the United Nations Command delegation 
in these negotiations This is what we meant by good faith 
on our part You have but to examine the record to see the 
many evidences of our restraint, our constructive sugges- 
tions, our willingness to conciliate and compromise, and our 
patience There is very little evidence of similar contribu- 
tions by your side As an answer to the question, 'Which 
side has brought good faith to these meetings?" Nothing 
could be more impressive than a comparison of the actions 
of the two delegations during our ten months of these con- 
ferences They are as different as day and night No amount 
of propaganda, however oft repeated, can hide your ignoble 
record That these meetings have continued this long and 
that we have, after a fashion, resolved our differences to the 
point where only one major issue remains is testimony to 



the patience and dedication of the United Nations Com- 

Now our negotiations have come to the point where the 
pnsoner-of-war issue stands as a formidable barrier to the 
accomplishment of an armistice Casbng aside any pretense 
of humanity, you have made the demand that the United 
Nations Command must return to your side all the pris- 
oners of war in its custody, driving them at the point of a 
bayonet if necessary You even have the colossal imperti- 
nence to document your position by referring to the Geneva 
Convention What could be more ironic than your attempt 
to found your inhuman proposition upon an international 
agreement whose purpose is to defend and protect the un- 
fortunate victims of war? These are strange words for you 
to employ You who have denied the International Red 
Cross access to your pnsoner-of-war camps, who have re- 
fused to furnish lists of prisoners to the Prisoner of War 
Bureau, and who cannot even account for over fifty thou- 
sand (50,000) United Nations Command soldiers whom 
you officially boasted as having in your custody before the 
Korean war was nine months old After months of concilia- 
tion, of meeting you more than halfway on issue after issue, 
the United Nations Command has told you with all firm- 
ness and finality that it will not recede from its position 
with respect to the prisoners of war On the 28th of April 
we offered you an equitable and specific solution to the 
issues remaining before us We told you then, and we repeat 
now, that we firmly adhere to the principles of humanity and 
the preservation of the rights of the individual These are 
values which we will not barter, for they are one and the 



same with the principles which motivated the United 
Nations Command to oppose you on the battlefield No 
amount of argument and invective will move us If you 
harbor the slightest desire to restore peace and to end the 
misery and suffering of millions of innocent people, you 
must bring to the solution of this issue the good faith which, 
as I said at our first meeting, would directly determine the 
success or failure of our negotiations The decision is in your 

After ten months and twelve days I feel that there is noth- 
ing more for me to do There is nothing left to negotiate I 
now turn over the unenviable job of further dealings with 
you to Major General William K Harrison, who succeeds 
me as Senior Delegate of the United Nations Command 
delegation May God be with him 

And that was it Though the Korean Armistice Conferences 
continued for more than another year in fits and starts, the 
final agreement was substantially that which I had submitted 
on 28 April, 1952 Arrangements were made for a rescreening 
of prisoners under the supervision of India This was accom- 
plished without major alteration of the results we had long 
before reported The armistice document signed at Panmun- 
jom on July 27, 1953, was practically identical to that which I 
tabled in Apnl, 1952, in all but details relative to the mechanics 
of exchanging prisoners Thus, fifteen months were required to 
impose our principle of voluntary repatriation on the Com- 
munists It was a long year for Americans on the battle line in 
Korea It must have been a painful year for Americans in 
Communist dungeons 



I departed the Korean Armistice Conference for assignment 
as Superintendent of the United States Naval Academy on 
May 22, 1952 Major General William K Hamson of the 
United States Army replaced me as Senior Delegate Though 
General Hamson is an unusually able officer whose skill as 
a negotiator is beyond question, there really was nothing left 
to negobate There was only the long waiting until time alone 
convinced the Communists our position on the prisoner issue 
was irrevocable 

Why did the Communists finally bow to the principle of 
voluntary repatriation after so much resistance? Since they had 
capitalized on the armistice conference by preparing and oc- 
cupying almost impregnable defensible positions, the desul- 
tory war in Korea was not too much for them to bear Nor is 
it useful to look to areas of reason and logic for the answer 
No, I think the cause of Communist acquiescence in the prin- 
ciple of voluntary repatriation was neither the continuing 
hostilities in Korea nor the mercurial status of world opinion 
Their plans for the conquest of Indochina may have influ- 
enced their ultimate decision But what influenced them most, 
I feel certain, were ominous sounds of impending expanded 
warfare, the prospect of United Nations Command forces 
being released from their confinement to Korea and allowed 
to range over Red China During the spring of 1953, the 
United States began running out of patience Serious con- 
sideration was being given to extending United Nations Com- 
mand military operations into Red China The threat of atom 
bombs was posed defeat for Red China became a distinct pos- 
sibility Thus at the last, the one negotiating factor that Com- 
munists respect above all else was beginning to appear naked, 



massive power and the willingness to use that power when 
necessary Red China did not dare challenge the unrestrained 
military strength of the United States That way lay ruin In 
understandable prudence, they took the only step open to 
them to remove the growing threat of a holocaust in Red 
China It was as simple as that It had always been as simple 
as that 




The Korean Armistice Conference terminated in July, 1953, 
after two years of agonized travail The formal result of this 
conference was an armistice agreement, duly signed, sealed, 
and delivered to the governments concerned That agreement 
has been considered by some as the alternative to world war 
others saw it as a sorry substitute for American victory in 

Whatever may be the ultimate judgment of history regard- 
ing the significance of the Korean Armistice, those who must 
deal with the problems of today can learn from it certain 
sharply pertinent lessons Taken to heart, this painfully 
acquired knowledge may save us all from the creeping disaster 
of unskilled effort in later negotiations between our world of 
freedom and that of tyranny 

The greatest single influence on the Korean armistice nego- 
tiations was the failure of the United States to take punitive 
action against Red China During the winter of 1950, Chinese 



forces crossed the Yalu River from Manchuria into Korea and 
executed a crushing attack on the Eighth Army All evidence 
showed beyond doubt that this assault was directed by the 
Red Chinese Government Despite a severe military setback, 
and grave casualties among United States troops attacked by 
the Red Chmese Army, the United States refrained from 
taking retaliatory military action against the territory and 
military facilities of Red China For the United States, this 
was an unprecedented backdown before a show of force Fail- 
ure to take immediate punitive action against Red China was 
at the root of most of the difficulties encountered by United 
Nations Command representatives in the Korean armistice 
negotiations Our seemingly weak and fearful withdrawal in 
the face of an unprovoked attack on our forces in the Far East 
gave the Communists good reason to believe that the United 
States would not stand firm on any aspect of the continental 
Asian problem The question was posed Would our govern- 
ment possess the determination to continue an abortive and 
unpopular war in Korea rather than to accede to Communist 
terms for an armistice 7 Throughout the Korean armistice con- 
ference the Communists acted as if they definitely thought not 
It has been contended that the United States Government 
as executive agent for the United Nations was in no position 
to take punitive action unilaterally against Red China This 
does not seem reasonable when one considers that the United 
States took the initiative in sending ground forces to Korea to 
repel the North Korean attack, supplied over 80 per cent of the 
resources required to prosecute the war, and sacrificed many 
more lives in the war than any nation except South Korea 
Had not the United States borne the brunt of tie war, and 



had it not been for the prompt action of the United States in 
the first place, all of Korea today would be under Communist 
control Moreover, as the recognized leader of the free world 
in the struggle against international Communism, the United 
States had every good reason from a moral standpoint to take 
the initiative in punishing the Chinese aggressor, particularly 
when the United Nations General Assembly had denounced 
Red China as an aggressor nation in the Korean War 

The recall of General Douglas MacArthur when that re- 
nowned officer was vigorously advocating a strong and aggres- 
sive policy m the Orient, particularly toward Red China, gave 
further reason for the Communists to believe we had no steel 
in our attitude, that we were, in their phrase, a "paper tiger " 

On 24 June, 1951, Soviet Minister Jacob Malik made a radio 
announcement suggesting that a truce be arranged by the op- 
posing military commanders in Korea, based on both sides 
withdrawing equal distances from the %8th Parallel Washing- 
ton immediately directed General Matthew B Ridgway to 
broadcast an announcement to the Communist field com- 
manders that the United Nations Command was willing to 
discuss an armistice This was not only done in great haste, it 
was done without denouncing the 38th Parallel as a line of 
demarcation The Communists, therefore, concluded that the 
United Nations Command needed an armistice, and that the 
38th Parallel would be a truce line acceptable to the United 
States These misunderstandings cost us many months of fruit- 
less negotiations 

The armistice negotiations were profoundly affected by the 
restraints imposed on the United Nabons Command forces m 
Korea United Nations Command forces were not allowed to 



attack their enemies in the most effective manner nor with the 
most effective weapons In consequence, the United Nations 
Command could never exert the decisive military pressure of 
which it was capable United Nations Command negotiators 
at Kaesong and Panmunjom were not in a position to deal 
from maximum strength, and 'well did the Communists 
know it 

The armistice effort in Korea taught this Never weaken 
your pressure when the enemy sues for armistice Increase it 
In June, 1951, the Communist forces were falling back 
steadily, suffering grievously Then Jacob Malik issued his 
truce feeler As soon as armistice discussions began, United 
Nations Command ground forces slackened their offensive 
operations Instead, offensive pressure by all arms should have 
been increased to the maximum during the armistice talks 
Force is a decisive factor, the only logic the Communists 
truly understand It has been argued that to endure the casu- 
alties which result from offensive operations while an armis- 
tice was potentially around the corner would have been an un- 
acceptable policy Yet, I feel certain the casualties the United 
Nations Command endured during the two long years of ne- 
gotiations far exceed any that might have been expected from 
an offensive in the summer of 1951 The lesson is Do not 
stop fighting until hostilities have ended, not if you want an 
armistice with the Communists on acceptable terms within 
a reasonable period of time 

The foregoing leads to the lesson that armistice conferences 
should be brief A time period should be set for reaching an 
agreement If an acceptable agreement is not reached within 
a reasonable fame, discussions should be terminated until the 



enemy again indicates a desire for (that is, a need for) an 
armistice To allow armistice talks to become protracted is to 
indicate weakness on your part This encourages your Com- 
munist opponents 

The site at which armistice talks are held should be outside 
the area of conflict In the case of the Korean armistice con- 
ference, a site outside Korea would have served far better 
than did a neutralized area lying on the battle line in Korea 
and interfering with combat operations The plague of "inci- 
dents" which delayed and disrupted our negotiations would 
have been at least less intense, if not non-existent, m areas 
where 'live" warfare was not in progress 

Communists should not be allowed unilaterally to select 
the site for a conference If one cannot successfully negotiate 
a site for talks, why expect to negotiate substantive issues suc- 
cessfully? Finally, and above all, the site of negotiations should 
not be, as Kaesong was, within the enemy's lines and subject 
to his military control This invites the Communists to arro- 
gance, and they need little invitation on that score 

Reaction to a Communist suggestion for a conference or to 
discuss an armistice should be unhurried My liaison officers 
were in Kaesong talking with Communist representatives only 
two weeks after Jacob Malik mentioned the possibility of an 
armistice in Korea This is much too short a period in which 
to study the ramifications of the question thoroughly and 
well It is especially important that a military command not 
be rushed into armistice discussions when it has the upper 
hand in combat, as we did in the spring of 1951 

The team selected to conduct negotiations with Commu- 
nists should be of the highest available quality Rank, renown, 



and position are a secondary consideration Clear thinking, 
rapid thinking, are the criteria to be sought Every man should 
be the best in his line, whether stenographer, signalman, inter- 
preter, or delegate You can be assured that the Communists 
will put in their first team You can be assured your second 
team will not be good enough 

The system of procedure used by the United Nations Com- 
mand delegation at Panmunjom is worthy of consideration in 
future conferences As a general matter, we attempted to se- 
cure agreements on broad principles at the plenary sessions 
of full delegations This being done, we arranged for meetings 
of subcommittees of delegates to expand upon the general 
principle that had been established in plenary sessions We 
then had groups of staff officers discuss the finer details of the 
agreements reached by the delegates Our liaison officers were 
charged to attend to "incidents" and to make arrangements 
governing the conditions of meetings In the case both of the 
United Nations Command delegation and of the Communist 
delegation, the liaison officers were also notably active as staff 

The United Nations Command delegation followed a prac- 
tice of "staffing" all formal statements uttered in the armistice 
conference by delegates Each day staff officers prepared a 
number of proposed statements for use by the delegates These 
were considered and discussed by the delegates and staff offi- 
cers in meetings at our camp at Munsan, before proceeding 
to Panmunjom for the day's events The statement finally 
worked out was almost never the work of any one individual 
It was the product of careful editing by all delegates and final 
approval by the Senior Delegate Thus the benefit of all the 



fine intellects available to the delegabon was used to the 

Subsequent to each day's meeting with the Communists, the 
United Nations Command delegates and staff officers gathered 
in my tent at Munsan, to discuss the steps to be taken the 
following day When a basic decision was reached, staff officers 
prepared implementing statements for use on the morrow 

Press coverage of negotiations should be as unfettered as 
physical facilities permit If your objecbves are honest and 
sincere, if your methods are above reproach, if your skill in 
negotiating is adequate, you need not fear the press The 
American people deserve to know what is going on, since 
they must foot the bill in hves and in dollars 

Candor compels me to report a rather unsavory aspect of 
press coverage of the Korean armistice On repeated occasions, 
articles appeared in United States publications, attributed to 
"authoritative sources in Washington/' which predicted con- 
cessions by the United Nations Command delegation to the 
Communists Sometimes the accuracy and timing of these 
articles left little doubt that they were in fact 'leaked" by 
official sources in Washington One example of this under- 
mining procedure was an article, date-lined Washington, 
which stated, "UNC Ready to Yield on Airfield Ban " Instruc- 
tions to make this concession had been received by the United 
Nabons Command delegabon, classified "Top Secret'' The 
delegabon intended to use the concession on airfields as a 
lever to pry out Communist agreement on the prisoner issue 
Once such a "leak" occurred, however, the Communists were 
not likely to pay a price for something they believed we were 
prepared to surrender 



Another 'leak" attributed to official sources suggested that 
""professional" negotiators be sent to Panmunjom to replace 
the military personnel of the United Nations Command dele- 
gation Although the record of our and other "professional" 
negotiators at such places as Yalta and the Geneva Conference 
on Indochina leaves some room for improvement, that con- 
sideration is not my reasons for mentioning this particular leak 
Rather, the important point is the weakening of our position 
at Panmunjom that resulted On reading that the United Na- 
tions Command delegation might not have the full confidence 
and backing of the United States Government, the Com- 
munists could reasonably decide to delay a while longer They 
could hope that a new United Nations Command delegation 
would be less firm about the disputed issues 

I do not criticize the press for printing these stones To do 
so is their business I suspect, however, that the person who 
planted them did not have the best interests of the United 
States in mmd when he did so 

Never concede anything to the Communists for nothing, 
merely to make progress Make the Communists pay for your 
acceptance of their point of view Require an equivalent con- 
cession to match yours This will not only double the number 
of agreements you achieve in a given period of time, but will 
impress upon Communists the conviction that you are neither 
softheaded, gullible, nor weak To a Communist, your ready 
acceptance of his proposed solution merely because it is logical 
and correct is a sign of at least undue haste, indicating a pre- 
carious basis on your part Never imagine that any point is un- 
important To concede a minor point to Communists without 
a like concession from them is but to convince them that in 


more substantive issues you will ultimately submit to then- 
viewpoint Exact equating concessions from the Communists 
in respect to every matter, large or small 

Avoid a "hurry-up" attitude, for such an attitude tends to 
invoke a Communist conclusion that you are pressed for time 
The enemy will not credit you with humanitarian motives 
Quite to the contrary, show plainly that you are willing to 
terminate or suspend negotiations at any time the Commu- 
nists may desire If no progress is perceivable in a reasonable 
period, then terminate the negotiations 

The agenda of a conference with Communists should re- 
ceive careful study In retrospect, it is clear that we made a 
mistake in agreeing to discuss the line on which hostilities 
were to cease prior to reaching agreement on all other matters 
Early agreement upon a specified line on which hostilities will 
cease removes the justification for continued military pressure 
on the Communists That item of the agenda dealing with 
supervision of the armistice should be placed first The first 
objective of an armistice conference is to set up safeguards 
which will ensure the stability of the trace Neither belliger- 
ent should be permitted to capitalize on the armistice by in- 
creasing his military capabilities A requisite for achieving this 
objecbve is adequate supervision of the armistice terms and 
observation of the forces and activities of the belligerents 
during the period of truce Without such supervision and 
observation, any and all terms of agreement in an armistice 
document are worth only the valuation pkced on the good 
intent of each side by the other When dealing with Com- 
munists, one would be reckless indeed to assume good faith 
on their part 



When a firm position has been taken, from which you do 
not intend to withdraw, do not thereafter engage in long- 
winded and repeated statements supporting your position 
Having put forth your final proposal, simply be quiet, or at 
best rebut the Communist attacks by terse, positive, dignified 
statements denouncing or ridiculing then* verbal acrobatics 
Defense of your final proposal in response to Communist 
verbal attacks only offers gnst for the Communist mill The 
more you talk, the more you offer targets for the Communists' 
insidious propaganda On the other hand, Communist nego- 
tiators are nonplused by, and fearful of, an unresponsive oppo- 
nent because such tactics are contrary to their teachings How 
not to conduct negotiations was illustrated by our action in 
connecbon with our final "package" proposal The United 
Nations Command Delegation planned to table this proposal 
and thereafter remain relatively silent, thus indicating the 
bleak finality of our offer After we had presented our "pack- 
age" we were allowed to remain quiet for several days During 
this period the desperation of the Communist negotiators be- 
came apparent They could find nothing to shout about Then 
Washington issued an ill advised directive requiring that we 
support our proposal with extended arguments at each meet- 
ing With misgivings, the delegation obeyed The relief and 
satisfaction of the Communists at this change of tactics were 
immediately apparent They leaped upon our daily statements 
with enthusiasm No progress was made until, after some five 
months of insistence by the delegation, Washington permitted 
the delegation to suspend the meetings, a step we had recom- 
mended shortly after our final proposal had been tabled Then 
the Communists became convinced they were confronted with 
a truly firm United Nations Command position 



We learned in Korea that crystallization of political objec- 
tives should precede initiation of armistice talks All personnel 
in the United Nations Command delegation were aware of 
the chameleon-like character of American political objectives 
in Korea United States forces entered Korea, in accord with 
political objectives, to prevent an impending collapse of the 
South Korean Government and to help repel aggression against 
South Korea When the North Korean aggressor was thrown 
back north of the 38th Parallel from whence he came, these 
two political objectives had been secured Then United States 
policy shifted to the intent to unify Korea Accordingly, United 
Nations Command forces swept north of the 38th Parallel, 
headed for the Yalu When the Red Chinese plunged into 
the fray, the controlling political objective of the United 
States became a desire to avoid all-out war with China When 
the Soviets suggested an armistice, the political objectives in 
Korea became an honorable cease fire During the armistice 
negotiations, we took on a political objective of gaming a 
propaganda victory over Communism in respect to prisoners 
of war Thus the political objectives of the United States in 
Korea weather-vaned with the winds of combat, accommo- 
dating themselves to current military events rather than con- 
stituting the goal to be reached through military operations 
Consequently, the delegation, and indeed General Ridgway, 
never knew when a new directive would emanate from Wash- 
ington to alter our basic objective of obtaining an honorable 
and stable armistice agreement In such circumstances it 
is most difficult to develop sound plans, to present one's case 
convincingly, to give an appearance of unmistakable firmness 
and finality It seemed to us that the United States Govern- 
ment did not know exactly what its political objectives in 


Korea were or should be As a result, the United Nations 
Command delegation was constantly looking over its shoulder, 
fearing a new directive from afar which would require action 
inconsistent with that currently "being taken 

On issue after issue the United Nations Command delega- 
tion sought advice from Washington whether the then current 
position of the delegation was or was not final, whether we 
could count on the unwavering support of the United States 
Government to and through the point of termination of nego- 
tiations We needed such information in order to avoid prej- 
udicing future discussions of other issues with the Com- 
munists For example, if the United Nabons Command 
delegation announced a particular position on an issue as final, 
then later, on orders from Washington, recanted and accepted 
the Communists' version of the issue, one could expect that 
our next announcement of "finality" would make little im- 
pression on the Communists Precisely this happened in the 
successive cases of airfield rehabilitation and prisoners of war 
For many weeks the United Nations Command delegation 
firmly announced to the Communists that we would never 
agree to an increase of their military capabilities during the 
period of truce This, of course, included the rehabilitation 
and construction of airfields Later, under instructions from 
Washington, we did propose to delete from the armistice 
agreement any prohibition of development of airfields Subse- 
quently, the delegation, General Ridgway, and President Tru- 
man announced that our position regarding exchange of pris- 
oners of war was final and irrevocable Apparently the Com- 
munists thought otherwise for more than a year Thus we 
learned a lesson which it is to be hoped will be heeded by 



those who set our political objectives Before entering a con- 
ference with the Communists (or a war), political objectives 
should be determined and disclosed to those who must pursue 
them Thereafter they should be altered only when a change is 
vital to the national interests There is stall much to be said for 
remaining on the same horse in midstream 

Let no one think that in negotiating with the Communists 
we should reject the threat of force On the contrary it is only 
through the imminent threat of application of our military 
power that the Communists can be compelled to negotiate 
seriously for the alleviation of the basic issues between their 
world and ours We must be prepared to accept the risk of war 
if we hope to avoid war When the Communists beheve that 
failure to resolve issues with the Western world will engage a 
serious and immediate nsk to their present empire, they will 
then, and only then, seek to resolve those issues They 
will not be bluffed, however Successful negotiations with the 
Communists will ensue when the United States poses employ- 
ment of its tremendous military power as the actual alterna- 
tive We must be prepared to carry through that threat or it 
cannot succeed in its peaceful purpose We must accept what- 
ever nsk of world war may attend such a procedure, knowing 
that should the Communist world choose war, war was com- 
ing in any event 

At last it must be concluded that there should not have 
been a Korean armistice such as was accepted The principal 
reasons for seeking an armistice in Korea when and how we 
did will not bear critical examination Consider the reasons 
most often heard 

Military victory could not be achieved by the United Na- 



bans Command Therefore, an armistice was the only prac- 
tical course of action Military victory was not impossible, nor 
even unusually difficult of achievement Elimination of the 
artificial restraints imposed on United States forces, coupled 
with an effective blockade on Red China, probably would 
have resulted in military victory in less time than was expended 
in truce talks This is the considered judgment of senior 
military commanders of the United Nabons Command 

There was a danger the Korean War would expand to war 
with Red China, and thence into world war War with Red 
China should have been the instant response of the United 
Nations to the Red Chinese attack of November, 1951 The 
USSR never showed the slightest intention of expanding 
the Korean War In fact, Soviet overtures for a Korean truce 
plainly indicated the direction of Soviet purposes I know of 
not a single senior military commander of United States forces 
in the Far East Army, Navy, or Air Force who believed the 
USSR would enter war with the United States because of 
any action we might have taken relative to Red China Had the 
Soviets entered a Sino-Amencan war on the side of Red China, 
the resulting conflict in Asia would have wrecked Soviet amis 
in that area, and estabhshed a position of unassailable strength 
for the free world The Soviets must have known this 

If the Korean War continued, total war might accidentally 
evolve therefrom In this era of nuclear weapons, total war 
wdl not "evolve" from any set of circumstances To initiate 
total war, a positive decision to deliver nuclear weapons on 
targets vital to the opponent is required This decision cannot 
be "accidental" or "evolutionary" in character In past decades 
the step between limited war and total war was a short one, 



often of insignificant implications Today, the difference be- 
tween limited war and total war is that between life and death 
for all humanity No government will take such a leap without 
long and careful deliberation Accordingly, had United States 
action in Asia coincided with the outbreak of total war, this 
would have been so only because total war had already been 
decided upon by the Soviets 

A truce in Korea would mean less American casualties Be- 
tween July, 1951, and July, 1953 (^ e s P an * ^ e tru ce nego- 
tiations), more American casualties were suffered in Korea 
than are likely to have resulted from decisive, victorious mili- 
tary operations I do not know how many United Nations 
Command prisoners m the hands of the Communists died 
during the two years we talked truce 

A truce in Korea demonstrating that aggression does not pay 
'would deter further aggressions First of all, the truce in 
Korea, making Red China the first nation in history to fight 
the United States to an inconclusive ending, profited Red 
China enormously in prestige and influence throughout Asia 
Second, the truce m Korea assisted, rather than deterred, sub- 
sequent Communist aggression in Indochina by releasing 
Communist war materials and technical assistance from the 
Korean front to be used against Dienbienphu 

A truce in Korea, involving acceptance by Communism of 
permanent defection by many prisoners of war, would inflict 
a tremendous propaganda defeat on Communism First, a 
military armistice conference is no place to seek a propaganda 
victory Second, what has that propaganda "victory*' gamed 
the United States 7 Has there been wholesale defection from 
Asiatic Communism as a result? Has the cause of Communism 



in Asia faltered? Has the prestige of Red China sunk? The 
answer, of course, is that lie Korean armistice was a victory 
for Red China her prestige has continued to rise, the transient 
setback in respect to prisoners of war was quickly erased by 
Communist victory in Indochina. Where are the masses of 
defectors it was supposed would rush to escape Communism, 
once safe asylum was a demonstrated fact? Why did Commu- 
nist troopers in Indochina not rush to join the opposing 

General MacArthur has said that in war there is no substi- 
tute for victory The record of Korea certainly justifies that 
conclusion The broader struggle in which we are now engaged, 
however, is not entirely a battle of guns and ships and aircraft 
We are m a world conflict with Communism, one presently 
being fought with threats of force, with ideologies, diplomatic 
maneuverrngs, and economic pressures It is a fight to the 
finish In it, there will be no substitute for victory either the 
darkness of Communism will engulf the world, or the banner 
of freedom will fly over all lands 

If freedom is to be the victor in the great world conflict, we 
should enter negotiations with Communism when, and only 
when, negotiations serve the cause of freedom best We must 
not negotiate merely "because the enemy wants to do so Once 
we have decided that to negotiate is in the best interests of 
freedom, we should do so with the full backing of the strength 
of the United States There will never be a situation in which 
that strength is insufficient, if we Americans remain as strong 
as we have the resources to be We must negotiate not merely 
from strength, but with strength Granting that, no American 
need fear the outcome